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Abstract:  
What are the barriers to building a trusted police service in China and India? A 
Comparative Study 
Author: George Chak Man Lee 
This thesis attempts to identify what the barriers to building a trusted police service in 
China and India are through answering the questions: How has economic 
modernisation impacted upon policing? To what extent are the two police forces 
trusted by its citizens? Do the police carry out their duties in a fair and unbiased 
fashion? What do police corruption/malpractices look like and why does it persist? And 
what are the influencing factors in decision-making at the moments-of-truth? There is 
very limited research into the Chinese Police generally and even less on factors 
affecting organisational culture, practices, and decision making. There is no 
comparative study between the Chinese and Indian Police. This thesis found that the 
Chinese Police are held in higher esteem than the Indian Police by their respective 
citizenry. Both the Chinese and Indian police use stereotypes and are biased against 
certain section of society in the way they carry out their duties and that corruption and 
malpractices are tolerated and engrained in its culture but is subtler in China than in 
India. However, one surprised finding is that India is more at risk of the rule by man 
than China, even though India is said to be the world’s largest democracy grounded 
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1. Introduction:                                                                                                               
It is my belief that the core of Development Studies is in essence an attempt to 
understand the processes and phenomena of raising the welfare of the masses. One 
key aspect of socio-economic development is the provision of a safe and stable 
environment. The police play a pivotal role in providing this environment. Therefore, the 
aim of this PhD is to establish what the barriers are to building a trusted police service 
in China and India. An important factor influencing public trust is the behaviour of street-
level-officers at the moments-of-truth (i.e. police-public interactions). 
The PhD question came about when I met Professor Nolan at a roundtable discussion 
where a Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) delegation was presenting China’s steps 
towards building a “socialist rule of law”. Being a 17 year London Metropolitan Police 
Veteran I made the point that none of the institution building or legislative efforts 
presented would lead to real change at the coal-face (moments-of-truth) unless the 
Chinese Police (Public Security Bureau – PSB) was reformed because police officers 
are gatekeepers to the criminal justice system. Therefore, the focus of reform must also 
apply to the PSB if positive impact is to be made for the Chinese people. 
India was chosen because it and China share many similarities including “vast 
populations and territories and undeniable political, economic, and cultural importance; 
severe "principal-agent" problems arising from their size; particularistic cultures that can 
buttress nepotism and personalism; the legacies of centralized economies; and now 
economic liberalization and rapid growth. Both economic centralization and overall 
levels of development affect corruption in complex and reciprocal ways. China had the 
more centralized economy for many years but began liberalization first, proceeded with 
it faster, and is now the wealthier country. India's economy was quite centralized in its 
own right, at least until 1992, and less integrated with the world” (Sun and Johnston, 
2009, p.1-2). They differ in that China is said to be the largest dictatorship in the world 
and India the largest democracy. 
The structure of this thesis will consist of a literature review on barriers to trust in the 
form of how police culture informs decision-making/behaviour – especially misconduct 
at the moments-of-truth. The subsequent sections will include a methodology section 
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followed by a discussion where I attempt to identify the barriers to building a trusted 
police service in China/India by answering the following questions: How has economic 
modernisation impacted upon policing? To what extent are the two police forces trusted 
by its citizens? Do the police carry out their duties in a fair and unbiased fashion? What 
do police corruption/malpractices look like and why does it persist? And what are the 
influencing factors in decision-making at the moments-of-truth? This will be followed by 
a conclusion and reflection.           
2. Literature Review:                                                                                                            
In this literature review on police culture and decision-making I will first define what 
organisational culture looks like and how it affects organisational behaviour generally 
and the police in particular. I will then examine what the current police decision-making 
literature has to tell us in regard to what factors influence decision-making/use of 
discretion at the coal-face. That done, we will then seek to understand what police 
culture in India and China looks like before exploring various forms of police 
malpractices/corruption because they have significant impact on public trust.       
2.1 Organisational Culture                                                                                      
There is a rich vein of literature in the management science discipline exploring 
organisational culture and behaviour (e.g. Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Schrodt, 2002; 
schein 1992; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Handy, 1972; Harrison, 1972; Denison, 1990; 
Moorhead & Griffin, 1995; Miner, 2006; Weber, 1947; Taylor, 1911; Simon, 1997; Katz 
& Khan, 1978; Herzberg, 1968; McGregor, 1960; and Hofstede et al. 2010) and how it 
affects performance, productivity, processes, practices, effectiveness, decision- 
making, morale, staff satisfaction, governance, values, attitudes, behaviours, etc. 
Organisational culture can be understood by using the examples of attending a rock 
versus a classical concert or a football match as opposed to a tennis match. At both 
concerts and sporting events a set of differing social expectations (e.g. how one dress 
and behave) are unofficially codified and generally followed by spectators. 
Organisational culture can be understood to work in similar ways1.  
                                                          
1 Study.com, Business 107, Chapter 22/Lesson 1 
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My experience from working in companies across the globe is that every company has 
its own unique personality. For example, at Deutsche Telekom it is the smallest detail 
that will decide on what decision is made whereas at Vodafone it is the broad concepts 
that determine the outcome. This is because Deutsche Telekom originated from a state 
owned fixed line telecom operator full of engineers therefore risk avoidance was a key 
part of decision-making. Vodafone, on the other hand, had started out in life as one of 
the world’s first start-up mobile operators where its entrepreneurial culture was reflected 
in its decision-making.  
In short, each company has a unique personality and that is what is usually referred to 
as its culture. It is “an invisible force that influences the behaviour of the members of 
that group”. Additionally, it is also the “pattern of such collective behaviours and 
assumptions that are taught to new organisational members as a way of perceiving and, 
even, thinking and feeling”. Thus, organisational culture “affects the way people and 
groups interact with each other, with clients, and with stakeholders”. Moreover, 
organisational culture “may affect how much employees identify with an organisation” 
(Schrodt, 2002, p.189–202). Furthermore, it is a system of shared assumptions, values, 
and beliefs, which governs how people behave in organisations. These shared values 
have a strong influence on the people in the organisation and dictate how they dress, 
act, and perform their jobs. Every organisation develops and maintains a unique culture, 
which provides guidelines and boundaries for the behaviour of the members of the 
organisation (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Schrod, 2002; Schein, 1992). 
There are numerous theories on types of organisational culture put forward by 
commentators referenced above but they can be summarised as composing of 
potentially seven characteristics that range in priority from high to low. Every 
organisation has a distinct value for each of these characteristics, which, when 
combined, defines the organization's unique culture. Members of organisations make 
judgments on the value their organization places on these characteristics, and then 
adjust their behaviour to match this perceived set of values. The seven characteristics 
of organisational culture are: innovation (Risk Orientation); Attention to Detail (Precision 
Orientation); Emphasis on Outcome (Achievement Orientation); Emphasis on 
People (Fairness Orientation); Teamwork (Collaboration Orientation); 
8 | Page 
 
Aggressiveness (Competitive Orientation); and Stability (Rule Orientation). However, 
other commentators (e.g. Parker, 2000; Schein, 1992; Deal and Kennedy, 2000 and 
Kotter, 1992) suggest that complex organisations might have many cultures, and that 
such sub-cultures might overlap and contradict each other. The neat typologies of 
cultural forms found in textbooks rarely acknowledge such complexities, or the various 
contradictions that exist. Although a company may have its own unique culture, in larger 
organizations there are sometimes co-existing or conflicting subcultures because each 
subculture is linked to a different management team (Kotter, 1992).  
2.2 Police Culture                                                                                                       
The notion of sub-culture in police organisations (Herbert, 1998; Paoline, 2003) was 
certainly borne out in my experience of being a police officer where the values, attitudes 
and behaviours of officers in different departments in the same force were demonstrably 
different. For example, in comparing the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) with 
Traffic Division the CID culture was much less formal, less enforcement focused, 
sociability (drinking) with colleagues was seen as critical (indeed, in most CID offices 
there were drinks laid out where senior officers would join in with the heavy office 
drinking session every Friday afternoon even though drinking on duty was strictly 
against the disciplinary code), the acceptance of gratuities was much more lax to the 
extent that teams of detectives were routinely practicing what I would term aggressive 
“mumping” (Punch, 2010) i.e. eating and drinking banquet size meals in China Town 
restaurants without formal invitation but waltzing in to get their freebies as if it was their 
God-given right and helping themselves to goods and produce from small businesses 
without even offering to pay.  
In short, although there was an overarching police culture as described in the literature 
there were also subtle nuances between departments. The dominant view in police 
study literature is grounded in the idea of a “special character” that often dictates police 
behaviour (Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1969; Westley, 1970; Bittner, 1970; 
Van Maanen, 1974) and is generally referred to as the “blue curtain” (Westley, 1970) or 
the “blue wall of silence” (Bittner, 1970). Scholars (e.g. Campeau, 2015) refer to a 
protective and united “brotherhood”, which is mainly attributed to the isolating and 
threatening nature of the work (Skolnick, 1966), as well as the constant pressure to be 
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productive in what are often uncertain circumstances (Wilson, 1969). The core 
characteristics of police culture can be summed up as conservative, mission-oriented, 
isolated, possessing a cynical outlook, masculine, pessimistic and suspicious with an 
encompassing ethos of a code of silence and us versus them mentality and the thin blue 
line where these values or attitudes are acquired through on-the-job socialisation, and 
is said to play a vital role in explaining police behaviour (Reiner, 1985). This combination 
of traits is best interpreted as an “ideal-type”; a synthesis of police values and 
perspectives into a unified analytical construct (Campeau, 2015). Repeated studies 
have confirmed the pervasiveness of these core characteristics: conservatism (Loader 
and Mulcahy, 2003; Skolnick, 2008), danger/mission (Barker, 1999), masculinity 
(Fielding, 1994; Herbert 2001), solidarity (Punch, 2009), and suspiciousness (Kappeler 
et al., 1998). Loftus (2010) argued that because the core tasks of police work remain 
largely unchanged over time and across space - police hold a monopoly on the 
sanctioned use of coercive force and are obligated to perform society’s “dirty work” on 
a routine basis (Bittner, 1970; Westley, 1970) – consequently the durability of the core 
cultural characteristics still holds true. A considerable amount of time has been devoted 
by academics to try and understand police culture because it is noted as an obstacle to 
police accountability (National Research Council, 2004), as a reason why police reforms 
fail (Skogan, 2008), as a cause of police abuse of authority (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993), 
as a mechanism officers use to cope with the dangers and uncertainties (Paoline, 2003), 
and as an explanation for discretionary behaviours (Paoline and Terrill, 2005; Terrill et 
al., 2003). 
My experience of how police culture influences officers’ attitudes and behaviour is that 
whilst police managers, laws and procedures dictate the broad parameters within which 
officers operate, it is the canteen culture (Waddington, 1999) dominated by the “old 
sweats” (veterans with more than 10 years in the job) that tells the rest (especially the 
‘sprogs’ – police probationers who has less than 2 year service) how to go about their 
job (“avoid getting into grief”, “make sure you don’t bring grief in for the skipper” - Station 
Sergeant, “be careful of the 3 Ps = Prostitutes, Properties and Prisoners – especially 
juveniles”, “don’t be a smart ass”, “always cover your ass”, etc.) how hard to work (“don’t 
be a lazy cunt”), what kinds of relationships to have with their fellow officers (“he’s a lazy 
uniform carrier”, “he’s dodgy”, “he’s a good thief-catcher”, etc.) and other categories of 
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people (including “Assholes” - Van Maanen, 1978) with whom they interact (“domestics 
are grief because you are always piggy in the middle so avoid it like the plague”, “apart 
from God check out all the other bastards”, “If you attend a pub fight don’t rush in, you’ll 
end up being kicked by every bastard in the place so wait and pick up the pieces after”, 
etc.), and how they should feel about police managers (“don’t trust governors as far as 
you can throw them”, “none of them give a shit about you they will always hang you out 
to dry”), judges (“doddery old fuckers”, “no idea of the real world or how ordinary folks 
live”, etc.), lawyers (“defence briefs are all bent and always looking to trip you up”, “CPS 
- Crown Prosecution Service - are incompetent and useless tossers”, etc.), the law (“it’s 
an ass”), etc. and the requirements and restrictions they impose on his/her daily 
activities. Combined with the effects of formal pressures, uncertainty of the nature of 
work (“you never know what’s round the corner so always be on your guard”) plus the 
pressures generated by working unsociable hours often lead police officers to 
experience a great deal of stress in their professional, social, and family lives thus 
resulting in cynicism, burnout, medical retirement and a host of physical and emotional 
ailments (Campeau, 2015).  
To deal with the isolation from the community that results from the ‘job’ and the police 
socialisation process (e.g. everyone is expected to go down to the pub after work no 
matter what time of the day or night it is where men have to drink pints of beer whether 
they actually enjoy it or not), they fall back on the shared sense of purpose and identity 
in order to cope and make sense of the world around them. Although much of the 
academic literature portrays police culture as aggressive and negative. Speaking as 
someone who experienced it first hand, at its core, there is a shared sense of mutual 
responsibility, team work, the desire to get the job done no matter the circumstances 
and provide stability for its actors in an uncertain and often complex working 
environment.  
Having painted a broad-brush picture of what police culture looks like it might be helpful 
to also examine how and why a distinctive police culture arises and how it impacts 
moments-of-truth. I will use Lawson’s (1983) study (because this study more than any 
other accords with my personal policing experience) to illustrate and summarize similar 
findings from various sources mentioned above. Lawson suggests that officers develop 
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a professional combatant perspective (a gladiator mentality) for nearly all encounters 
with the public, even service related functions systematically “skirt the law” (i.e. police 
engage in quasi-legal or outright illegal activities to maintain community peace) and then 
develop elaborate mechanisms for concealing (hiding, denying, and lying) these 
activities.  Police become extremely critical of the other agencies within the criminal 
justice system, particularly the “lenient courts” and “permissive correctional programs”. 
His survey findings of  American officers suggest that: 1/ nearly 50% indicated that their 
friends were almost exclusively other officers (reinforcing the isolation aspects of the 
policing profession); 2/ nearly 60% believed that the public’s image of law enforcement 
had declined in recent years; 3/ 60% indicated that police work was getting more difficult 
because fewer people respected police officers personally; 4/ over 40% felt that fellow 
officers quit, in part, because the public generally did not appreciate their attempts at 
keeping the peace; 5/ 69% agreed that the public was becoming more and more 
disrespectful of authority (police, courts, judges, etc.); and 6/ 76% believed that this 
situation is “very serious”.  Lawson suggests that whether or not the public is as anti-
police as these impressions by officers indicate, it is important to realise that officers 
react to citizen encounters with these views in their minds. Thus, the very nature of the 
mediation process is bound to be influenced by such police impressions of the public 
(1983, p.83-84). 
A gladiator’s view is adopted because nearly all encounters with the public involve 
tension. Either someone has called because something is wrong in their personal world 
or the police initiate an encounter because things are not perceived as entirely 
satisfactory by him/her. The officer’s initiation of an encounter can certainly affect the 
tension or anxiety levels of opposing parties. “No one calls to invite any old officer over 
for tea. They call because they’re hassled or bothered”. Most police encounters are 
antagonistic in nature e.g. directing traffic, investigating complaints, interrogating, 
arresting suspects, controlling mobs and crowds, urging prosecutors to press or drop 
charges, testifying in court, participating with (or battling) probation officers in juvenile 
courts, presenting budget requests to local government, negotiating with civil rights 
groups, defence lawyers, reporters, quelling domestic disputes (officer arrives and 
spouses jump on this ‘intruder’ who dares enter their sacred home), moving on loitering 
individuals, stopping unlicensed solicitations, dealing with drunks and rowdy youths and 
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anti-social behaviours (including playing sports in the streets), asking owners to keep 
dogs on leash or from fouling streets, etc. Police-public encounters take the form of a 
precarious balance of officer control and citizen submission where control is often more 
apparent than real. Especially when dealing with antisocial/antagonistic people police 
assume a veneer of hardness because they believe that courteousness is seen as 
weakness or servility. They will say that criminals (antagonistic people generally) are 
not entitled to the treatment accorded to gentlemen” (Ibid., p.94-95). 
Moreover, this policing veneer is easily accommodated by the shared characteristics 
and values of police officers’ reverence for authority. Police officers tend to be 
conservative and security bound. They are uncomfortable with rebellion and all forms of 
dramatic adolescent protest. They are idealistic, and have preserved an attitude towards 
authority that is one of respect, awe and sometimes reverence. They cannot 
understand, accept, or tolerate any direct challenge of authority. They experience 
challenge as abuse and defiance – my personal knowledge of this is the repeated 
mantra from long-serving police colleagues, “don’t let them [disrespectful people] take 
the piss out of the uniform”. There is a need to take command/control of encounters 
which means “demanding that all parties respond properly to the officer’s authority or 
else varying degree of force will be used to accomplish control” (Ibid., p.99). The 
justification for control comes from the belief that only people with something to hide or 
general undesirable types would show public contempt towards the police. 
Consequently, when officers felt challenged this might lead to questionable practices by 
“over enforcement” for very minor offences e.g. spitting or jaywalking. “For the patrolman 
the street is everything; if he loses that, he has surrendered his reason for being what 
he is” (Ibid., p.100-101). 
Lawson made the point that “time and again officers would state that they primarily deal 
with only the bastards and the assholes of the community, therefore, such perceptions 
surely taint one’s rose coloured glasses” (Ibid., p.106). My experience suggests that 
police cynicism manifests itself in assuming the worst about all people (“apart from God 
check out all other bastards” was the first advice I received from my Police College 
Instructor). From the outside, this can appear cold and unsympathetic even towards 
victims, however, experience shows that all “too often it turns out that the stolen TV 
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never existed, lost, loaned to a boyfriend, or hidden because payments were overdue; 
the assault was in fact a fight which the victim started but could not finish” (Ibid., p.106); 
or the missing child was dead and hidden in the loft of the grieving relative, etc. 
A new police officer soon realises that it is impossible to make everyone happy. Police 
must fall back on the realisation that they are ultimately professional combatants 
(gladiators) working for the state to maintain a particular definition of social order. That 
definition may not be popular with some or even majority in particular instances. The 
display of authority is to convince the detainee (and the community) of the gravity of 
what he has done so as to restore the unity of meaning. Collectively agreed upon 
meaning must be maintained regardless of the methods used. Whether police choose 
a ‘crime fighter’ perspective (stress on law enforcement) or an ‘order maintenance’ 
orientation (stress on keeping the peace), the ultimate end is the “maintenance of a 
particular definition of social order” (Ibid., p.93). The essential philosophy of democracy 
is to trust a person until he proves himself untrustworthy but the culture of police to 
“check out all bastards apart from God” is the reverse of this principle. “Even though 
officers know that most people they stop or question are not guilty of any wrong doing, 
but they cannot know for sure until after they have stopped him…The paradox of 
authority, attempting to maintain order through struggle or confrontation, is that it must 
uphold absolute or pure principles by impure means. This paradox is obviously true of 
dictatorships. It is equally true of governments that proclaim themselves democratic 
and/or humanitarian in nature” (Ibid., p.102). Police tendencies 1/ to initially treat people 
as guilty or at least potentially dangerous, 2/ to be ready, if not outright willing, to combat 
challenges to police authority, 3/ to question the legitimacy of ‘victims’, 4/ to define as 
criminals those who do not show proper respect for officers’ attempts at controlling the 
streets, all suggest why officers can, in fact, “create hostility in community members, 
even when none previously existed or at least had not surfaced beforehand” (Ibid., 
p.104). 
Lawson argued that police illegality refers to tactics or strategies that foster the 
completion of general responsibilities such as law enforcement and order maintenance 
but not promote basic consideration or guarantee the protection of ‘due process’ to the 
public. Behaviours such as taking bribes, using excessive/unreasonable force, 
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engaging in burglaries while on duty are obvious violations of criminal law. These are 
less prevalent than ‘lesser illegalities,’  where the distinction between illegal behaviour 
and quasi-legal or skirting the law behaviour is more blurred e.g. hassling people they 
don’t like, arresting and detaining suspects in full knowledge that no charges will be 
brought, overlooking someone’s criminality to extort information regarding other crimes, 
getting drunks to leave their homes so that they can be arrested for being drunk in a 
public place, using threat of force to coerce respect and reverence, etc. (Ibid., p.109). 
The rotten apple idea is an excuse to find scapegoats but the pressure for police 
illegality or skirting the law is the “normal daily characteristics of policing which facilitate 
officers circumventing the law”. Most officers will maintain control, thwart challenges, 
and suppress outward signs of disrespect, even if they must violate the law to keep 
control of the streets as this is of utmost importance and police illegality is tolerated in 
the pursuit of this objective - in my experience this is achieved by using ‘The Ways and 
Means Act’. Their primary function is solving public disputes therefore pragmatism is a 
key element within police work that leads to “ends justify the means orientation” (Ibid., 
p.114-115). 
The analysis of police illegality must focus on aspects of the job that promote law 
violations. It is not enough to say that each officer disobeys the law for his or her own 
reasons. The rotten apple theory of police illegality does not suffice because officers are 
primarily responding to, and obeying voices outside, not within themselves. “Officers, 
do not, in an isolated, individualistic fashion, choose to be unyielding in their attitudes 
toward citizen misbehaviour, while becoming increasingly tolerant of police 
misbehaviour” (Ibid., p.123). Lawson maintains that police, like other occupational 
groups, developed a shared world view around attitudes, knowledge, expectations and 
perception of community history. He suggests that there is a loosely shared picture of 
society which, whether correct or not, has encouraged certain adaptations by the police. 
It has fostered a professional combatant perspective. It has promoted police illegality 
and nurtured concealment and secrecy. Officers in his research talk of three frustrations: 
1/ taking bulk of the heat and criticism over increased crime and disorder; 2/ inability to 
convince increasing numbers of the public that their task is law enforcement not ‘social 
work’; and 3/ increasing ‘dues’ or social costs officers have to pay in order to police 
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society – as mediation becomes more complex/tough and solutions more temporary, 
officers feels that they are subjected to increasing antagonisms from the public (Ibid., 
p.151-152). 
2.3 Police Culture – Indian/China                                                                           
From the perspective of factors informing police culture in China and India. In the case 
of the PSB, commentators (e.g. Wong, 2012) argued that since the creation of the PRC 
the PSB has been entrusted with wide ranging powers to protect the socialist revolution 
and in the last three decades has been charged with maintaining social order for the 
purposes of creating a stable environment for economic and social development. This 
has led to runaway police powers where the prevailing pragmatic policing culture has a 
preference for substantive rather than procedural justice. 
Chan (2014) argued that there is a universal concern from Chinese policing 
commentators that the PSB’s abuse of authority; brutality, misuse of force, in particular 
deadly force; over-enforcement of the law; bribery; manufacturing of evidence in the 
name of efficiency or success; failure to apply the law because of personal interests; 
and discrimination against particular groups or individuals has a detrimental effect on 
public trust of the Chinese police. Moreover, Mao’s (1926) thought on “Who are our 
enemies, who are our friends, that is a question germane to revolution” has led to the 
PSB’s “expressions of dissent in the embryonic socialist state was not simply to patrol 
the divide between friends and enemy but to define it. Police work was held together by 
this very thin thread of understanding. Empirically, the thread becomes the path along 
which the border patrols of the police walk. Chinese police patrolled the line separating 
friend from enemy to ensure no ambiguity and no ‘trails’. It is a world in which clarity is 
necessary and…it is gained through the intense and violent struggle origin against the 
enemy”. This means that China’s campaign-style policing and politics are not 
necessarily a smoke screen for cynical real politicking, personal ego or exercise of pure 
power, etc. It can be due to “believing in the cause too much. In this way moral 
zealousness expresses itself in a semiotic of tyranny” (Dutton, 2005, p.68-9). 
Trevaskes (2010, p.7-8) argued that campaign justice in modern China is evidence of a 
policing “culture in action”. A core aspect of her argument is that the anti-crime campaign 
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has been employed as the very template or mechanism through which a pre-existing 
political culture of punitiveness has been able to be sustained and encouraged in a 
period of rapid economic transformation. By embodying quasi-Maoist nomenclature and 
practices, campaigns have acted as a bridge between past and present, a bridge that 
political authorities believed to be a necessary way of negotiating through the potentially 
unstable path to social and economic transformation. Cohen (2011) points out that the 
police in China are king both in law and practice. 
In the case of India, retired officers (Singh, 2001; Arun, 2000; Dikshit, 2000) and other 
criminal justice scholars (Vadackumchery,1998; Gupta, 1979; Mehra, 1985) argued that 
the modern Indian police still suffers from the legacy of British colonial rule in which the 
primary purpose of the police was to collect revenue thus the police was designed to 
repress rather than to serve. Consequently, due to a lack of financial resources and the 
political will to affect reform the Indian police is still focused on its priority for paramilitary 
duties to maintain state security at the expense of crime investigation and prevention 
(Gupta, 1979). Moreover, the colonial legacy has embedded a culture of corruption, 
abuse, rudeness, rigidity, arrogance, insularity, discrimination against the lower castes, 
and couldn’t care less attitude (Vadackumchery, 1998) as well as laziness, inefficiency, 
ineffectiveness, fabrication of evidence, and the unnecessary use of violence which has 
resulted in the Indian police being alienated from the general population (Dikshit, 2000). 
This conservatism of police organisations and their resilience to change can be partly 
explained by the Weberian theory that suggests that once bureaucracies are 
established, they are extremely difficult to deconstruct. Even when state change occurs 
as a result of revolution or incremental change (e.g. as in India and China) institutions 
maintain their rule for functioning. Seleti (1998) argued that police institutions maintain 
legacies of historical behaviour and ideology, and are rooted in past and present 
cultures and traditions that may be authoritarian in nature. Marks (2000) supports 
Seleti’s assertions and suggests that new policies and legislations do not automatically 
bring about desired transformation within the police, and effective police transformation 
may require a more radical challenge of established culture. 
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2.4 Corruption                                                                                                                  
Distrust of government and enforcers of its laws (the police) usually goes hand-in-hand. 
For example, during my policing of the 1980s miners dispute my colleagues and I were 
frequently called ‘Maggie’s boot boys’ (referring to the then British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher) by striking miners on picket lines. Furthermore, we were also 
targeted by Poll Tax Rioters a decade later in Trafalgar Square as symbol of the 
unpopular government at that time even though the ‘British Bobby’ were well known 
apolitical actors. Goldsmith (2005) suggests that distrust is learned, and all too often it 
is proved. People share stories of misunderstanding, ignorance, and occasional 
brutality.  Moreover, police who are consistently required to enforce unpopular laws will 
gradually lose public support which leads to the paradox that a weak police with public 
support, at least in the long run, will be more effective than a powerful police lacking 
public support (Goldsmith, 2003). He further reinforced this view by proposing that in 
societies in which police are deployed to bolster the political authority of the regime, 
police will often be used under the guise of the law against political opponents and ethnic 
minorities. When the enforcers are themselves immune from legal processes, a 
situation of impunity arises. The failure of the police to be governed by the law is 
evidence of double-standard and hypocrisy, as well as an imbalance of expectations 
between citizens and police officers. Trust has to be learned, just like any other kind of 
generalisation, what is sensible for a given individual to expect depends heavily on what 
the individual knows, both about the past and the future of the other person or other 
party to be trusted because experience moulds the psychology of trust (Hardin, 1993). 
A key determinant of public trust is that police must be seen to be fair, just and free from 
malpractices – i.e. corruption and abuse of authority. There is no universally accepted 
definition of corruption (Holmes, 2015) but the traditional view is that it involves 
economic improprieties, such as bribes and embezzlement by a public official, and there 
is usually an element of reciprocity in the corrupt transaction (Heidenheimer et al., 1989; 
Glaeser et al., 2008; Porta et al., 1997). 
However, this narrow legalistic view fails to answer one of the trickiest issues in 
determining whether or not a given act constitutes corruption. That is, how to distinguish 
a gift from a bribe. In many Asian cultures, for example, not only is a gift not seen as a 
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bribe, but it can be insulting to decline it, or to treat it as a bribe. As the first Chinese to 
join the British Police and serve in London’s China Town District I knew well that 
accepting hospitalities from the locals was a way of giving the community leaders ‘face’ 
and if my colleagues and I had not attended banquettes held in our honour or accepted 
Christmas gifts as signs of the community’s gratitude, offers of free food from the 
restaurant owners, etc. then police-community relation bridges cannot be built and both 
the police and the Chinese Community as well as the wider community would have been 
the worse for it. This is an example of cultural difference; not only elites, but also most 
citizens in most Asian states believe that it is polite and one is required to show 
hospitality by giving a visitor a gift. 
Moreover, the concept of corruption has evolved and the scope widened to include both 
private-to-private sectors without the need for a public official and as featured in The UK 
Bribery Act 2010 (Comer and Stephens, 2013).  Additionally, the practice of nepotism 
and cronyism where the perpetrator receives no bribe but has certainly abused his 
power and perhaps ‘gained’ by doing his family or friend a favour by securing them a 
position or contract at the expense of a potentially better qualified applicant. Meny 
observed that the concept of corruption changes over time and varies somewhat across 
cultures. From Meny’s relativist perspective corruption lies very much in the eyes of the 
beholder. For example, what the Russian’s call ‘blat’; the Chinese term ‘guanxi; the US 
call ‘networking’ and in the UK it’s the ‘old school tie’, and while each is distinct and 
culturally specific they do have commonalities between them. In that they all create 
insiders and outsiders, with privileges for insiders. If the narrower version of the 
definition is adopted, then they are not corruptions but if the broader version is adopted 
then all sorts of relationships between people (including those listed above) may be 
seen as corrupt (1997, p.7-8). 
Heidenheimer (1989) has drawn attention to the problem of borderline areas mentioned 
above. He attempts to make a distinction between ‘white’ corruption, ‘grey’ corruption 
and ‘black’ corruption. Black corruption is accepted by everyone, elite as well as the 
public at large, as corruption and offenders should be punished; White corruption is 
where both groups accept that an act is technically corrupt but should not attract 
punishment; and Grey corruption is where views differ between the elites and the 
19 | Page 
 
masses due to uncertainty over whether it is corrupt or not. In short, there is no 
universally accepted definition of corruption because in different jurisdictions different 
definitions are adopted due to cultural factors and legislative differences on how and 
why laws are drafted and by whom. However, although there is no universal definition 
of corruption it is generally accepted that it now includes abuses that go beyond 
traditional bribery and embezzlement activities. 
According to surveys of more than 24,000 people conducted on behalf of the BBC in 
late 2010 and late 2011 across twenty-six (in 2010) and twenty-three (in 2011) countries, 
corruption was the topic most frequently discussed by the public globally, ahead of 
extreme poverty, unemployment, the rising cost of food and energy, climate change, 
and terrorism. Since these polls were run at a time when most countries were still 
suffering the effects of the 2008 GFC (Global Financial Crisis), such results testify to the 
significance of corruption in the contemporary world. Indeed, a more recent (2013) 
survey of almost 70,000 people in sixty-nine countries, conducted by WIN/Gallop 
International, provides further evidence to support this contention; it identified corruption 
as the world’s no. 1 problem (Holmes, 2015). 
The effects of corruption impact directly the lives of the ordinary population in many 
ways, for example, social, economic, politico-legal, environmental, security-related, and 
international implications. More importantly it can also increase inequality. “While many 
citizens will tolerate reasonably high levels of inequality if this appears to be based on 
merit, they will resent it if based more on personal connections and bribery to obtain 
prestigious jobs and promotions. The problem is exacerbated if growing inequality is 
accompanied by higher levels of poverty, which is often the case. In a seminal analysis 
published by the IMF in 1998, the authors analysed data from more than thirty countries 
over an 18-year period and demonstrate convincingly that increased levels of corruption 
increase both income inequality (as reflected in the Gini coefficient) and poverty levels. 
Since poverty is linked to poorer health, both physically and mental, corruption can 
impact directly on people’s well-being” (Holmes, 2015, p.19). 
Moreover, high levels of corruption might lead to increased distrust of the state and its 
officers. This can lead to a widespread “return to the family” and heightened attachment 
to kinship. This might have the potentially negative effect of creating greater reliance 
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on, and identification with, “kith and kin”, thus resulting in a reduction of social capital 
and cleavages appearing between social and ethnic groups in society, which can lead 
to ethnic and other forms of social conflicts (Holmes, 2015). 
In terms of economic impact, it is generally accepted by corruption commentators that 
the phenomenon of capital flight makes elite corruption more of a problem than that of 
petty corruption because of its monetary impact in developing nations. This is because 
poorer nations will feel the effects of capital flight in its economic performance more so 
than economically developed nations (Madsen, 2013). Kleptocracy is a term used to 
describe corruption of high-level public officials, who use their positions systematically 
to line their pockets directly or indirectly with funds from the public purse. Foreign 
borrowing and capital flight are connected by a financial revolving door, as funds 
borrowed in the name of governments are captured by politically connected individuals 
and channelled overseas as their private wealth (Madsen, 2013, p.33). There are 
ongoing debates as to the definition of capital flight and the accuracy of various 
measuring methods based on distinctions between ‘normal flows’ and ‘capital flight’, 
‘short term’ and ‘long term’ and between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal transactions’. Consequently, 
estimates of capital flight vary. Such debates notwithstanding, however, capital flight 
measures have an important economic impact on developing economies because they 
are still viewed as important indicators of a nation’s predicament in financing 
international debt repayments and act as a warning to the international banking 
community as to the risk of lending to these countries (Schneider, 2003). 
In sum, the effect of corruption is wide ranging, it has social, economic, politico-legal, 
environmental, security-related, international, and inequality implications for the host 
nation as well as risks for trading partners and global financial institutions. If left 
unchecked, it erodes the quality of everyday lives of its citizens and has a demoralising 
impact on its people as well as legitimacy challenges for the ruling elite.  
There is a prevailing belief, largely based on western-centric value-laden views, that 
Parliamentary democracy as an institution is less corrupt than other forms of 
government: “Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world 
of sin and woe. No one pretends democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been 
said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that 
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have been tried from time to time (including dictatorship)” (Churchill, 1947). This 
perception is not only popular among Western politicians and media but also true among 
corruption academics. “In more open and democratic societies, legislation may be the 
result of compromise between different groups both within and beyond parliament – and 
the particular permutation of diverse interests is unique to each society. This explanation 
is less likely to apply in authoritarian systems. But such systems are typically more 
corrupt than more democratic ones, and ruling elites often choose either to have no 
explicit anti-corrupt legislation – and hence no legal definition – or else deliberately 
vague laws; they want to preserve their privileged positions, and prefer not to introduce 
laws that could be used to undermine these” (Holmes, 2015, p.8). Leaving aside the 
fact that there are a number of problematic western democracies with major corruption 
issues, such as Greece and Italy, to name but two, the proposition that democracy is 
the panacea for corruption, in actuality, is far from clear (see articles by J. Van Klaveren; 
H.J. Ford; J.Q. Wilson; J.J. McCook; J.G Speed; A.A. Rogow/H.D. Lasswell; and R.S. 
Geitz on US local and state corruptions in A. Heidenheimer’s edited collection on 
Political Corruption, 1978). 
As an illustration, analysis of the Transparency International’s 2010/11 Global 
Corruption Barometer survey to the question of percentage of respondents (or their 
family members) who had paid a bribe in the last 12 months (global average = 24%) 
shows that China (an authoritarian regime) with 9% was on par with Austria and only 
2% behind France. China actually came out much better than many other Western 
democracies or ‘developed nations’ including for example: Belarus (28%); Bosnia 
(23%); Czech Republic (14%); Greece (18%); Hungry (24%); Italy (13%); Latvia (15%); 
Lithuania (15%); Luxembourg (16%); Macedonia (22%); Poland (16%); Russia (26%); 
Romania (29%); Serbia (18%), etc. Moreover, China’s position was positively 
outstanding in comparison to South Asian democracies: India (54%); Pakistan (50%); 
and Bangladesh (72%). 
Furthermore, proponents of the democracy panacea thesis have not yet provided 
compelling evidence to explain countries such as Singapore, which does not have a 
typical western-style democracy but a single party state but yet it is largely seen as not 
having a ‘corruption problem’ and is regarded by all manner of measurements as being 
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less corrupt than most Western democracies including UK, USA, France and Germany. 
Moreover, many corruption commentators tend to gloss over or even ignore the issue 
of political lobbying in western democracies which can be seen as buying political 
influence under another name. Additionally, there seems to be incongruence on how, 
for example, UK anti-corruption legislations are framed, take for example cash for 
access. Regulators have made it clear that if a business pays to arrange a meeting with 
a foreign government official, it will be regarded as ‘bribery’. However, paying £50,000 
for a dinner place with the Prime Minister at Conservative Central Office is framed as 
‘lobbying’ and is therefore acceptable. Consequently, it can be argued that “It is highly 
unlikely that corruption in the UK, France, the USA, Italy and the EU is any less than in 
countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia or Mexico, it is just different (Comer and Stephens, 
2013, p.11). 
Moreover, Comer and Stephens (2013, p.24) catalogued a whole series of corruption 
scandals both by western governments and public servants which to-date have resulted 
in very little actions taken against the perpetrators. For example, in the UK they 
highlighted a report published by the National Audit Office which estimated waste in the 
Civil Service between 2009 and 2011 at £31 billion. These includes, for example, 
numerous failed public IT system projects that went way over budget; public 
procurement contracts that were extremely poor value for the tax payer; and Private 
Finance Initiatives (PFI) where hospitals were being charged £150 to fit a light bulb and 
£3,500 for a basic laptop computer; the starting budget for the Scottish Parliament 
building was estimated at between £10 and £40 million but the final cost exceeded £440 
million. “It is, of course, possible that some or all of these cases can be attributed to 
misunderstanding or negligence although corruption is most likely explanation. It is hard 
to believe that innocent people could be that careless or so stupid”. Not only has there 
been no police investigation into many of these cases but no civil servants have 
resigned for incompetence. To the above list one can also add MP expenses; cash for 
questions; cash for honours; Iraq dodgy dossier, etc. 
I was involved in a number of the above mentioned public sector bids as a deal 
executive in various well known multi-national information technology and business 
process outsourcing firms in early-to-mid 2000s, and the practice of lavished ‘corporate 
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entertainment’ and leveraging the ‘old school tie’ was the norm in trying to access and 
influence decision-makers – it was how business was done. The difference in corruption 
practices between developed democracies as opposed to those of developing nations 
is that the degree of subtlety in developed nations is more oriented towards longer term 
relationships and deferred benefits. “Corruption in developed economies are just as 
bad; just subtler (Comer and Stephens, 2013, p.13-14). Moreover, Porta and Meny 
(1997, p.168-179), in their comparative analysis of corruption in Western democracies, 
argued “...both in France and the UK, the opportunities for corruption are increased by 
the practice of large businesses of recruiting retired public administrators or distributing 
consultancies to those still working…In both the Italian and French cases, we can 
highlight the role played in organizing more or less illegal dealings by some Masonic 
lodges. We can conclude, therefore, by observing that important functions in the 
widening spread of corruption are played by various network of power, characterized by 
secrecy: ‘transverse’ involvement of politicians from different parties, entrepreneurs, 
public officials, professionals; selective membership procedures which consolidate the 
relationship between members”. The suggestion that a Masonic network creates an ‘in’ 
and ‘out’ crowd was certainly evident when I was a police officer in the early 1980s. It 
was an accepted fact among colleagues that officers who were Freemasons had better 
career prospects than those who were not. 
The causes of corruption are obviously varied as, indeed, are the effects. Socio-political 
circumstances and the level of development most certainly play a role, “Federico Varese 
points to a series of positive relations that seem to exist between corruption and the 
level of ‘red tape’; tiers of government; Spanish colonial domination; the amount of time 
spent by managers with public officials; the cost of capital and investment; and the 
degree of regulatory discretion on the part of officials” (Madsen, 2013, p.9-10).  
Additionally, it would seem that a nation with weak state apparatus in transition or going 
through rapid modernisation experiences more corruption (Holmes, 2015). There are 
ample examples of systemic corruption on the road to modernisation in the corruption 
literature regarding role models of western democracies – e.g. USA (Glaeser et al., 
2008) and the UK (Gill, 1999). In short, there are many competing theories as to the 
causes of corruption. Some argue that it is down to the individual, others point to the 
social environment, and still others suggest that it is a combination of both. Whatever 
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the real cause(s) it is certainly the case that a nation in transition provides the conditions 
for the elite with a get rich quick mentality to extract graft and rent in less subtle manner 
than those in more developed nations. 
2.5 Police Malpractices                                                                                                  
A pre-requisite for police trust and legitimacy is a service free from malpractices and 
corruption. Much of the literature on corruption focuses on elite corruption by politicians 
or state administrators (e.g. national level civil servants, ministers and politicians) with 
little attention paid to low level corruption by the police (Holmes, 2014). Yet police 
corruption is regularly seen by the public as a major issue. For example, in 
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometers, which have been published 
every 1-2 years since 2003 and now involve surveying the general public in more than 
one hundred countries, the 2013 survey showed that globally the police were 
considered to be the second most corrupt agency (after political parties), but also that 
respondents had paid bribes to them more than to any other agency of the state.  
Police corruption may be viewed by some commentators (e.g. Madsen, 2015) as less 
important than high level corruption because economically it has considerably less 
impact on a country’s economic performance and so, in comparison, police corruption 
is but “a fly on the back of an elephant”. However, just like flies, police corruption is at 
the very least a major irritant that plagues the lives of commoners in developing nations. 
It is much more visible (e.g. traffic cops extracting bribes or patrolling officers demanding 
‘rents’ from vendors and shop-keepers) than other forms of state corruption and thus a 
constant symbol of a corrupt or failing state in the eyes of both citizens and foreigners 
alike, which has major consequences for the reputation and morale of the nation as a 
whole; and, it has an immediate impact on the pockets of those who can least afford to 
pay i.e. the common people (Gill, 1999). 
Furthermore, police corruption also differs to other forms of corruption: Firstly, police 
officers are usually armed - with guns or truncheons - thus allowing them to use more 
or less legitimate violence in ways that other officials cannot; Secondly, in addition to 
the highly visible uniform branch policing activities mentioned above, many police 
activities - e.g. CID and undercover investigations - are less open to public scrutiny than 
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other public services; Thirdly, as a corollary to the previous point, police interact directly 
with organised crime gangs (who cannot exist without some form of police collaboration 
– Holmes, 2014, p.15) thus giving them opportunities for collusion that are rarely 
available to other officers of the state; Fourthly, police holds a privileged position of trust 
and power in that they hold the key to starting the criminal investigation engine which 
provides them with considerable leverage for intimidation to extract bribes, and so , 
greater opportunities to abuse this unique power than other officials; Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, citizens look to the police to enforce the law, for protection, 
for help in emergencies and for them to catch and prosecute corrupt officials, politicians 
and businessmen (see appendix 1 for analysis of opportunity for corruption comparing 
police vs. other officials). Marenin (1996) proposes that the police are major actors in 
changing society and that they are involved in crucial activities such as the combating 
of crime, the protection of citizens and the curtailing of threats to the functioning of 
society. Therefore, in many ways, the police not only reflect the nature of the state, but 
are also responsible for the prevention or promotion of state change. Consequently, 
police have a unique role to play in acting as change agents for developing nations 
wishing to tackle official and private sector corruption. Therefore, if the police are also 
corrupt then what hope is there for a nation wanting to break out of this quagmire?  
The Knapp Commission’s investigation of the New York Police Department in the early 
1970s is a much cited report in the field of police corruption. The commission coined 
two terms that describes police corruption which is now frequently used. They are 
‘grass-eaters’ and ‘meat-eaters’. The former refers to police officers who will accept 
bribes if offered to them and the latter refers to more predatory officers who actively 
seeks or solicit bribes, though some analysts prefers to use the terms ‘proactive and 
reactive’ corruption (Holmes, 2014).  
However, I would argue that when researching police-public trust the traditional 
understanding of corruption is insufficient because other police malpractices that impact 
on public trust extend beyond bribery, embezzlement, rent extraction, nepotism and 
cronyism. For example, there exists the term ‘noble cause corruption’ in policing which 
has been depicted in popular culture by Hollywood movies such as Dirty Harry, Apache 
the Bronx, etc. This is where an officer abuses his office through excessive use of force 
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(e.g. ‘bitch slapping’, threatening a suspect in the interrogation room or cell with 
violence, sleep deprivation, etc.) to extract information or confession in order to 
administer the officer’s version of substantive (result justifies the means) rather than 
procedural (sticking to legal rules) justice. 
In my experience, UK police practices in the 1980s, such as the so called ‘verbals, 
gilding the Lilly, or egging-the-pudding’ and ‘testilying’ (Barker and Cater 1990; Slobogin 
1996) that is, making up evidence or enhancing evidence to strengthen one’s case 
against an individual whom the officer is convinced is guilty, were both widespread and 
routine. Moreover, senior officers - and occasionally magistrates and crown court judges 
- not only turned a blind-eye to these practices but some actively encouraged it. In these 
kinds of corruption cases, there is no question of reciprocity or bribery and the idea of 
‘gain’ is potentially also tenuous, but judged by today’s standards they are no doubt 
corrupt acts nonetheless. Academics such as Punch (2010) takes a broader definition 
in defining police corruption to include unwarranted police violence, police prejudice and 
sexual harassment. In short, for him, police corruption equates to malpractices. 
For the purposes of this research the definition I will use is ‘Police Malpractice’ which 
will include corruption (defined above as bribes, embezzlement, rent extraction, 
nepotism and cronyism), cover-up for misconduct and abuse of power (including ‘noble 
cause’ and unlawful violence). Other activities such as ‘mumping’ (Punch, 2010) or 
‘blagging’ i.e. proactively seeking freebies such as gifts, food and drinks, etc. may also 
be malpractices if the officer acquires it from businesses who give it grudgingly because 
the owner feels intimidated by the officer. The reason is that it is an abuse of power and 
contributes towards undermining police-public trust. However, if the individuals provide 
these as gratuities because they are genuinely grateful for the work that the police is 
doing in their community - ‘slippery slope’ (Sherman, 1974) not withstanding - then they 
may be contrary to the discipline codes of the police force in question (e.g. Singapore) 
but the act is not police malpractice for the purposes of this PhD (see appendix 2 on 
analysis of how moments-of- truth may be exploited). 
Most academics (e.g. Bittner, 1974; Brown, 1981; McNamara, 1967; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; 
Skolnick, 1966; Sparrow et al., 1990; Van Maanen, 1974; Westley, 1970) and police 
officers agree that the organisational culture of a police department affects the 
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behaviour of officers. Thus, the establishment of a professional, moral, ethical culture in 
a police organisation can control, prevent, and punish misconduct and corruption. Of 
course the establishment of this type of culture relies in part on the organisation’s hiring, 
retention, promotion practices, leadership, and socialisation process for new police 
officers. This is what the Metropolitan Police aimed to do in their Plus Programme in 
1989 to change its culture from a ‘force’ to a ‘service’. This programme was launched 
against the backdrop of major social dislocations in 1980s Britain (e.g. violent trade 
disputes involving coal miners and news-print-workers, football hooliganism, deadly 
race riots, frequent anti-apartheid and CND demonstrations, IRA2  bombings, etc. - all 
against the backdrop of the Cold War). 
Social dislocations put pressures on police to change its behaviour and researchers 
argue that policing in many societies is currently entering unsettled times and with it is 
the potential to reduce the negative aspects of the blue code during police-public 
encounters. This is because of the prevalence of CCTV, mobile smart devices, digital 
cameras, etc. combined with the speed and accessibility of mass social media, which 
may be causing a significant disruptive influence in police practices and culture. “With 
the rise of social media such as Sina Weibo, the Chinese equivalent to Twitter, the vivid 
pictures and videos of Chinese police brutality can spread to the world through the 
internet almost instantly and give rise to social conflicts and profound changes in social 
sentiment of China…The police brutality and subsequent violent reactions for the 
Chinese civilians are actually undermining the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) goal 
to build a hexie shehui (harmonious society) and shatter the Zhongguo meng (China 
dream) portrayed by the Xi Jiping administration and are likely to endanger the 
legitimacy of the CCP by tarnishing their image”! (Chan, 2014, p.243). Moreover, “the 
disruptive influence of society’s changing accountability standards for police and of the 
bright spotlight that is now being shed on an organization that has historically hidden 
behind a blue curtain. This study highlights an alternative conceptualization of police 
culture that underscores its dynamic qualities and contextually contingent nature… 
‘Anybody who’s got a phone in their hand becomes a video journalist, and we’ve all 
seen it, right? With the emergence of You Tube and Facebook and everything…I tell 
                                                          
2 Irish Republican Army, terrorist movement seeking unification of Ireland 
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people that all the time now - Always assume you’re on camera. Always assume … if 
you take that advice, then you’ll govern yourself accordingly’ (Sergeant B, Media 
Relations) …In the past, witnessing police–citizen encounters was largely limited to 
those dealing personally with law enforcement, or to bystanders of officers executing 
their mandate. In recent years, the visibility of policing has increased substantially with 
the advent of surveillance equipment on commercial establishments and visual 
recording technologies in the hands of the citizenry (e.g. mobile phones and cameras) 
...These images are easily accessed by a mass audience through social media 
networking sites like Facebook or Twitter, and video-sharing platforms such as 
YouTube. This trend is paralleled by increased demand from public and political groups 
for greater police accountability” (Campeau, 2015, p.674).  
It is worth hypothesising that while historically police culture change (e.g. as in the case 
of the Metropolitan Police’s Plus Programme) had been driven by external political and 
social pressures due to a series of scandals or moral panics with police leaders applying 
business transformation techniques to drive changes. But with the advent of social 
media the drive for change in behaviour is coming from the front line officers themselves 
because of the danger that their misconducts will be caught on camera and broadcast 
instantly to the world thus eroding the code of silence. Moreover, the old police mantra 
of ‘covering your ass’ has potentially come home to roost against corrupt officers 
because his/her colleagues will certainly cover their own ‘ass’, “With more stringent 
legislative policy to impose accountability, as well as elevated visibility in the community, 
police are less able to rely on informally instituted behavioural codes to maintain 
solidarity in the new environment” (Campeau, 2015, p.683).   
However, whilst organisational cultural influences on police attitudes and behaviour 
have been the subject of much debate and are assumed to play a significant role in the 
quality of police-public encounters especially in regard to decision-making shown in the 
exercise of discretion, “The field of policing is understood by the officer by means of a 
decision-frame…acquired through police officer’s habitus – their past experiences, 
personal ideals, motivations and moral values…influenced by officer’s occupational 
culture” (Parsons, 2015, p.69). But studies into what factors may influence police 
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decision-making and the choices s/he make (i.e. discretion) at the sharp-end during 
public encounters indicate that there is still much to be done.  
Discretion is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as: ‘the freedom or authority to 
make judgments and to act as one see fit’. Police discretion is said to exist when 
“…officers have some leeway or choice in how to respond to a situation. The fewer the 
rules about handling incidents and situations, the more discretion officers can exercise. 
Discretion involves both action and inaction” (Groeneveld, 2005, p.1). Moreover, 
discretion is a necessary and constant feature of daily police work and at least some 
discretion is exercised in every aspect of the police task. “Some discretionary actions 
involve very subtle and perhaps minor decisions, while others involve blatant and 
important ones” (Dunham and Alpert, 2010, p.73). Discretion is seen as being so 
important that Parsons (2015, p.225) noted that much of the literature on police 
discretion focuses on its control to prevent abuse of power. Furthermore, some 
academics have actively argued for it to be removed from officers’ remit altogether. 
“Police should not be delegated discretion not to invoke criminal law…the police should 
operate in an atmosphere which exhorts and commands them to invoke impartially all 
criminal laws within the bounds of full enforcement…Responsibility for the enactment, 
amendment and repeal of the criminal law will not, then, be abandoned to the whim of 
each police officer or department, but retained where it belongs in a democracy – with 
elected representatives” (Goldstein, 1960, p.587). However, whatever side of the 
argument scholars favour there is general agreement that the quality of police-public 
interaction is important in promoting police legitimacy (Mazerolle et al., 2013) and that 
police decision-making is a complex multi-faceted issue (Schulenberg, 2007).   
Skogan and Frydl (2004) undertook the task of reviewing all available research into what 
factors may influence police behaviour, decision-making and the use of discretion during 
police-public encounters. In this review they examined sixteen (16) situational, officer 
outlooks & characteristics, and affirmative action factors (1/Legal, 2/Citizen Demeanour, 
3/Social Class, 4/Gender, 5/Race, 6/Mental Illness, 7/Authoritarian Personality of Police 
Officers, 8/Police Culture, 9/Cynicism, 10/Job Satisfaction, 11/Effects of specific 
attitudes, 12/Greater knowledge skills & ability, 13/Officers Education, 14/ Training 
,15/Officers Race, 16/Officer’s Sex) but apart from ‘Legal’ they found that in general the 
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available evidence was insufficient to make a judgment on whether it did or did not 
influenced behaviour during encounters. They also examined organisational and 
environmental factors e.g. effects of hierarchy, organisational models, oversight by local 
officials, citizen review boards, etc. but once again their conclusion was that the 
available research was insufficient to make a judgment on causality (2004, p.214). Their 
recommendation was for more research to be conducted into what factors influenced 
police decision-making (2004, p.114-153). 
Dunham and Alpert (2010) conducted a similar review exercise but classified the factors 
as: Organisational Variables; Neighbourhood Variables; Situational Variables; and 
Officer Characteristics but concluded, “Since police exercise so much discretion, it is 
important to understand the factors that affect their discretionary choices. It appears as 
though organisational, situational, neighbourhood, and officer characteristics all may 
play some part in the decisions that police make. While much research has focused on 
the determinants of police behaviour, and much has been learned in the process, there 
is still a great deal that is unexplained...it becomes apparent that the study of police 
discretionary behaviour is a complicated endeavour…more attention should be paid to 
this area” (2010, p.85). 
2.6 Conclusion                                                                                                                  
There is a large volume of literature on both organisational and police culture but there 
is no universally agreed definition for corruption. This is largely due to the fact that 
nations have differences in history as well as differing cultural mores and values. 
Moreover, due to the nature of policing the traditional term ‘corruption’ is insufficient to 
cover activities that undermine public trust. Consequently, for the purposes of this PhD 
the term malpractice will include corruption, cover-ups, abuse of power and unlawful 
violence. Moreover, the nature and form that police corruption takes is different to those 
practiced by political elites and other officials. This is because police officers are in a 
position of trust where they hold the key to the criminal justice system and have the right 
to use lawful force. Furthermore, the public expects the police to be their go-to-person 
in emergencies as well as the guardians of law and order in their community. Therefore, 
they are seen as the institution that keeps corrupt politicians, businessmen and other 
errant officials in check. Consequently, the population will lose all hope of being able to 
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change the status-quo if the police themselves are in cahoots with those who are 
corrupt. 
It is a generally accepted wisdom by both academics and police officers alike that police 
culture plays an important role in police decision-making at the moments-of-truth but 
research in this domain is inconclusive with scholars asking for more research. 
Furthermore, corruption is a relatively new area of research in academia and police 
corruption in particular is a much neglected field (Holmes, 2015). It is also very obvious 
that the vast majority of research into this domain is US dominated and western-centric 
with very little material in relation to China. Much of the literature and media reports 
covering corruption in China focuses on corruption by the ‘Princelings’ (children of senior 
CCP cadres) and local officials turning from “Apparatchiks to Entrepreneurchiks” (Lu, 
2000) by taking advantage of China’s economic reforms. There is limited research on 
the Chinese police and still less in the study of Chinese police malpractices (Wong, 
2012). There is no literature on comparisons between policing in India and China. 
However, getting reliable data on the extent and nature of corruption generally and on 
PSB malpractices in particular is extremely difficult. Surveys that are available 
consistently indicate that corruption is one of the main concerns of both officials and 
citizens (Wong, 2012; Wong, 1998; Pei, 2007). Consequently, research into identifying 
what the barriers are to building police-public trust and the potential factors that 
influences an officer’s decision-making at the moments-of-truth in India/China will help 
to redress this yearning gap. 
3. Methodology:                                                                                                                            
I adopted a mixed-method approach (i.e. one-to-one interviews, focus groups, surveys, 
and field-observations) so as to get an understanding on the inner ways of working by 
getting inside the heads of the frontline ‘bobbies’ on the beat. This is the “Inside Out & 
Bottom-Up, Horses’ Mouth” approach that Wong espoused. In concluding his research 
into internet forum comments by PSB officers, he noted, “In not so many words, the 
police voices told us that the future of police reform in China most likely rests on the 
people and their culture, values, and interests; thus, studying policing in China is 
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perhaps better suited for cultural anthropologists than lawyers or social scientists” 
(Wong, 2012, p.375). 
Verma argued that, “…the difficulties in obtaining cooperation especially from 
organizations that are secretive and defensive about their activities remains 
insurmountable. In organizations like...the police, the only way to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the prevailing organizational culture are from those "insiders" who 
have worked in different capacities for sufficiently long periods of time to describe and 
explain the genesis of the culture. Such personal accounts have their limitations, for 
these could be construed to be biased or subjective and even suspect since the narrator 
may have an axe to grind. Authors also charge that insider accounts mindlessly ignore 
the deeper complexities of the craft of policing and the paradoxes and ironies that mark 
the role of the police. Nevertheless, such accounts still remain the best source to learn 
significantly about any organization and in one sense the object of any cultural study is 
to seek an insider's viewpoint” (1999, p.266).  
Wong argued that research into the PSB is a much neglected field and that the 
prevailing negativism toward Chinese ways of doing things acts as a barrier to unbiased 
scholarships and commentaries, “Surprisingly, outside of China, few attempts have 
been made to study Chinese legal, criminal justice, and police reform on her own terms. 
Instead, most foreign observers have adopted a negative view toward China’s political, 
legal, and criminal justice system to the point of being dismissive (e.g. “uncivilised”) and 
contemptuous (e.g. “barbaric,” “punitive,” “arbitrary,” “capricious”)’ (2012, p.51). 
Peerenboom also commented on the lack of interest in the West towards the serious 
study of the Chinese legal system, “Within the academic world, political scientists on the 
whole have paid little attention to legal reforms. Much of the political-scientist literature 
is devoted to high-level Party manoeuvring elite politics, and geopolitical issues. Nor 
have sociologists, anthropologists, or economists devoted much time to exploring 
developments in the legal system, even when they are directly relevant to their research 
topics” (2002, p.563). 
However, it is also fair to say that it is difficult to research the state security apparatus 
of most countries but in China there are more barriers to overcome. This was brought 
home to me when I asked a PSB contact for an organogram of a typical police station 
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only to be met by the warning that “these are regarded as secret so it won’t be possible 
to get and you must be careful asking for official materials”. The difficulty of getting 
reliable data is also another issue in China, “It is impossible to get any kind of data 
regarding malpractices by the police, there’s no transparency, and no unified data. Each 
province and municipality can selectively make public what they wish, and there are 
only official statements. When Mainland legal reporters tackle this topic, they have to 
go in person to the court to submit an application of enquiry for information – but the 
application won’t necessarily be accepted or handled” (Shanghai Journalist). 
In contrast, there are much more readily available material on Indian policing. However, 
Verma (1999, p.266) noted that “although, there is a growing literature about Indian 
police… there is virtually no empirical research about its organizational culture. The 
literature describing the organizational practices, belief systems, prevailing norms and 
values within the Indian police is very limited. Some understanding of the organizational 
practices and norms is available from the memoirs published by former police officers 
and through some journalistic accounts. However, these could hardly be classified as a 
scholarly examination of the organizational culture within the Indian police”. Moreover, 
Sinha (2012, p.91) asserted that “while socio-economic reforms have attracted the 
attention of policy-makers and academicians in areas of health, education and the like, 
the Criminal Justice System has seldom generated much interest in India”.  
In regard to decision-making in China, Wong argued that the Chinese take cognisance 
of feelings more so than the West, “Oriental thinkers, with Confucius in the lead, have 
long considered the holistic and integrated nature of the body, soul, and mind with 
regard to decision-making. As such, the Chinese are situational feeler-thinkers who 
think in a contextual, concrete, and above all, intuitive (emotional) way, as distinguished 
from Westerners, who tend to be dispositional (and dispassionate) rationalistic thinkers 
and whose thinking can be individualistic, general, abstract, or, most significantly for our 
purposes, logical. The observation here is that who we are as people and how we think 
or feel as individuals affect the process, content, and outcome of our decision-making 
or, more generally, our life choices…After an in-depth review of a court case in imperial 
(Qing) China, Eugenia Lean concluded that “the moral authenticity of emotions has 
been a powerful motivating force” in justice administration…When foreigners study 
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Chinese policing, of necessity (inaccessibility of the culture) and by choice (facility with 
rationality and being drawn to utility), there is a tendency to substitute Western “thinking” 
for Chinese “feeling” when considering crime, social control, and justice” (2012, p.58-
61). 
In short, in order to truly understand policing in China, Wong suggests that we need to 
“discern how the Chinese people (including the police) see, think, and feel about and 
evaluate their police. What we see or do not see is governed by our perceptions, 
mediated by perspective and framework. How we think is governed by a cognitive map, 
populated by definitions, classifications, and connections of things, or, more simply, by 
an idea or conception of where everything belongs. What we feel is governed by our 
reception of things, people, events, and ideas, controlled by values, philosophy, and 
ideology of an intuitive kind (i.e. what make for good, beauty, and meaning in life). 
Studying policing in China requires asking three questions: (1) From whose perspective 
are we looking at police reform (e.g. from an insider vs. an outsider’s perspective, from 
a top-down vs. bottom-up perspective)? (2) How are ideas conceived and things ordered 
in the Chinese (police) culture (e.g. duty to collective interests vs. rights of individuals)? 
(3) How do Chinese intuitively feel about what is good, just and beautiful?” (2012:64).  
In the case of India, from Vikash Mehra’s observations3 (and my own experience of both 
cultures,  it can be said that many aspects of the Chinese culture (e.g. desire for peace, 
harmony, family hierarchy, stability and social connectedness) are also important to 
decision-making4. In short, Wong’s argument regarding societal cultural influence upon 
policing in China can also be said to apply to India. 
It is always problematic to cluster a whole race of people to a particular universal 
outlook, especially for vast and diverse countries such as India and China. Nonetheless, 
Mehra and Wong’s observations are worth noting and taking into consideration in terms 
of the formulation of the relevant questions; the way the questions are asked; how the 
answers are interpreted and insights derived. 
                                                          
3 Indian Culture 05/08/14, http://www.importantindia.com/10518/indian-culture 
4 See http://www.commisceo-global.com/country-guides/india-guide 
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In practice, researchers will always need to tailor their planned field research depending 
on the situation and access on the ground. This is more so in the case of researching 
into a sensitive and difficult area of policing/corruption and in the highly complex social 
and political societies of China and India. Consequently, in addition to the usual 
diagnostic tool choices associated with this type of field research there is also the added 
complexity of language and cultural barriers – both societal and organisational.  
In regard to the language issue, in both China and India I was grateful that my local 
pathfinders not only arranged the interviews but were also present to help break the ice, 
and act as interpreters. In China some ex-PSB friends (one holds a UK PhD) either 
accompanied me during these interviews or conducted them alone without me if the 
participant wished for that to happen. In India, many of the interviews were conducted 
in the company of a Cambridge PhD colleague whose father was a retired DGP (Director 
General of Police). The use of interpreters obviously conjures up the feelings of 
inadequacy but it is worth noting that this is a common feeling amongst foreign 
researchers (especially in China) and that practically nobody in the field worked without 
assistance (Heimer and Thogersen, 2000).  
Additionally, there are other cultural (societal and organisational) barriers to overcome. 
However, as a Hong Kong born British Chinese who had studied Oriental Studies at 
Cambridge; had worked in China/India; and was a police officer, I was well prepared for 
understanding the nuances of these cultures. Moreover, my pathfinders were personal 
friends and their reading of situations was invaluable in helping me to interpret, analyse 
and understand nuances from a native’s perspective. Furthermore, as they had all 
studied in the UK, they were also able to critique observations from an academic 
perspective. 
However, in any horses’ mouth research, the first barrier that one has to overcome is 
gaining access. “Gaining access to representatives of the security state is difficult, 
particularly for foreign researchers. Scholars seeking to break into this world must 
identify points of entry, navigate cultural differences and establish trust with their 
interviewee” (Scoggins 2014, p.1). One way of gaining access is via official channels 
but (according to Heimer and Thogerson 2000, p.12-13) this may expose researchers 
to official control over data collection and a potential lack of autonomy. In China, this 
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may result in “walking in the footsteps of the CCP” where respondents are more likely 
be under the “direct political-ideological control of the CCP or at the very least restricted 
by the influence of the Party on what can be disclosed”. Furthermore, going through 
official channels may potentially allow the “Chinese state to construct the discourse and 
defining which topic we and our informants can and cannot talk about”. Moreover, due 
to “changing political climate even local officials do not know where the boundary lie in 
regard to what is politically sensitive or not, hence there is a general tendency for 
interviewees to play safe”. Consequently, alternative sources of information, from critical 
articles in scholarly journals to the hairdresser’s opinion and comments (guerrilla 
interviewing – Gold, 1999) in Internet chat rooms (Wong, 2012), can be used to 
contextualise our studies and shape our understanding of the research topic. I took this 
advice and enriched my data by interviewing as many subject matter experts and 
members of the Chinese and Indian public as I could during my research. 
The other access approach is through the snowballing method (Hoyle et al., 2002; 
Scoggins, 2014). Scoggins (2014, p.1) argued that interview information is not available 
as research into policing in China had been extremely limited and that which has been 
done was predominately top-down, therefore effort in gaining access even via the 
snowballing method is worthwhile and often the only choice left to researchers. I had 
met a wall of silence from the Chinese authorities requesting access, thus, this was the 
method I decided to adopt. I also adopted the same snowballing approach for India 
because I felt that it was best to align my method for both countries as much as possible 
to enable compatibility. Moreover, as I had anticipated that there would be greater 
difficulties in obtaining data from China I decided to focus on this first to see what data 
I could get before progressing to India. This approach allowed me to adjust my data-
gathering-tools in order to obtain the kinds of data I needed for comparison. 
In addition to the access issues, researching in China, and especially in the case of 
interviewing in closed government institutions, familiarity with the researcher’s potential 
insider/outsider impact to that process need to be understood (Ke, 2015; Herod, 1999; 
Dwyer et al., 2009). Furthermore, to facilitate a smooth interaction, shared culture 
(Hofstede, 1980; Bond and Wang, 1981) as well as other connections (e.g. in my case 
policing experience) need to be leveraged. In short, in qualitative research the 
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researcher cannot avoid bringing individual experience, personal background and pre-
existing understanding of a phenomenon into the research process. Consequently, the 
researcher has to be thoughtful, and self-aware of the role that s/he plays in that process 
(Finley, 2002). 
It is worth noting that even by adopting the snowballing method, as in official access 
situations, the tendency for interviewees to ‘play-safe’ when discussing sensitive 
subjects such as corruption can still occur. Therefore, as an experienced interviewer in 
sensitive situations I  overcame this potential obstacle by making every effort to building 
rapport and trust with the interviewees and by being authentic, empathetic, credible (e.g. 
by sharing my personal history which included my childhood in a Hong Kong shanty 
town, working in a toy factory aged five, an immigrant to the UK at the age of 10, as well 
as, my career achievements in policing, politics, and business) and reiterating 
assurances on participant anonymity.  
Reflexivity (Takeda, 2012; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Griffith, 1998; Bridges, 
2001; Hellowell, 2006; Merian, 2001) allows us to observe our feelings, positionality 
(Takeda 2012, p.2) and the analysis of this dynamic is an important source of data. 
Reflexivity is an on-going and active process of critical reflection both on what 
knowledge has been produced - what do I know - and on how this knowledge comes 
into existence - how do I know what I know (Takeda 2012, p.2). In short, reflexivity is a 
significant part of the process of knowledge production, especially in qualitative 
methodologies and being an ‘insider’ allows researchers a more complete knowledge 
than that of an ‘outsider’ where (as in my own case) life (including policing and low social 
class origins) experiences may outweigh structural or biological characteristics in 
understanding where one stands in relation to one’s interviewees (Takeda 2012, p. 2) 
as well as intuitively appreciating the nuances of what is being said. As stated earlier, I 
found the fact that I was an experienced police officer and a Chinese who studied 
Oriental Studies and Social Political Sciences as an undergraduate, as well as, 
someone who had worked extensively in both China (as a management consultant) and 
India (I had been Vice President in an Indian Company) was certainly an advantage in 
helping to understand such nuances.  
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In sum, in researching the Indian and Chinese police it can be argued that it is more 
fruitful to take a bottom-up and inside-out approach as espoused by Wong. In my desire 
to identify the barriers to trust where decision-making factors at the ‘moments-of-truth’ 
between police/public interactions is a key part of the study then in designing the data 
capturing tool as well as during the data capturing stage one has to be mindful of the 
difficulties in researching into sensitive topics within the security apparatus. These 
obstacles notwithstanding, if insights can be gained as to the importance or otherwise 
of these influencing factors and the degree of impact they have then potential solutions 
can be developed for mitigation. This would in turn potentially help India and China to 
build a police that is less prone to the temptation of malpractice - thereby benefiting the 
population as a whole and users of police services in particular. 
 
 
3.1 Public Surveys and Focus Groups                                                                            
China:                                                                                                                               
Although the primary aim of my study was to get an inside-out horses’ mouth 
perspective, it is nevertheless also useful to gain a holistic view by gathering an outside-
in perspective in order to contrast and identify potential gaps in perspectives between 
the citizens of China/India; between police and citizens; and between officers of these 
two countries. To do this, for the China part of my research, I conducted two focus 
groups and collected responses from a survey. Due to various constraints (e.g. difficulty 
in gaining public access) in doing a traditional public survey on a sensitive topic in China, 
I initially spoke to mainland Chinese living in the UK to obtain their views on the PSB. 
However, I found that these were unsatisfactory due to factors such as stale opinions 
because of the length-of-time respondents had left China or biased by the fact that they 
had decided to live a ‘freer’ life in the UK.  
Consequently, I decided to use PRC students in Cambridge as my sample. I managed 
to obtain 31 responses for my survey out of the total population of 1,068 (Cambridge 
University Student Statistics 2015/16). It is recognised that the size and the limited 
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socio-economic and demographic make-up of these students cannot obviously provide 
a representative sample for generalisation purposes. However, I believe that there are 
still useful insights to be gained because they are more likely to respond to the survey 
in a more open and informed fashion than their counterparts in China. This is because 
they are far from home and hence less likely to be shackled by political and social 
constraints as may potentially be the case if the survey was conducted inside of China. 
These students are also generally better educated, better informed, better travelled and 
have greater exposure to western culture than their average fellow countrypersons. 
Moreover, it is safe to say that these individuals are members of the country’s ruling 
class as many of their parents are either senior officials or wealthy business people who 
are most certainly in a majority of cases senior CCP members. Furthermore, most intend 
to return to China after their studies so they have more stake on how China develops 
than their counterparts residing permanently in the UK. 
In short, these students will have a better chance of one day becoming members of 
China’s ruling elite and are therefore more likely to have the ability to influence the 
direction of China’s development than the average PRC citizen and certainly more so 
than Chinese living in Britain. Consequently, it can be argued that obtaining their views 
on the subject of police trust has greater significance than views from the general 
population. Moreover, as members of the ruling class they are more likely to support the 
police and the status quo than the average citizen. Thus, any criticisms or poor regards 
for the PSB will add more weight to their answers and to any potential negative findings 
from this study.   
The public survey was created after I had conducted a thorough literature review on the 
PSB and discussions with Criminal Justice academics in China, USA and the UK as 
well as subject matter experts in Hong Kong and UK. I also conducted a small number 
of informal interviews with Chinese Students to adjust the questionnaire content and 
format. I used these initial interviews to gauge the level of appetite for participation and 
to understand any potential barriers to getting responses from the student population. I 
learnt from these interviews that many Chinese students were uncomfortable in 
discussing matters relating to ‘state security’ and on top of this reluctance, many were 
mindful of presenting a positive image of China and its police. One emotional 
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interviewee’s comment that “it is ok for me to criticise our police but I always find it 
offensive when outsiders especially Westerners criticise them” summed up the 
sentiments shared by many I encountered. 
The questionnaire was largely a perception survey asking respondents to assess 
officers’ motivation for joining the police; their moral character; views on the level of 
corruption and malpractices; how they would rate officers’ social status – here I decided 
not to simply ask respondents to select between White Collar or Blue Collar Workers 
because I did not want to assume that foreign students necessarily know the 
distinctions. Therefore, I created a list of professions for respondents to choose from 
which included, for example, teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc. for White Collar and shop 
assistants, factory workers, etc. for Blue Collar ; what they believe the PSB culture to 
be in regard to tolerance of malpractices; the percentage of CCP membership in the 
PSB; whether the PSB treated everyone on equal terms – For this I listed a bi-polar 
construct contrasting treatment by the police in a dispute between the following 
categories: Wealthy Businessman; Government Official; CCP Member; Factory Worker; 
Peasant; and a Migrant Worker. By pairing each category into a systematic one-to-one 
comparison I hoped to be able to narrow down the level of bias through the adding up 
of frequency of choices and thereby establishing a hierarchy.  
I also included experiential questions in the form of whether they or a member of their 
family/friend had ever paid a bribe to the PSB. Furthermore, I wanted to test out attitudes 
and trusts by using the UK Police as the benchmark in asking who they trusted more 
and how they would react under certain circumstances in the UK verses when they are 
in China. My reason for using the UK police as a benchmark is because these students 
would most likely have had some impression of both the UK and Chinese police. In the 
question I asked them to indicate whether they would (1) definitely involve the police, 
(2) may involve the police or (3) definitely not involve the police under various scenarios. 
These scenarios were based on the most frequent types of situations that, in my policing 
experience, a police officer would be called upon to deal with in the course of a tour-of-
duty. I categorised them into: Victim of serious crime (e.g. robbery, assault with injury, 
burglary); Victim of minor assault without injury; Witness to a serious crime (e.g. assault 
with injury, robbery, burglary) or to anti-social behaviour (e.g. rowdy youths and yobbish 
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behaviour); civil disputes with a trader or a neighbour; traffic accident; and ‘being a good 
citizen’ type questions e.g. reporting to police when they see suspects loitering or theft 
from motor vehicles. The responses can be compared between China and India for the 
purposes of using them as a proxy to gauge trust of the two countries’ respective police 
to perform their duty. Open questions were used to solicit comments from respondents 
in regard to what questions they would ask a PSB officer if they had the chance and, 
that if they were stuck in the lift with President Xi of China what advice would they give 
him on how to improve trust between the Chinese masses and police. I hoped that these 
questions would yield insights into what respondents believe to be the core issues facing 
the PSB from the point-of-view of its future elites.      
I distributed the survey randomly to students through various forms of encounters e.g. 
social events; attendance at lectures; as well as, via various student associations; and 
personal network. All the questionnaires were completed and returned anonymously. 
However, even by assuring respondents that these were anonymous (as no identifying 
details were recorded on the questionnaire itself) a large number of students that I had 
approached were still either reluctant to complete the questionnaire or refused outright 
to take part saying that the subject matter was “too sensitive”.  
After I had received 31 responses I conducted two focus group with Chinese students. 
I had originally planned to hold only one session with 12 students but had to do a second 
because of the difficulty in securing enough participants at the first session where only 
3 of the 12 actually showed up. I was told by one of the students who had helped me to 
organised the session that many had pulled out when they discovered in more detail the 
topic of my research. In the end, however, I did manage to secure 13 participants in 
total over the two sessions but as in the first session a number of students who had 
agreed to participate also failed to show.  
During these focus groups I noticed that while there were some individuals happy to 
share their ‘war stories’ a large number were obviously reluctant to criticise the PSB. 
Furthermore, judging from the body language (e.g. folded arms, crossed legs, frowning, 
leaning far back on their chair as if checking out of the discussion, covering their mouths 
with their hand, etc.) that I observed, many were uncomfortable with the subject matter 
under discussion especially when the topic of corruption was brought up or when the 
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more openly critical participants were sharing their war stories. During one focus group 
a more willing female participant brought up a number of examples of police misconduct 
reports on Chinese social media adding that “you see and hear about these kinds of 
corruption and abuse all the time in China”. To which, a more reluctant male participant 
challenged her by saying “I don’t trust these sites, I never see these on social media, 
you only see this because you actively look for it”. Moreover, his body language (leaning 
forward towards her, frowning, twisted facial expressions, and pointing finger, etc.) 
indicated to me that he was rather annoyed by the fact that a fellow Chinese was openly 
criticising the police in the presence of a Western researcher – even though I am a 
British Chinese born in Hong Kong.           
My purpose in holding these sessions was so that I would be able to get a more 
qualitative handle on some of the responses I had in the survey; to get more experiential 
insights into police-public encounters; and qualitative perceptions of trust or the lack of 




I kept the data-gathering between China and India as closely as possible, by conducting 
a survey with Cambridge Indian students. I obtained 24 responses out of a total 
population of 299. As in the China case I first conducted a literature review and 
interviews with Indian students and subject matter experts in order to adapt my 
questionnaire. From these activities I made the necessary adjustments, for example, in 
the question relating to fairness I replaced ‘CCP Member’ and ‘Migrant Worker’ with 
caste status unique to India by introducing Brahmin (highest) and Scheduled (lowest) 
Castes. This is because in spite of government attempts to eradicate the caste system 
it nonetheless still dominates much of Indian society. I would also argue that the 
observations regarding the elite status of the Chinese sample also holds true for the 
Indian sample - albeit to a lesser extent.  
 
However, due to my experience that canvassing public opinions in India is much easier 
than in China I supplemented the student survey data with interviews and focus groups. 
I managed to obtained views from individuals of diverse castes and social backgrounds 
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(e.g. barristers, documentary-makers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, company 
executives, property developers, taxi drivers, consultants, government advisors, 
shopkeepers, labourers, peasant farmers, village heads, bank managers, families of 
serving police officers, a professional golfer and a British expat, etc.). Although many of 
these interviewees were from Uttar Pradesh (UP), I did also manage to interview 
members of the public from Goa, Chennai, Bangalore, Delhi, and Mumbai. The 
conclusion I gained from these validation interviews was that whilst there are differences 








I took an iterative approach to designing my interview and survey tools because I was 
unsure of what access level I would attain; how open or comfortable the interviewees 
would be to the topic; and what the quality of the insights would be. Judging from the 
experience with the Chinese students and the largely silent response I had from the 
Chinese authorities regarding access to interviewees/data I was extremely cautious and 
pessimistic in being able to access sufficient interviewees and survey respondents to 
gain meaningful data. However, through various routes – e.g. personal/family network, 
introductions from members of Cambridge University, cold calling individuals and 
institutions in China, Hong Kong, UK and the USA – I was able to seek out the 
appropriate introductions and thereby start the snowballing process. I was eventually 
able to conduct 29 interviews: 2 with Chinese Judges; 2 with Chinese Prosecutors; 2 
with Chinese lawyers; 1 with a Chinese Journalist, 2 with Hong Kong Assistant Police 
Commissioners with knowledge and experience of working in China and India and 20 
with serving PSB officers of various ranks from Superintendent (SP) downwards. All the 
interviews were conducted under agreement of total anonymity and the interviewees 
came from various parts of China – Beijing, Jiangsu, Shenyang, Hejian in Heibe, 
Qingdao, and Guandong/Shenzhen.  
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To minimise any potential resistance or embarrassment and to reduce barriers for an 
open and honest discussion I made clear that I was interviewing these officers as 
subject matter experts in the policing situation of China and that when we discuss 
attitudes or activities surrounding corruption and misconduct they are not talking about 
themselves nor their colleagues giving me their opinion on what a typical PSB officer 
would do in a particular set of circumstances. I did this because in my experience it is 
always easier to be candid if one removes the potential for moral judgement and 
recrimination. Moreover, due to the universal policing mantra of ‘covering your ass’ few 
police officers would openly admit to any personal forms of illegality/wrong-doing. 
 
To further make the interviewees feel safe the interviews were conducted more as 
conversations between international policing colleagues sharing each other’s policing 
experiences and they were usually conducted in restaurants, bars or other social venues 
and we were joined by their good friends or family members who had set up the meeting. 
However, in spite of these precautions a number of potential interviewees outright 
refused to participate, frequently citing the phrase “too sensitive”.  Additionally, a large 
proportion of officers who had originally agreed to meet pulled out after having had 
second thoughts saying that it was “tai ma fan” (too much trouble). It is worth noting that 
these officers were asked by my contacts who were close friends, colleagues or family 
members of the targeted interviewees and many were well respected individuals of high 
social status. Therefore, the significant number of declines, which in the Chinese culture 
inevitably leads to the lost-of-face, provides a glimpse of how sensitive this topic is in 
China and how reluctant officers were in sticking their heads above the parapet.  
 
Moreover, even officers who had agreed to meet, on two occasions, I found myself 
having to wait in the hotel while my contact went to the meetings alone armed with my 
briefing on the types of questions and insights I was after because the interviewees 
called at the last minute to say that s/he would only talk in private with my contact but 
not with me being present. I conducted two interviews via telephone as the interviewees 
were reluctant to meet in person to discuss this topic. I also conducted 5 interviews at 
dinners or over coffees at official China/UK events that I was invited to either as a VIP 
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guest or as a speaker where I sought out delegates who were senior PSB officers or 
members of the judiciary. It was noticeable how these conversations were a great deal 
more formal and guarded than the privately arranged interviews. Nonetheless, I was 
surprised that even in these interviews I was still able to get insights into the private 
views of these individuals. In short, I had to be very flexible in the way I approach 
individuals and in the way I asked sensitive questions and how I recorded their answers. 
I was very grateful for the skills/experiences I had acquired as a police officer and as a 
management consultant because I was experienced in the art of asking awkward 
questions in ways that would solicit a response and in the recording of 
evidence/conversations immediately after the event as well as being verse in the 
reading of body language.  
 
Obviously, my difficulty in acquiring willing participants in my research is not unique in 
the study of China’s security apparatus. However, the timing of my fieldwork was not 
very opportune. This was because I was there in September/October 2016 when the 
Chinese authorities were in the throes of preparing for the G20 Summit. This meant that 
security (and the desire to prevent any kind of loss-of-face) was a top priority for the 
country’s leadership. Additionally, the UK had just voted for ‘Brexit’ of the European 
Union leading to a new Prime Minister and her (Theresa May) deciding to postpone the 
granting of the Hinkley Point Nuclear Power Station Project to China until after a review. 
This decision caused a diplomatic hiccup because China had thought that they had 
already won the rights to build this plant under the Cameron administration. One 
Chinese academic told me “it’s very difficult to research China’s security organisations 
especially by a foreigner. Sometimes if the political atmosphere is a bit more relax then 
you can sneak in get your data and get out. Currently the political atmosphere is much 
tighter under President Xi, people are more cautious and the diplomatic spat with the 
UK doesn’t help either”. 
 
The design of my interview guide consisted of a number of themes: 1/ Ethos/raison 
d’être; 2/ Governance; 3/ Culture and ways of working; 4/Job satisfaction and morale; 
5/ Malpractices/Corruption; and 6/ Potential causal and inhibition decision-making 
factors (see table below): 
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These enabling/causal and inhibiting decision-making factors were made up into 
individual cards and at the end of each interview I would place them randomly in front of 
the interviewee and ask them to select the top 5 choices from the 20 options. I then ask 
them why they had selected these and elicit war stories out of the interviewees by asking 
for examples of it happening in their experience. I used the interviewees’ answers to 
provide qualitative commentaries to the survey results where respondents were asked to 
select the top 10 factors in order of importance thereby providing me with quantitative 
data on hierarchy as well as potential differences between the rank and file officers’ views 
versus managers. 
 
These influencing factors are important because they can potentially be ‘inhibitors’ or 
‘enablers’ to malpractices. For example, if officers are used to collecting levies and 
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enforcing commercial contracts this would potentially increase the chances/temptation for 
abuse. Additionally, the fact that local units are poorly funded where the officers are 
routinely not paid their salaries and where officers have to actively issue fines in order to 
keep the ‘lights on’ (Wong, 2012) then this would also encourage malpractices. 
Consequently, both of these factors are clearly ‘enablers’. However, a strong and 
independent media that openly reports malpractices or a spontaneous viral internet debate 
that highlights such incidences may be ‘inhibitors’ to an officer from abusing his/her powers 
at the moments-of-truth. In short, these factors are worth exploring because they might 
hold the key to gaining important insights into the minds of the officers. Obviously in the 
Indian case some of these factors are common and therefore may apply (e.g. low pay) but 
others (e.g. administrative powers) would not apply. Consequently, the factors used for 
China were adapted for India but in so doing I was able to gain further insights.   
 
My experience in India was a great deal easier, especially in terms of gaining access and 
being able to conduct more interviews in a structured fashion – i.e. recording answers 
during interviews in a meeting room. Most of the interviews were conducted either in police 
offices or at police stations (Chowk) where I was treated as a VIP guest with endless rounds 
of refreshments being offered to ‘Sahib’ during the time I spent on police premises and ride-
alongs. This was made possible because I was lucky enough to have been hosted by a 
very respected Uttar Pradesh (UP) DGP Mr. K. Singh (a very open-minded, candid and 
reflective gentleman of enormous presence and gravitas and one of the few DGPs who 
served a full two-year-term in that office and was later retained by the Chief Minister as an 
advisor after he retired in 2012) whose daughter was a PhD colleague at Cambridge. As a 
family guest and treated as a “member of the family” I was able to have daily interactions 
with my host and even though all the surveys and interviews were done on the basis of 
anonymity, Mr. Singh readily agreed for that to be waved for his contributions.    
 
Moreover, I found the fact that I was introduced as the first Chinese to join the British police; 
was a “famous Senior British Police Officer” who had worked in “New Scotland Yard”; 
someone who had had a successful international corporate career; had stood for the British 
Parliament; and was a Cambridge graduate now back doing a PhD added to my 
prestige/credibility. I was aware that this positioning was potentially a double-edged sword, 
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whilst it was an advantage when dealing with senior officers who treated me as a peer. But 
with junior officers, in a society and in an institution where the culture is based on hierarchy 
and deference, I had to make sure that the uneven power dynamics did not bias my 
interviews. Therefore, I adopted a humbling posture when interviewing junior officers to 
make them feel at ease and to encourage them to be as honest and open as possible by 
showing warmth and deference in my mannerisms and reassuring them that their opinions 
were anonymous. The enthusiasm and willingness of both senior and junior officers to have 
their say was in stark contrast to my somewhat cloak-and-dagger China experience. 
Indeed, in China, I found that me being a “high profile British-Chinese” sometimes acted 
against me because some potential interviewees actually changed their minds about 
meeting me when they realised who I was. This was because they felt that my profile would 
make it more likely that our undercover meeting would be more easily discovered. In India, 
on the other hand, so many officers (especially junior officers) wanted to have their say that 
I struggled to accommodate. 
 
All in all I was able to interview 37 police officers of varying ranks from Additional Director 
Generals (ADG) to Constables working in police stations and in specialist departments 
such as Anti-Terrorism, Special Task Force (specializing in cybercrimes & wildlife 
protection but this unit was originally set up in the nineties to deal with ‘Dacoit Encounters’ 
– i.e. eradicating armed bandits through extra-judicial killings referred to as ‘Encounters’), 
and Dalit (Oppressed/Untouchables/Scheduled castes) Unit investigating caste-motivated 
crimes. Although the majority of these interviews were arranged either directly by my host 
or via his network I managed to conducted interviews (10) via a local journalist to try and 
eliminate any potential bias in the sample. UP was chosen mainly because of access via 
Mr. Singh but it was also chosen because it is the most populated state in India (with the 
population of 223,897,418 equating to 16% of the total Indian population in 2017) and 
therefore it has the largest police force (327,955 personnel in 2015) in all of India and 
notably the world. Furthermore, UP also contains the area of Agra which is the home of the 
most famous site in India – the Taj Mahal. Among the 37 total, 5 of these interviews were 
with ADGs from Delhi, Goa, Bangalore, Chennai and Kerala either through Mr. Singh or 
other channels in an attempt to validate my findings. 
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In terms of the interview guide, I used the same set of questions as the ones I had used for 
China. However, I did add in questions relating to caste and amended the decision-making 
factors to reflect the Indian situation without altering the thrust/substance: In item (B) I 
replaced MPS with ‘State Government’; in (C) removed MPS and Lei Feng5; (E) replaced 
MPS with ‘HQ’; (G) added ‘State Government, excessive VIP protection & private 
functions’; (J) removed MPS; (N) added ‘since independence’; (P) added ‘acceptance of 
evidence fabrication & evidence enhancing’; (S) removed the term ‘Guanxi’; and (T) 






For China, I initially produced a comprehensive survey based on the five dimensions - i.e. 
ethos/raison d'être; governance; culture & ways of working; job satisfaction & morale; 
malpractices/corruption - with multiple choice answers, 5 bar-gate scales and bi-polar 
constructs, etc. and had the questionnaire translated into Chinese. However, the feedback 
from my contacts in China was that even when they had managed to overcome various 
barriers discussed above to get PSB officers’ cooperation, these potential respondents still 
                                                          
5 CCP role-model 
Decision factors - India 
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refused because the survey was too long and complicated. I was advised that I would stand 
a better chance of getting responses if I were to shorten and simplify my survey to agree 
or disagree statement choices where possible.  
 
In response, and after analysing the interview data that I gained, I prioritised the kind of 
insights I needed validating. From that basis I made the survey simpler but retained the 
decision-making factor section. This revised format meant that I was still able to ask 
questions covering: morale/job satisfaction; whether the job has become more 
complicated; whether they would be proud if their son/daughter became police officers; 
whether central or local government had more power over the PSB; who would be treated 
better in a dispute; how an officer would react witnessing malpractices; and, asking an open 
question regarding what the one thing they would change in order to increase public trust. 
After this adaptation I was able to get a total of 23 responses consisting of 5 
Superintendents (SP), 2 Inspectors (Insp), 2 Sergeants (PS) and 14 Constables (PC) from 
cities including Changzhou, Shenyang, and Hejian in Heibe.   
 
For India, I used the same survey format but it was very noticeable that the Indian 
respondents were much more willing to elaborate on their answers. In total I received 39 
responses consisting of 1 ADG, 1 Inspector General (IG), 1 SP, 4 Inspectors (Insp), 18 
Sub-Inspectors (SI), 9 Head Constables (HC), and 5 Constables (PC). Apart from 
amending the decision-making factors as described above, the other question in the survey 
I amended related to who has more say in appointing senior officers. As law and order is a 
state responsibility, the appointment of senior officers is a state government affair except 
that the IPS (Indian Police Service) cadres (entry as Additional SP via a national exam) are 
federal level officials whom state governments cannot readily sack but they can be 
transferred. Moreover, during the research I was told by many interviewees that there was 
a great deal of political interference in appointing not only senior officers but also the 
constabulary. Consequently, I added into the question two additional options – i.e. 
politicians and senior officers. I did this with the intention of soliciting extra insights into the 
level of interference by politicians.  
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In sum, I used the same tools and method of data-collection for both China and India to 
enable ease of comparison. I conducted public surveys with Chinese and Indian students 
at Cambridge University as well as conducting focus groups with Chinese students. Due to 
the fact that it was easier to canvass public opinion in India than in China I was able to 
engage with wider and more diverse sections of the Indian public thus, unlike China, I was 
able to conduct interviews and focus groups with members of the public beyond the student 
sample.  
 
Overall, for the outside-in view, I obtained for China 31 student survey responses, 4 one-
to-one interviews, 13 focus group participants and 9 in-depth subject matter expert and 
stakeholder (e.g. judges, academics, journalists, etc.) interviews. For India, I obtained 24 
student survey responses, and 35 interviews/focus group participants. In terms of police 
engagement part of my data-collection for China, I was able to obtain 20 PSB interviews 
and 23 survey responses. For the Indian police, I obtained 37 interviews and 39 survey 
responses. In total, I obtain 115 survey responses/interviews for the public part of my 
research and for the police perspective part I obtained 119 interviews/survey responses. 
Making a combined total of 234 participant engagements through surveys/interviews - see 
Appendix 3 for results.          
 
4. Discussion:       
In this section, I will discuss my findings by attempting to answer: 1/ how are the 
Chinese/Indian police impacted upon by economic modernisation? 2/ to what extent are 
the police trusted by the masses? 3/ do the police carry out their duties in a fair and 
unbiased fashion? 4/ what do corruption/malpractices look like and why do they persist? 
and 5/ what are the key influencing factors for ethical decision-making at the moments-of-
truth? 
However, I will first provide an overview of the Chinese and Indian police. The rank 
structures of both the Chinese and Indian police are shown immediately below for the 
reader’s convenience. Table 1: Indian Police structure and Table 2: PSB structure. The 
tables will also help the reader to understand my abbreviations for various ranks.   
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Table 1: Indian Police Rank (*positions reserved for IPS officers only)                                                
Comments   
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In terms of background, according to Sun and Wu (2010) the PSB have undergone two 
periods of development since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The first being the 
counterrevolution period, which was between 1949 and 1977. The task of the PSB during 
this period was to suppress and punish anti-revolutionary or anti-communist party activities. 
The economic reform of 1978 opened a new policing era with a focus towards 
professionalization and modernisation. During this era, China went through a number of 
changes in criminal legislation, police functions and strategies. The introduction of the 
Police Law in 1995 was an effort by the government to regulate policing and the 
abandonment of class struggle as the dominant ideology. The main objective of policing 
Table 2: Chinese Police (PSB) ranks                                                                  Comments 
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now focussed on protecting economic development. This new focus forced the PSB to find 
a balance between law enforcement and public service6 and it required them to put more 
effort into protecting the interests and properties of entrepreneurs. Thus, the major 
functions of the PSB shifted to social order maintenance, public safety improvement and 
the protection of property. The second era of policing saw an increasing influence of 
western policing theories and practices on China’s policing development. For example, this 
student was one of the first British Police Officer to be invited to Beijing’s Public Security 
University in 1995 to give a series of lectures on community policing as practised in the 
UK, and by 2002 the MPS required community policing to be fully implemented in all 
departments by the end of 2004. However, Wu et al. (2016) suggest that the differences 
between China and the West lie in the social-cultural dimensions, such as, China’s long-
standing mass line principle and the use of residential profile systems (e.g. household 
registration - Hukou), government-funded civilian organisations (e.g. neighbourhood 
committees) and early intervention strategies are systematised and more widely and 
regularly used. 
 
Wu et al. (2016) further suggest that today’s Chinese policing system consists of several 
police agencies: the police in public security organisations, the police in state security 
organisations, the police in correctional facilities and the judicial police in the people’s 
courts and procuratorate. Out of all these police agencies, the public security police (PSB) 
has the most interaction with citizens. The PSB is centrally organised and divided into 
several administrative levels: the MPS, provincial-level police departments, city/county-
level police departments and neighbourhood-level police stations. Officers in this police 
organisation wear a common uniform irrespective of location, and all its precincts and 
divisions nationwide follow the same rules and regulations about enforcement procedure, 
recruitment standards, training requirements, rank structures, promotion criteria and 
benefits. It is noteworthy that the local governments exercise strong control over police 
forces by determining policing priorities, allocating budget and conducting personnel 
management. Moreover, police in China are given a great deal more official responsibilities 
                                                          
6 E.g. Introduction of public emergency call facilities (Wong 2012). 
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(e.g. fire, health and safety, running detention centres, etc.) and powers7 than their 
counterparts in the West and India. This means that the PSB (in their official capacity) have 
more interactions and involvement with the fabric of people’s daily lives than say the British 
police for example.     
 
Similarly, in India, many police and public interviewees highlighted the ubiquitous presence 
of the Indian police in the lives of the masses. This, they claim, stems from the legacy of 
the colonial model where the police was the sole enforcement agency and took the lead in 
resolving all kinds of disputes. Consequently, they are called upon today to act in situations 
even though officially it is not within their scope of responsibilities8. The current Indian 
policing model, according to commentators (e.g. Sengaputa, 2010, p.720-722), “can be 
traced historically to a peculiar combination of an already existing rural police system and 
a British model, set up in the mid-nineteenth century, based on the Royal Irish Constabulary 
(Bayley, 1969). With the governance of two-fifths of the sub-continent passing from the 
control of the East India Company to the Queen in 1858, a slew of legal codes and 
legislations were enacted for British India, including the Code of Civil Procedure in 1859, 
the Indian Penal Code in 1860, the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861 and, finally, the 
Police Act of 1861. The Act established a police structure that is virtually intact in 
contemporary India: a three-tier system comprising the constabulary, the supervisory ranks 
(Sub-inspector and Inspector) and the Deputy Superintendent and Superintendent of 
districts as ‘superior’ officers…along with a Deputy-Inspector General who supervised a 
range (a set of districts), and the Inspector-General who oversaw the police department 
and reported to the provincial government. The Acts that governed the British model 
continue to be the core legal tenets invoked by the Indian police, while the three-tier 
structure also continues with some modifications, including the expansion of the senior 
levels with the creation of posts such as the Additional Director Generals and Director 
Generals of police. The entire police department is under the control of the Ministry of Home 
                                                          
7 The PSB retains many of the administrative powers that they enjoyed under the Mao era for dealing with vices 
such as drunkenness, drug abuse, prostitution and delinquency. This enables them to by-pass criminal law and 
the various legal functions (e.g. judiciary, prosecution department, etc.) and the checks and balances within the 
criminal justice system. That is, they are able to issue fines and detention orders without due process or the 
requirement to involve other government agencies.     
8 This point was made by a number of senior officers.   
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Affairs at the provincial level, and the head of the department is supervised by the Home 
Secretary and the Chief Secretary...Under Article 246 of the Constitution of India...the 
police, public order, courts and other allied institutions come within the ambit of State or 
provincial authority. ...Consequently, the local civil police institution is governed at state 
level and is seen by many as the everyday face of the state”. Moreover, similar to China, 
various Indian states also introduced community policing9 and public emergency call 
facilities in an attempt to professionalise their police and as a response to the changing 
needs of policing since economic modernisation.  
 
4.1How are the police impacted upon by economic modernisation? 
 
4.1 (a) Economic modernisation:  
 
Scholars and commentators (e.g. Yang et al., 2014; Potter, 2009; Shen and Tsai, 2016; 
Hou, 2011; Huang, 2012; Zhu, 2012; Pleskovic and Stiglitz, 2000) characterise China’s 
economic modernisation efforts as based on incrementalism and pragmatism. “During 
the 1970s, profit-making activities were illegal, China’s economy was closed to foreign 
trade and investment, and internal migration/labor mobility was highly restricted. By the 
1990s, those key constraints to market oriented development had been reversed: the 
private sector was legalized and thriving, China became one of the world’s leading 
destinations of FDI, and hundreds of millions of rural migrants were working in its 
cities…Incremental reforms generated unexpected economic transformation” (Shen 
and Tsai, 2016, p.108).  
 
Wen (2012. p.12) argued that China’s latest “attempt at modernisation started in 1978 
under leader Deng Xiaoping. The country refused to take advice from Western 
economists (unlike what Russia did in the 1990s) and instead took a very humble, 
gradualist, experimental approach with its economic reforms. The keys to this approach 
have been to: 1. maintain political stability at all costs; 2. focus on the grassroots, 
bottom-up reforms (starting in agriculture instead of in the financial sector); 3. promote 
                                                          
9 Miharu Yui (2006) 
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rural industries despite their primitive technologies; 4. use manufactured goods (instead 
of only natural resources) to exchange for machinery; 5. provide enormous government 
support for infrastructure build up; 6. follow a dual-track system of government/private 
ownership instead of wholesale privatization; and 7. Move-up the industrial ladder, from 
light to heavy industries, from labor to capital intensive production, from manufacturing 
to financial capitalism, and from a high-saving state to a consumeristic welfare state”.  
 
Wen further argued that, “China’s path to industrialization has gone through three major 
phases: 1. 1978-1988: proto-industrialization. This phase featured the sprouting of 
millions of rural enterprises (collectively instead of privately owned by farmers) across 
China’s vast countryside and small towns; these enterprises acted as the engine of 
national economic growth during the first 10 years of economic reform. The number of 
village firms increased more than 12-fold (from 1.5 million to 18.9 million), village 
industrial gross output increased more than 13.5-fold (from 14 percent of gross domestic 
product, or GDP, to 46 percent of GDP), village peasant-workers grew to nearly 100 
million by 1988, and farmers’ aggregate wage income increased 12-fold. Because of 
such phenomenal growth in the supply of basic consumer goods, China ended its 
shortage economy (a typical feature of all centrally planned economies, characterized 
by the rationing of meat, other food, clothes and other basic consumer goods) in the 
mid-1980s and simultaneously solved its food security problem. The 800 million farmers 
were the biggest beneficiaries of the economic reform in this period.  
2. 1988-1998: first industrial revolution. This phase featured mass production of labor 
intensive light consumer goods across China’s rural and urban areas, relying first mainly 
on imported machinery. During this period, China became the world’s largest producer 
and exporter of textiles, the largest producer and importer of cotton, and the largest 
producer and exporter of furniture and toys. Rural enterprises continued their hyper-
growth, and their workers reached 30 percent of China’s entire rural labor force (not 
including migrant workers). Village industrial output grew by 28 percent per year, 
doubling every three years (an astronomical 66-fold increase) between 1978-2000.  
3. 1998-present: second industrial revolution. This phase featured the mass 
production of the means of mass production. Because of the rapidly and 
enormously expanding domestic market for intermediate goods, machinery and 
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transportation, there was a big surge in the consumption and production of coal, 
steel, cement, chemical fibers, machine tools, highways, bridges, tunnels, ships, 
etc. In all, 2.6 million miles of public roads were built, including more than 
70,000 miles of express highways (46 percent more than in the U.S.). Twenty-eight 
provinces (out of 30) have high-speed trains (with total length exceeding 10,000 
miles, 50 percent more than the total for the rest of the world)” (Ibid., p.13). 
 
However, as China has industrialized, it has “picked up not only the positives of Western 
development but the negatives, including rampant corruption and organized crime, 
unprecedented pollution and environmental destruction, rising divorce and suicide rates, 
widespread business fraud and scandals, markets full of “lemons” and low-quality 
goods, pervasive asset bubbles, rising income inequality and class discrimination, 
frequent industrial accidents, etc. And there are other challenges, including building 
social safety nets, finishing social and economic reforms in the health care and 
education sectors, finishing rural urbanization and agricultural modernization, 
establishing modern financial infrastructure and regulatory institutions as in the U.K. and 
U.S., and establishing a modern legal system as in Hong Kong and Singapore” (Wen, 
2010, p.14). Other challenges include the emergence of social strata10, rural-urban 
migration11, rapid urbanisation12, and even marriage prospects for  the less educated 
and low income males13. These negative developments have added weight to scholars 
(e.g. Huang, 2008; He and Sato, 2011; Warner, 1978; He, 1993; He, 1998; and 
                                                          
10 See Anne Anagnost From ‘Class’ to ‘Social Strata’: grasping the social totality in reform-era China. Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2008, pp 497 – 519; and, A caste-like system of social stratification: the position of 
peasants in modern China's social order Chapter 15 in Potter, J. (2009) China’s Peasants. The Anthropology of a 
Revolution: Cambridge University Press. 
11 Siham. G. (2015) Highlight the issue of large numbers of unskilled rural-urban ‘floating population’ (non-Hukou 
population) who are classed as ‘permanent temporary population’. Rural-urban migrant numbers jumped from 
30 million in 1980 to 262.61 million by 2012.   
12 The population of India currently stands at 1.1 billion and China at 1.3 billion. It is estimated that between 
2010-2015 the annual rate of urbanisation in this period was 2.47% for India and 2.85% for China. In 2011 31.3% 
of the total Indian population were classified as residing in urban areas and in China it was 50.6% of its total 
population (Index Mundi, www.indexmundi.com/facebook/compare/india,china. Retrieved 30/05/17). 
According to the PRC State Statistic Bureau (2005a, 2005) China’s urban population grew from 17.92% of total 
population in 1978 to 41.76% of total population in 2004. The bureau estimates that by 2050 75% of China’s 
population will reside in urban areas. Wu. F.  Xu. J. and Yeh. A.G (2007) Urban development in post-reform 
China: State, Market and Space. Routledge, London and NY. 
13 Jia Yu & Yu Xie, Changes in the Determinants of Marriage Entry in Post-Reform Urban China.  Demography 
(2015) 52:1869–1892.     
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Anagnost, 2008) who challenge China’s economic success story as “rapid economic 
growth with equity”14 (Huang, 2008).  
 
In the case of India, Byington and McGee (2010, p.9-10) argued that, “From 1947 to 
1991 India was under socialist-based policies that created a governmentally protected 
economy. It was characterized by extensive regulation, pervasive corruption, and slow 
growth (“Economy of India,” 2009). This situation was referred to as the “License Raj” 
because of the extensive red tape that was required in order to set up a company. As 
an example, there were 80 different agencies whose requirements had to be satisfied 
before a private company could begin operations (“Licence Raj,” 2009) and subsequent 
to this process, production would be further regulated by the government. These 
conditions resulted in the creation of numerous dysfunctional, unproductive corporations 
that were state-owned. Since 1991 there have been a number of developments that 
have moved the economy toward a market-based system. These developments include: 
(1) freedom from the red tape of the “License Raj,” (2) attempts to take the state-owned 
industries private, (3) relaxed rules pertaining to foreign direct investment in certain 
industries, and (4) the easing of cash flow across borders. These developments 
have…led India’s economy to become one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
world (Joshi, 2008)”. 
 
However, others (e.g. Rani, 2013; Sharma, 2011; Kotwal et al., 2011; Fall, 1998; 
Kothari, 1997; Siggel, 2010) paint a less structured picture and argue that the 1991 
modernisation effort was triggered by a financial crisis.  For example, Garikipati and 
Pfaffenzeller (2012:843) contend that, “India’s economic reforms, in common 
understanding, started in 1991. They were preceded by a period of high but 
unsustainable growth which culminated in the crisis of 1991 during which per capita 
GDP growth fell to -1 per cent...This crisis unfolded against the backdrop of high debt 
                                                          
14 Gini coefficient is a widely used measure of inequality and takes into account income distribution among 
residents of a country. The higher the Gini coefficient, the greater is the inequality. According to IMF data India’s 
Gini coefficient rose to 51 by 2013, from 45 in 1990, mainly on account of rising inequality between urban and 
rural areas as well as within urban areas. China’s Gini coefficient also rose to 53 in 2013, from 33 in 1990. 
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service as a percentage of exports…and was followed by economic reforms. Given the 
foreign reserve component of the crisis, these reforms were linked to IMF and World 
Bank conditionalities. India’s reform agenda was mainly focused on policy areas such 
as current account convertibility, industrial liberalisation (for example less restrictive 
labour laws, dismantling trade barriers), privatisation of large loss making public units 
and removal of subsidies mainly on credit, electricity and fertilisers. From 1991 onwards, 
licensing was abolished for most industries, quantitative restrictions were removed for 
a number of capital and intermediate goods imports and foreign direct investment was 
partially liberalised while a reduction in tariffs was phased in. This year also saw the 
beginning of a currency realignment which led to the unification of dual exchange rates 
in 1993 and the establishment of current account convertibility in 1994…Against the 
background of these reforms, India is classed as an open economy in Sachs and 
Warner (1995) from 1994 onwards and further reforms have taken place since. For all 
the breadth of the reform agenda, it has been limited in its depth. India’s economy 
remains highly regulated by international standards. This fact is illustrated by the overall 
value of the Economic Freedom Index which improved only slightly from 45.1 in 1994 to 
54.2 in 2007…As expected these policies had a beneficial impact on growth. The 
economy, which had grown at 3 per cent in the seventies and 5.5 per cent in the eighties, 
grew more than 6 per cent in the post-reform period. Growth acceleration has coincided 
with a moderation of annual inflation which experienced a sustained fall below levels of 
8 per cent from the late 1990s and declined to annual rates of 3 to 4 per cent by the 
beginning of the 21st century”. 
 
However, while accelerated growth in India has been widely attributed to the economic 
reforms of the 1990s, their impact on poverty is still a subject of intense debate. Most 
scholars agree that poverty has continued to decline during the post-reform years (the 
1990s). While the official government line is acceleration of poverty reduction, which is 
supported by Deaton and Dreze (2002) and Lal, Mohan and Natarajan (2001) others, 
including Bhalla (2002), Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003), Sen and Himanshu (2004), 
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Siggel (2010), Kothari (1997), Garikipati& Pfaffenzeller (2012)15, Fall (1998), Kotwal et 
al. (2011) posit that poverty reduction has continued at a slower pace after the reforms. 
Other scholars, for example Rani (2013) highlighted some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of India’s reforms. Kothari (1997, p.85-97), focusing on the 
disadvantages, argued that, “Behind the façade of superficial symbols of consumption, 
however, lies a story of increasing disparities: a rise in under-and unemployment; a 
deterioration in the livelihoods of a majority of the population; an increase in critical 
poverty; a decline in the membership of trade unions; and a phenomenal increase in the 
number of workers in the informal sectors of the economy and in the extent of the 
irregular employment. Additionally, there has been an intensification of rampant 
corruption, particularly by political and economic elites; a staggering increase in 
environmental degradation in both urban and rural areas; loss of bio-diversity; and 
growing social unrest arising largely out of greater immiseration. At the same time, there 
has been an increase in dependence upon international capital and multilateral and 
transnational institutions, resulting in a critical loss of control – not just by producers, but 
by the country itself…Politicians used poverty alleviation programmes and infrastructure 
development monies to advance their patronage networks. In the process, most 
programmes sustained dependency of the recipient on the donor rather than creating 
wider social and economic security…Demand for land consolidation and greater power 
to agro-processing and food processing companies, small, marginal and landless and 
particularly women among them is severely affected”. 
 
Furthermore, Kothari (1997, p.97-99) went on to argue that, “The 1991 reforms, besides 
affecting production, have also impacted the way business is transacted in India in the 
form of the black economy16. Evidence that illegal activity is steadily finding its way into 
the public domain is suggested by the dramatic increase in tax evasion, graft and 
financial speculation, as well as an increase in the illegal traffic in weapons and drugs. 
                                                          
15Argued that poverty alleviation due to growth has not only been limited but it has widened the rural-urban 
poverty divide and increased marginalization of female agricultural workers – which in 2001 stood at 46.9% of 
the Indian labour force.     
16 The government’s attempt at tackling this through demonetisation was evident during my fieldwork where 
high denomination bank-notes were withdrawn and people were made to open bank accounts to justify their 
deposits. According to media reports this led to a great deal of hardship (including suicides) among the poor who 
traditionally never held bank accounts.  
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Black money is used extensively for political patronage and economic gains. It is spirited 
abroad through the havala markets, where foreign currency is exchanged for Rupees at 
higher than the official rates, and is also cleared through the under-invoicing of exports 
and over-invoicing of imports (black money become legitimate through various 
amnesties)17.  Much of this black money is used to purchase gold, guns, drugs and 
gems and smuggled into the country and purchased by people using black money! Black 
income is estimated to be 20-25% of national income.18 The systematic violation of laws 
and regulations that perpetuates black money has partially been made possible by 
grand symbiosis between businesspeople, politicians and bureaucrats who have 
entrenched themselves in the political system…The 1991 reform has also led to 
increased unemployment19 and underemployment…The greatest effects are on 
artisans and handloom weavers and the young – driving the young into underworld 












                                                          
17See Arun Kumar, “The Missing Dimension of Micro-Economic Policy Making in India: The Black Economy,” 
Working Paper, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University 
(New Delhi: 1993).    
18 See Kamal Marayan Kabra, The Black Economy in India: Problems and Policies (New Delhi: Chanakya 
Publications, 1983. 
19 According to World Bank index covering the 10-year period of 1996-2016, the average unemployment rate as 
a ratio of total labour force for China was 4.4 and 3.9 for India. See also, for example, Michael P. Todaro, "A 
Model of Labor Migration and Urban Employment in Less Developed Countries," American Economic Review, 
March, 1969, p. 147, for correlation between unemployment/underemployment and crime.   
20 See Singh, A. K., “Social Consequences of New Economic Policies with Special Reference to the Working Class,” 
Economic and Political Weekly (13 Feb 1993).  







4.1(b) Economic impact – a brief comparison:            
 
 
Whichever side of the debate one favours in terms of the impact of China and India’s 
economic modernisation, the data from the World Bank (table 3 above) indicates 
improvement to the material lives of the masses. Whether it is GNI per capita and GDP 
growth; decrease in inflation; reduction in poverty; increases in live expectancy; or 
improved access to fresh water and sanitation, both China and India showed sustained 
Table 3. World Bank Development Indicators                                                                                     
Source: Adapted from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (Last updated:06/01/2017)  
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positive improvements between 1990 to 2015. However, in comparing China with India, 
these indicators (e.g. GDP, Income per capita, population density, poverty ratio, 
internet/mobile phone usage, energy consumption, access to clean water/sanitation 
facilities, life expectancy, infant mortality rate, education, etc.) along with other 
indicators (e.g. Adult literacy rate: China 96.4% versus India 71.2% - UNESCO 2012; 
The average number of individuals living in a private household: China 3.0 - National 
Bureau of Statistics 2013, China Statistical Yearbook 2013 versus India 4.8 - Census of 
India Population Enumeration Data 2011; as well as the HDI metrics shown in table 4 
below) suggests that the Chinese people live a wealthier, healthier, safer and more 
comfortable life than those enjoyed by their Indian counterparts.        
                                                                                    
Moreover, any international traveller to India and China can see the differences between 
these two countries as soon as one steps outside of the airport. Especially in areas away 
from tourist attractions most casual observers will fail to note the poverty21, poor sanitation 
(including open defecation in public places by its inhabitants as well as itinerant cows), lack 
of cleanliness and poor housing – all common features of the Indian urban landscape. As 
                                                          
21Researchers argue that there is a correlation between inequality and crime: see, for example, Journal of the 
Asia Pacific Economy, 2015 Vol. 20, No. 2, 202_223, “Crime rates and inequality: a study of crime in 
contemporary China.” Tsun Se Cheong and Yanrui Wu; Bharadwaj’s quantitative study in India suggests that 
there is “a positive and statistically significant impact of poverty, inequality income growth and low quality of the 
legal system in incidences of total property-related crime” (“Bharadwaj. A. Is poverty the mother of crime? 
Empirical evidence of the impact of socioeconomic factors on crime in India.” Atlantic Review of Economics. 1st 
volume, 2004); Crime in India: specification and estimation of violent crime index Kausik Chaudhuri • Payel 
Chowdhury • Subal C. Kumbhakar J Prod Anal (2015) 43:13–28. 
Table 4: Human Development Indicators (HDI) 
Source: Adapted from UN Human Development Indicators 1990-2017. *USA 3.9; France 1.2; UK & Germany 
0.9 UN Human Development Index: Comparison between China and India covering period 1990 to 
2017(Including measurements, such as: Health; Education; Income; Inequality; Gender; Poverty; Work, 
Employment and Vulnerability; Human Security; Trade and Finance; Mobility and Communication; 
Environmental Sustainability; and Demographics) ranked China 90
th
 with score of 0.738 versus India ranked 
131 and a score of 0.624. Best ranking is 1. 
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an ex-police officer I can speak from personal experience that it is less challenging when 
working in prosperous neighbourhoods than in poorer and more densely populated ones. 
Consequently, factors such as population density, community homogeneity, material 
wealth, hygiene and cleanliness of an area22 do play a part in forming police attitudes 
towards their work. This then leads to how a police officer goes about his/her duty and how 
s/he interacts with and gives due regard to residents of poorer parts of a city23.     
 
4.1 (b) Effects of economic modernisation on crimes: 
 
The study of criminal behaviour has been conducted from a variety of different 
viewpoints. One early group of theorists (e.g. Lombroso’s Theory formed in 19th century) 
focused on body-type, attempting to support and validate the assumption that genetic 
factors, as they appear in the structure of the physical organism, cause crime24. Another 
tradition has focused on race, some scholars even going to the extreme of asserting 
racial characteristics as causal factors in criminal conduct25. Crime has also been 
studied from the viewpoint of social class, generally revealing correlations between 
class membership and the prevalence of certain kinds of crime, as well as correlations 
between class and the volume of crime26. Durkheim's classical examination of the 
impact of the nineteenth century French industrial revolution on deviance and crimes 
laid a foundation for contemporary modernization theory and research (Huggins, 1985). 
Durkheim argued that in the process of modernization, rapid social changes disrupt the 
integrative force of the collective conscience, and consensus on social values 
associated with traditional society breaks down, resulting in social disintegration—a 
normless condition he termed anomie. He maintained that anomie is the social source 
of deviance and crime (Durkheim, 1933; Durkheim, 1950). Rostow (1960)27 also 
                                                          
22 See Broken Windows theory, proposed by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in 1982 that used broken 
windows as a metaphor for disorder within neighbourhoods. Their theory links neglected neighbourhoods and 
low level anti-social behaviours within a community to subsequent occurrences of serious crime. 
23 For example, R. Sharma (2006) found that the Indian police paid more attention to rich neighbourhoods.  
24 See George B. Vold, Theoretical Criminology (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985). 
25 See Richard R. Korn and Lloyd W. McCorkle, Criminology and Penology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1959), ch. 11. 
26 See Shaw and MaKay (1942) The Chicago School/Social Disorganisation Theory. 
27 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1960). 
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advocated the study of crime from a viewpoint of socioeconomic development where 
the process of economic development is viewed in stages. This, he argued, allows a 
more extensive consideration of the social, cultural, and historical contexts of crime. 
“Clusters of circumstances distinctive of specific developmental stages, or criminogenic 
contexts, are suggested as means of characterizing such variables. The first is a product 
of the unplanned drift of rural populations to urban areas in search of a better life. The 
second is a product of the changeover of elite groups in societies seeking to make the 
transition to modernization and sustained economic growth” (Fisher 1987, p.17). 
 
As an example, Tobias (1967, p.37), in Crime and Industrial Society in the 19th Century, 
wrote that, “in the last half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth 
century, society was in violent transition. The towns were growing rapidly, and the 
facilities available to their rulers were very limited and their knowledge of how to use 
them even more limited. Their population, ever increasing, was predominantly a young 
one, and the young town-dwellers were faced with a whole host of unfamiliar problems, 
problems for which their background and training provided them with no answer. The 
towns, and especially London, had always had a criminal problem different from and 
larger than that of other areas, and there were groups of people, living in distinctive 
areas, who had evolved a way of life of their own based on crime. Many young town-
dwellers faced with these problems and receiving no assistance from their families or 
their employers (if they had families or employers) or from the municipal authorities, 
found solutions by adopting the techniques, the habits and the attitudes of the criminals. 
There was, thus, in London and the other large towns in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century and the earlier part of the nineteenth century, an upsurge of crime which was 
the fruit of a society in rapid transition”. 
 
Additionally, Shelley argued in Crime and Modernization (1981) that at early stages of 
modernization, urban and industrial growth undermines the traditional way of life in 
urban areas. The concomitant social disorganisation, anomie, and weak control 
promote increases in property crimes. Newly arriving migrants from the countryside 
bring with them the traditions of violence associated with rural life, which leads to 
increases in violent crime. At later stages of development, patterns of crime change. 
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Property crimes continue to rise, becoming the most prominent type of criminal activity. 
In contrast, the growth in criminal violence subsides as rural migrants become adjusted 
to urban life. 
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, rapid rise in urbanisation in both China and India has led to a 
number of issues for both the PSB and the Indian police. In China, for example, official 
statistics indicate that serious and violent offences increased substantially from 1978 to 
2006 (Hu et al., 2014). Although official crime statistics in China, as in many other 
countries, are notoriously unreliable28, available data nevertheless showed that overall 
crime in China has taken an upward trajectory since economic reforms began in 1978. 
For example, between 1981 and 2001 robberies grew from 22,266 to 352,216 (Bakken, 
2004) - an increase of 18 fold. According to Marescialli (2005), the MPS reported that 
the nature of crime has changed since reform in that there are many more street crimes, 
car thefts, con games, blackmail, and e-prostitution. Moreover, most of the perpetrators 
for reported crimes are juveniles (Shuhua, 2000), migrants (Wang, 2002), and criminal 
gangs29 (Chen, 2005). In short, in today’s China crimes of major concerns for the 
government are property/economic (Forster, 1985), violent, official misconduct 
(Investigative Report on Chinese Official Crime, Beijing, 2004), and Internet (Chen, 
2004; Wong, 2005; Yu, 2007; Liang and Lu, 2010). 
 
Liu (2006, p.127) argued that, “The rapid modernization process in China, especially over 
the last two and one-half decades, brought about profound social consequences. China 
achieved very fast economic growth while engendering large increases in crime…the total 
official crime rate reached 337.5 per 100,000 people in 2002 from a rate of 55.91 per 
100,000 people in 1978 (Press of Law Yearbook of China, 1988 ;  Press of Law Yearbook 
of China, 2003)…The present study used annual time series data from 1978 to 2002 on 
                                                          
28 Dutton noted that “We agree with those Chinese scholars (including the MPS!) who suggest that public 
available statistics grossly underrepresented the extent of the crime problem in China” (1993:316). 
29 Chen. A. (2005) in “Secret Societies and Organized Crime in Contemporary China.” Modern Asian Studies, 39, 
77-107 argued that unemployment, impoverishment, economic inequality, relative deprivation, and political 
corruption created disadvantages and marginalized social groups, leading to organised gangs. 
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major crimes in China. Crime rates per 100,000 people. The statistical results comparing 
trends of property crimes with violent crimes showed a general pattern that property crimes 
increased at a faster rate than violent crimes during China's modernization process over 
the last two and one-half decades…The transition towards a market economy is a process 
of fundamental institutional change, which not only eliminated the previous institutionalized 
suppression of economic motivation for individuals, but also strongly encourages and 
stimulates it. In contrast with socialist institutional arrangements, pursuit of self-interest and 
realization of selfish economic motives of individuals and business firms are seen as 
fundamentally important for the operation and growth of the market economy. Market 
institutions embody the values orientation that promotes personal economic ambition, 
achievement orientation, entrepreneurial spirit, and individualism; it rewards and 
encourages entrepreneurship, which is an essential factor of production, fundamentally 
important in facilitating the growth of the economy (Hagen, 1962; Inkeles & Smith, 
1974; Lerner, 1958; Lerner, 1968; Levy, 1966 ;  McClelland, 1961)…The introduction of 
market institutions in China created vast opportunities for individuals to pursue economic 
success. From the countryside to the cities, individual and family based private businesses 
(getihu) boomed. The get rich examples of early starters further stimulated larger numbers 
of others. The Communist Party's new ideology encourages the entrepreneurial spirit and 
condones selfish economic motives for profit. These are considered compatible with a 
market economy and essential in the development of a market economy. The official media 
has criticized the traditional orientation as unfit for the modern economy. The institutional 
change in official ideology contributes critically in stimulating economic motivation. Getting 
rich by any means has become a national spirit. Under these social processes, crimes have 
increased dramatically. It is reasonable to speculate that there is corroboration between 
the patterns of expanding economic motivation and the patterns of a faster rate of increase 
in property crimes compared to that of violent crimes. Greatly expanded economic 
motivation has been a driving force for many social behaviors, including crime. Compared 
with violent crimes, property crimes are instruments for profit. The findings that property 
crimes increase at a faster rate than violent crimes mirror the pattern of exploratory 
expansion in profit motivation. The findings suggest that expanding economic motivation is 
a generating process for crime patterns. This explanation differs from traditional 
modernization theory, which mostly cites the breakdown of the traditional way of life, rural-
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urban migration, social disorganization, anomie, and weakening social control during 
modernization for explanations of crime patterns. The differential rates of increase in crime 
seem to corroborate more with the economic motivation explanation”. 
 
Other Chinese scholars (e.g. Hu, Qian and Chen, 1989) point to not only the changing 
economic structure but also deteriorating social conditions; the erosion of traditional 
communal cultural values and bonds towards individual-centric ones more suited to a 
competitive market place which tends to attenuate personal relationships and accentuate 
interpersonal conflicts. Moreover, the increasingly diversified and mobile urban population 
adds further complications to the already straining traditional collective communal 
surveillance and order management systems (Jingtai zhian guangli), such as household 
registration, which were no longer effective in tackling criminality in economically reformed 
China. In short, “economic reform has not only contributed to a rise and change in crime, 
but also to its demographics…[where] old strategies and methods are no longer working” 
(Dutton 1993, p.316).       
 
Similarly, economic modernisation and urbanisation have resulted in an increase in the 
incidence of crime in India. For example, according to the National Crime Bureau, 
Ministry of Home Affairs the crime rate in India stood at 1769308 in 2001 and by 2014 
this number has rocketed to 2851563. Sinha (2012, p.96-97) pointed out that “with 
increasing urbanisation and breakdown of community structures, there has been a 
resultant pressure on the police to respond to a plethora of situations…The increasing 
criminalisation of social or civic norms (e.g., spitting on footpaths or roads, smoking in 
public spaces) has only added to their woes. All these have led to increased workload 
and strain on the police, thus reducing their ability to act promptly and increasing 
criticism of the system. Additionally, they have to deal with issues of terrorism, 
gangsterism, trafficking, etc.” The increase in “gangerism” was also highlighted in 
Weinstein’s (2008) book Mumbai’s Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized 
Crime and Land Development - in which she argued that liberalisation and deregulation 
since the early 1990s has diminished demand for smuggled consumer goods and 
criminal syndicates have since diversified their operations. With skyrocketing real estate 
prices since the 1990s, bolstered by global land speculation, the mafia began investing 
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in property development. Supported by an illicit nexus of politicians, bureaucrats and 
the police, the mafia has emerged as a central figure in Mumbai’s land development 
politics. Furthermore, Byington and McGee (2010, p.10) point to the fact that, “India’s 
economic growth also fostered growth in White Collar Crime. Examples of this type of 
crime in India include: (1) fraud related to five World Bank health projects that included 
bid rigging, bribery, and manipulated bids during the procurement process; (2) credit 
card fraud at an Indian call centre; and (3) the fraudulent financial statements of the 
giant outsourcing company Satyam Computer Services, Ltd. (Credit Card Fraud in India, 
2009; Magnier, 2009; Serious Fraud Revealed, 2008)”. 
 
4.1 (c) Impact of economic modernisation from police officers’ perspective:    
 
As already shown in table 4 above, according to the HDI China’s homicide rate is 0.8 
versus India’s 3.2 per 100,000 of population. I also utilised the statistical website 
Nationamaster.com which provides access to their online database. Using this website, 
I was able to do a crime comparison for the year 2014 (year where the website’s 
databases had sufficient data for both countries to allow an online comparison). This 
site utilises official crime statistics from China and India as well as data from various 
sources30 and provides a ranking for countries based on recorded and perceived fear 
of crime by residents. The results are shown in table 5 below, being ranked number one 
is the worst outcome. Although this is only a single year snapshot it nevertheless 
provides us with a glimpse of actual crimes reported as well as perceived fear of crimes 
between the citizens of China and India. It is worth noting that while the overall actual 
and perceived numbers of crimes in China is less than half of those in India, property 
crimes (such as robberies and burglaries) are substantially higher in China, but the fear 
level among the Indian population is substantially much higher – e.g. 79% greater fear 
of being burgled. Moreover, whilst violent crimes such as assaults are more than twice 
as high in India as they are in China but the fear of being victims to such crimes is 
reported to be 64% higher among the Indian population. If one views China as being 
                                                          
30 E.g. Various UN reports ; World Development Indicators, etc. http://www.nationmaster.com/country-
info/compare/China/India/Crime  
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ahead in its modernisation than India, then these results can be said to support Shelley’s 
(1981) argument. That is, in the later stages of development, patterns of crime changes. 
Property crimes continue to rise, becoming the most prominent type of criminal activity. 
In contrast, the growth in criminal violence subsides. Additionally, these findings indicate 
that the fear of crime is far greater in India than it is in China. Therefore, these findings 
not only raise questions regarding the Indian masses’ well-being but also their potential 





For China, standing against the above mentioned unprecedented social changes and 
increased crime rate is a police service under enormous pressure, “Many police in China 
have no idea on how to deal with modern crimes and are struggling to adapt to new 
demands” (Insp 20 years of service). Against this backdrop, Wong (2012) argued that the 
number of incidences involving police malpractice and abuse has also grown since 
economic modernisation, leading to widespread public concerns. This may have led to the 
previous unwillingness of citizens to openly challenge authority in general, and the 
traditional superior–subordinate relationship between police and citizens in particular, 
having gradually been altered: “The number of cases brought against the police has 
increased substantially over the last ten years in my estimation” (Female Intermediate 
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Court Judge); “I had a young officer who was slapped on the face and made to kowtow by 
an old lady in the street because she was upset by the officer’s attitude” (Insp 17 years in 
the service). The above sentiments expressed by interviewees seems to support the 
findings of an MPS survey31 conducted in 2006 to evaluate relationships between the police 
and the public from the perspective of urban police officers. They found that 71% of officers 
reported having conflicts ranging from verbal altercations (50%) to physical encounters 
(21%). 57% of these conflicts arise out of policing mass incidents and resolving disputes, 
while 13% relate to making arrests, and 10% dealing with public order cases. In terms of 
PSB officers’ views of the general public’s attitude towards the police, the survey found that 
officers felt that there is a lack of public support, saying that in a majority of confrontations 
55% of the public would stand by and watch, 13% would support the police, 7% would 
support the agitator, and 25% would want to stir up the situation (Wong, 2012, p.176).       
   
Moreover, Wong (2004) argued that there is a noticeable surge of disrespect or resistant 
citizen behaviour toward police authority being observed in today’s China. Although getting 
reliable data is notoriously difficult in China, data that is available shows two interrelated 
national trends that may potentially provide illustrations of this development. The first relate 
to mass protests and the second relate to attacks on, injuries to, and deaths of police 
officers while on duty. The first (according to Sun et al., 2012, p.164) - using 2005 data 
published by the Mainland Affairs Council - a cabinet-level Taiwanese administrative 
agency responsible for the planning, development, and implementation of policies between 
the Taiwan and Mainland China32 -  is the apparent widespread occurrence of mass 
incidents throughout the country. Public demonstrations are said to have increased in both 
number and size, multiplying by more than 2.5 times, from 8,700 in 1993 to 32,000 in 1999. 
The total number of protests increased by over a quarter, from 56,000 in 2003 to 74,000 in 
2004, during the first half of 2005, 341 organized and armed mass protests in 92 areas 
were documented. Among them, 17 involved over 10,000 protesters, 46 involved over 
5,000, and 120 involved over 1,000, causing the deaths of 102 citizens and 55 police 
                                                          
31 Survey of Police and Public Relationship from Police Officers’ Perspective (“Paichusuo minjing zhong de 
jingmin guanxi tiaocha”), Police Post Work, Feb 2006 (http://www.phcppsu.com.cn/news/2006/c-2.htm 
retrieved 03/06/17).   
32 Due to potential conflicting political motives, Taiwanese sources need to be used cautiously. However, when 
used in conjunction with other sources they may help provide an overall impression of the PRC situation.  
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officers (Ibid., p.89). Using official MPS sources Wong (2012) argued that “According to 
Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang, mass incidences are increasingly getting 
worst:157 The number has obviously increased. The 10,000+ mass incidents in 1994 and 
the 74,000+ mass incidents in 2004 represent an increase of more than sevenfold over the 
span of 10 years. The number of participants increased from 73,000 persons in 1994 to 
3,760,000 persons in 2004, more than a fivefold increase”.  
 
Both in India and China one of the effects of economic growth is the increased value of 
land and land disputes have become a major source of confrontation between the police 
and public. In China, the spread of mass incidents since reform is said to usually relate 
to land seizures without due process or illegal seizures motivated by corrupt local 
officials. One of the most notorious and widely reported mass incidents relating to land 
dispute is the Wukan protest. This was an anti-corruption protest that began in 
September 2011, and escalated with the expulsion of officials by villagers, the siege of 
the town by police, and the death in custody of one of the village representatives in 
apparent suspicious circumstances. The villagers forced the entire local government, 
Communist Party leadership and police33 out of the village. Residents in several villages 
near Wukan alleged that village officials had confiscated their farm land and sold it to 
developers. Wukan villagers claimed that they were unaware of the sale until developers 
began construction work, and alleged that local party officials had profited from the sale 
of communal land without compensation since 1998. The villagers petitioned various 
levels of government in vain over the years, accused local cadres of pocketing more 
than 700 million yuan ($110 million USD). A breakthrough occurred when senior 
provincial officials intervened in the dispute and acknowledged villagers' basic 
demands. The officials admitted to mistakes in handling the grievances and vowed to 
crack down on corruption. The provincial government also agreed to make financial 
                                                          
33 In disputes between the authorities and the masses the police are in a difficult position. On-the-one-hand they 
have to keep law and order but on the other they have to keep the wheels of commerce turning irrespective of 
whether they have sympathies with the demonstrators or not. This was certainly the case during my experience 
of policing violent disputes (e.g. Coal Miners’ Strike – 1984, and News International dispute at Wapping - 1986) 
where many police officers (some were from mining families themselves) had sympathies with the workers but 
had to deal with riotous situations with violence thus being accused of siding with big businesses and being 
“Maggie’s boot boys”.       
74 | Page 
 
records public, to dismiss and investigate local officials responsible, to address flaws in 
electing local officials, and to redistribute land which had been confiscated34.  
In India, not only has economic development led to increasing crime, disorder and 
pressure on an ill-equipped and badly trained police (Singh, 2002, p.151) but it has also 
led to the breakdown in traditional family structures and togetherness. Once many 
families lived off the land and each family worked together to generate an income from 
the family farm. Economic liberalisation and the associated urban growth resulted in 
many family members (usually male) moving to the cities to find paid jobs leading to 
divergent interests among brothers in the family. As parents passed away, disputes over 
assets and land became commonplace especially when land for construction purposes 
is now a valuable commodity. During my stay at the home of DGP K Singh in Lucknow, 
every morning he hosted a wide variety of visitors on his veranda overlooking the rose 
garden on his estate - it was like a king holding court. He kindly allowed me to sit in 
during these morning sessions, which were essentially individuals from all walks of life 
and from various social classes and castes asking him for favours or advice in resolving 
problems – usually to do with corrupt police, government officials, mafia, or goondas 
(ruffians). At the conclusion of these meetings, Mr Singh would make his phone calls to 
various individuals who can ‘help’. I noted that many of the disputes revolved around 
land and/or construction.  
It was explained to me that, “It is extremely common these days, say there are 3 brothers 
left land by their late father but how the land is divided between these brothers is usually 
unclear. As land is scarce, there are many developers wanting to buy the land. However, 
if one of the brothers refuses to sell then a dispute will follow where the other two brothers 
have sold their share and moved on but then the brother that is left faces intimidation or 
threats from the developer either by using goons or corrupt police or they just simply build 
and encroach on his portion of the land. The other usual occurrence is that unscrupulous 
developers will go to a peasant farmer and pay him a below market price because although 
the sum offered seems big to the poor illiterate farmer but the developer and land agent 
know it’s not a fair price. If the farmer refuses to sell then rough tactics are used and the 
developer is usually wise enough to bribe the local police so they turn a blind eye. At 
                                                          
34 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wukan_protests retrieved 02/06/17 
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present there are so many disputes regarding land because people simply squat on other 
peoples’ land and if they pay the police then the rightful owner finds it extremely difficult to 
regain his land so escalation occurs and frequently lead to violence or even murder 
because so much money is at stake” (DGP K Singh).  
 
In China, the second trend relates to the number of deaths and injuries of PSB officers due 
to assaults in the line of duty. In 2005 there were 1932 injuries and 27 deaths (i.e. total 
deaths and injuries in 2005 equals 1,958) and in 2009 injuries on duty rose to 2871 and 
deaths to 431 (i.e. combined total in 2009 equals 3,302). The number of attacks on police 
in 2002 was 12,076 and in 2004 it was 13,891. If one considers the fact that attacks on 
police were virtually unheard of during Mao’s era where there were only on average 36 
officers dying annually in the line of duty (Wong, 2012, p.157-158), then this puts the 
increased numbers into perspective. 
 
It is recognised that comparing statistical data of different countries is problematic not least 
because of the variation in compilation methods, scope and definitions. However, it is still 
useful in our case to use them as potential indicators of how economic transformation in 
China and India has impacted their respective police forces. Table 6 below shows that 
between the periods of 2000 to 2004 while India suffered more police deaths with an annual 
average of 818 deaths on duty verse 456 in China, the numbers of police injuries on duty 
in China (annual average 6,660) was substantially more than those reported in India 
(3,496).     
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It can be argued that using police deaths and injuries on duty data may support the 
proposition that the PSB have felt the impact of economic reforms more so than their Indian 
counterparts. This can be further illustrated by the fact that tables 7a (covering the period 
1989 to 1993), and 7b (covering the years between 2010 and 2014) below show that the 
numbers of police deaths/injuries in India has not been drastically impacted by the country’s 
reforms which commenced in 1991. Indeed, the numbers appears to be roughly similar and 
if anything the numbers for table 7b shows a potential improvement in comparison to the 
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For the PSB the above figures potentially support the case that the increase in negative/ 
confrontational nature of police/public interactions (e.g. policing mass incidents, traffic 
management, enforcing drugs/alcohol laws and other anti-social behaviours commonly 
associated with urban living) since economic reforms promotes hostile sentiments between 
the police and public, “When I first joined the police people used to respect my position and 
no one argued with me. Nowadays, public are rude and disrespectful and openly challenge 
police authority” (Insp 25 years of service). As previously pointed out the average annual 
number of police deaths in the line of duty was low between 1949 and 1978 (averaging 36). 
However, according to the MPS, police deaths were up three years in a row, increasing 
from 443 in 2002, to 476 in 2003, and to 492 in 2004. Occupational risk of death and injury 
may shape officers’ attitudes in interacting with citizens and have a negative effect on 
police/community relations. Using survey data to compare Chinese officers’ occupational 
attitudes with those of the US police, a 2010 study found that PSB cadets were more likely 
than their American counterparts to favour the notion of ‘distrust of citizens’ (Sun et al., 
2010). Indeed, Sun et al., (2012, p.89-90) argued “the rise of mass incidents and police 
deaths may have taken a toll on Chinese policing with respect to officers’ attitudes toward 
citizens and police/community relations”. For example, in response to my question 
concerning the impact of all the changes in China made on an officers’ attitude towards 
work, one respondent noted: “Fear of the unknown when they walk the streets in regards 
to the risk of potential violence towards police. There are a lot more of it these days than 
when I joined 30 years ago and because we are unarmed we often have to run away when 
attacked” (SP 30 years of service).  
 
Moreover, 82% of the PSB officers in my survey agreed with the statement that China’s 
economic growth has impacted policing by making things more complicated and that 
people are more challenging of police than before. It is also worth noting that those who 
disagreed (17%) were all constables with between two to eight years of service, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that they had only known what the job is like post reforms, whereas, all 
the officers who agreed were generally much longer serving officers. Additionally, the 
current state of affairs may have an impact on morale as 62% of the respondents stated 
that they would not be proud if their children joined the police against only 30% who would 
be proud if their children joined the police. This conjecture on morale is further supported 
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by the result that 43% agreed and 56% disagreed with the statement that most officers are 
satisfied with their job because it has high social status and it is a job for life: “When I first 
joined the police we were god and king and the eyes and claws of the Party. We had a lot 
more power and respect back then but I suppose it is still a secure job that provides an iron 
rice bowl” (Insp 25 years of service); “We have less power these days, and public attitude 
towards the police has changed in the last 10 years” (SP 22 years of service); “There are 
now more pressure and less pay compared to others outside the police” (SP 20 years of 
service). Additionally, even among those who said that they were satisfied with the job one 
can still detect an element of negativity, “It’s a stable job that can support my family. Today’s 
society is so competitive it would be impossible to find a comparable job if I leave” (PS 12 
years of service). 
 
In the case of India, commentators (e.g. Sinha 2012, p.92) argued that, on the ground, 
India’s transition from a primarily rural and agricultural economy to an urbanised and 
industrialised society has led to large-scale migration35, which is gradually weakening the 
traditional social control mechanisms of the family and the community. As a result, “…the 
Criminal Justice System deals with increasing conflicts and incidents of crime. Maintaining 
a balance between ensuring justices to victims of crime and protecting rights of the 
accused, who quite often are victims of circumstances, becomes a complex challenge. In 
response, India has continued to rely on penal policies based on age-old principles of 
retribution. Authorities respond to perceived rising crime levels by introducing harsher 
punishments and reducing procedural safeguards in order to secure more convictions.” 
Stretched, stressed, poorly paid, poorly trained, corrupt and carrying on with the “colonial 
master-servant attitude towards the masses” (DGP K Singh), police responds by “making 
innumerable arrests with a dismal record of illegal detentions, extra-judicial killings and 
custodial deaths” (Sinha, 2012, p.92).  
                                                          
35  1/ According to the 2011 India Census the rural population in 2001 stood at 72.19% and in 2011 this declined 
to 68.84% and the urban population increased from 27.81% in 2001 to 31.16% by 2011: “For the first time since 
independence, the absolute increase in population is more in urban areas than in rural areas” (p5). 2/ China too 
have seen mass rural-urban migration In the 30 years since 1979. China's urban population has grown by about 
440 million to 622 million in 2009. Of the 440 million increase, about 340 million was attributable to net 
migration and urban reclassification. “Even if only half of that increase was migration, the volume of rural-urban 
migration in such a short period is likely the largest in human history”. Chan and Bellwood (2011:1-46). ‘China. 
Internal Migration’ In Immanuel Ness (ed.). The Encyclopaedia of Global Migration. Blackwell Publishing. 
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Sinha’s thumbnail synopsis on the effects of urbanisation and economic growth on the 
Indian policing situation provide a useful backdrop to both Nickels and Verma’s 2008 
quantitative study between Canadian, Japanese and Indian officers and my own findings 
from Indian officers’ perspectives. Nickels and Verma (2008, p.203) found that Indian 
officers reported a significantly higher amount of stress where “Dysphoria (i.e. feeling of ill 
at ease) is significantly pronounced among Indian officers...reflection of the relatively 
poorer working conditions and more extensive citizen-media criticism of the police”. In my 
own survey, 74% of officers agreed that economic growth and its associated modernisation 
effects has impacted on their workload, public interactions and increased complexity: 
“Workload is about 90 hours per week at least, sometimes it is 18 hours a day with no leave 
and no respect from police ranks or the public” (Insp 30 years of service); “Economic growth 
has increased wealth and made policing more complicated. Money and what it buys has 
become much more important to people” (SI 1 year of service); Massive population 
increase in urban areas and use of technology has complicated police work a great deal” 
(HC 18 years of service); “People have become more self-centred” (SP 20 years of 
service); and, “The police department is exploited and is in a state of mental tension” (SI 
26 years of service).  
 
Furthermore, 54% of Indian officers stated that they would not wish for their children to 
follow their footsteps in joining the police, and the majority of the 46% who said that they 
would be proud if their children became police officers said that this was conditional in them 
joining via the IPS route. The themes of poor pay36, poor working conditions, political 
interference, feelings of alienation from the public and neglect by the powers that be, as 
well as, schisms of distrust between the ranks were often repeated in both interviews and 
survey responses: “There is a lot of political pressure and job conditions are inadequate. I 
would not want my children to have a life of struggles and tension” (SI 1 year of service); 
“Most police work in districts away from their families because of frequent transfers due to 
political interference. Working away from home means you don’t get to see your family 
sometimes for months or even years. My teenage son said to me recently that ‘you have 
                                                          
36 The average salary of a PC is Rs281,976pa; a primary school teacher earns Rs239,756pa; and a bank clerk earns 
Rs235,245pa. http://www.payscale.com/research/IN/Job=Constable/Salary   
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dedicated yourself to the police for Rs25,000 per month rather than to me – is that my worth 
to you?’ I was very hurt by this comment” (IG 24 years of service); “There is no working 
condition, senior officers don’t care and don’t listen to you. Everyone is too interested in 
making money” (Insp 26 years of service); Nobody cares about the falling morale or poor 
pay and conditions of police. Public only see the poor image portrayed by the media and 
don’t appreciate our problems” (SI 19 years of service); “We’re officially entitled to 30 days 
leave but no one is ever allowed any leave and you have to work even when you are ill. 
Many officers are stressed, feels fatigued, tired, and pressured all the time. Many are 
suffering from poor health conditions; most officers I know have high blood pressure or 
diabetes. Officers simply dropping dead at work are quite common. The workload is high 
and made worse because you are taken away during the day for VIP duties, guarding 
events and myriad of other things, so you only have the evenings to do any police work. Is 
it any wonder that we take short cuts, especially as we only have 24 hours to get the case 
together before presenting the prisoner to court” (Insp 15 years of service); “Politics is all 
about money and staying in power these days and less about ideology or building the 
country. Political alliances need to be built and fed. For example, the equivalent of some 
£20 million allocated by central government for UP police reforms and modernisation were 
diverted by the Chief Minister for programmes to keep his supporters happy. Politicians 
only care about benefiting their supporters to keep them onside. This is especially important 
in rural areas where 70% of the Indian population still live and voting turnout can be as high 
as 90% in these areas. The turnout is so high because for the poor it is the only hope they 
have in changing their situation. This obviously sustain caste and mafia-based politics” 
(DGP K. Singh); and, “Many senior officers have no backbone they do as their political 
masters tell them and they do not take responsibility for things going wrong but are quick 
to take the credit for your good work. It is not unusual to see senior officers decamp from 
scenes of major crime or disturbances so that they can’t get blamed if things go wrong” 
(Add SP 25 years of service).     
 
However, surprisingly, in spite of the sentiments expressed about their working conditions 
and their lack of enthusiasm for their children to follow their footsteps, seventy-seven 
percent of Indian respondents still said that they were either satisfied or happy in their job 
versus 23% who said that they were not. When I tested this with interviewees a number of 
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potential reasons emerged that might explain this result. Firstly, as India does not have a 
comprehensive and well-functioning welfare system government positions are very sought-
after because public servants are hard to fire. Consequently, many officers feel happy in 
the knowledge that they have a job for life and a pension for their old age. Secondly, many 
public servants, including teachers, junior clerks and even janitors, pay bribes to secure 
government positions for the same reasons so job security is an important factor. Officers 
also mentioned that they like the fact that their office provides them with a great deal of 
power and security in an uncertain world. Furthermore, the universal parental aspiration of 
having greater ambitions for one’s children to do better than oneself also seems to have 
had an influence. As many of the longer serving officers, especially among the 
Constabulary ranks (i.e. Head Constables and Constables), are poorly educated they see 
the police not only as a means to earn money (both from salary and bribes), to provide a 
decent living for their dependents but also to provide a good education for their children in 
private schools. Therefore, whilst they themselves are happy to toil in their allocated lot in 
life they hold greater ambitions for their offspring. 
 
The idea of paying for a public-sector position may seem alien to those of us in the UK but 
this practice is obviously widespread in India and it is apparently also a major issue in 
China. Indian police personnel have to pay a great deal of money in order to secure their 
position, “Many pay with the intention of recouping their investment from taking bribes. This 
has become an increasing trend in recent years. For example, in 2005/6 40,000 recruits 
were recruited into the UP police and most paid a fee that was split between senior officers 
and their political masters” (DGP K. Singh). Moreover, rank and file (Constabulary) 
personnel may also have to pay to gain promotion into the gazetted ranks (i.e. Sub-
Inspector rank and above). This is even if they have satisfied and passed all the 
prerequisite requirements for that position.  Additionally, the practice of officers paying large 
sums of monies to secure ‘plump’ postings is also widespread37.  
 
In the case of China, for example, during one of the focus group discussions with Chinese 
students one participant stated that a member of her family had “paid the equivalent of 
                                                          
37 Interviewees referred to good money-making postings as ‘plump postings’.  
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£25,000 to get into a county level police college”38, and one Inspector told me during an 
interview session that, “There are still advantages in having a family member in the police 
because he can protect the family’s interests and facilitate their business. That is why a 
few wealthy families with good guanxi pay up to one million yuan39 for their sons to get into 
the police. On paper, there is very little return on their investment as it would take a long 
time to earn that sum back in salary. They can achieve high ranks and are competing with 
graduates from the provincial police colleges and the two national police universities for 
promotion. Apart from protection, it’s a bit like sending your kids to private schools abroad 
– for face and status”. However, one needs to question whether the motive for buying a 
police office40 at such a high monetary price is merely for ‘face and status’ rather than for 
making money and maximising the positional power that the office provides. Moreover, the 
interviewee emphasised that to be able to buy such a position it was not based on money 
alone but on strong guanxi. Therefore, it can be surmised that the opportunity to buy a 
police office is only opened to those already well entrenched within the CCP and wealthy 
elite. Moreover, even if it is not for making grey money then the need to ‘protect’ family 
interests through having one of their members in such an office may say a great deal 
regarding the instability/vulnerability elite families feel in China. It also provides a glimpse 
of how China really works even with its much-flaunted economic freedom and success. In 
that, positional power is not only as desirable as wealth itself but an essential ingredient in 
the nexus.       
 
According to Pei (2016, p.78-79), there is more to the buying and selling of government 
offices (maiguan maiguan) than just face and status. He argued that this practice is one of 
the causes of China’s ‘crony capitalism’ and creates the necessary conditions for corruption 
through vertical collusion, “It can be argued that maiguan maiguan is a contributing cause 
of crony capitalism since officials seeking promotion through bribery are more likely to 
                                                          
38 There are three tiers of Police Colleges in China – National (Shenyang and Beijing, graduates from these 
universities are potential future leaders. They are posted across China after graduation and the passing of the 
national civil service/police exams. Course duration of 4 years); Provincial (Potential future middle managers but 
can only work in a particular province. Course duration 3 years); and County (Lowest level who can only work in 
a particular city or county. Course duration 2 years).    
39 Approximately £113,690.00 (based on exchange calculation of 1CNY = 0.1136 GBP on 04/06/17).  
40 Sun and Johnson (2009) also discuss the problem of buying of public offices in China in their comparative study 
of corruption in China and India. 
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engage in collusion with private businesses. They need to accumulate sufficient funds to 
finance their purchases and they use the power granted by the offices they have bought to 
recoup their investments”. Indeed, this situation was recognised by President Xi as being 
such a serious problem that in October 16, 2014 he said, “Corruption in personnel matters 
is a prominent problem; the practice of appointing officials in violation of the rules is 
widespread. Our system of cadre management is for show only. In some areas, the 
problems of bribing for votes, lobbying for offices, and maiguan maiguan are grave” (Ibid, 
p.78). As one PSB interviewee confirmed, “Money is now at the heart of the CCP, it is 
intertwined even in the police” (SP 20 years of service). 
 
4.1 (d) Examples of how reforms affected police corruption/malpractice 
 
An example of how China’s economic rise has resulted in more temptations for police 
corruption/malpractices and how the nexus of corruption and power intertwine can be 
illustrated by the rather unique example of China’s attempts to control public fundraising. 
Unlike the UK where raising money for a business venture is relatively unrestricted where 
entrepreneurs can approach would-be investors as they wish including, for example, via 
online crowd-funding, in China raising money for a business venture is more restrictive. 
Private equity investment is a relatively new method of financing emerging companies in 
China as previously most enterprises were state owned entities before economic reforms. 
Under China’s financial administration laws and Criminal Law (1997) public fundraising is 
prohibited if done without government approval. “According to the Supreme Court of 
China’s (13th December 2010) ruling (Fa Shi [2010] No.18) the Judicial Interpretations 
explicitly state that issuing shares of fund to public without approval would merit the charge 
for illegal operation of business. According to the Judicial Interpretations, the offense is an 
act of taking capital from social public including both entities and individuals. It must satisfy 
all the four requirements: (1) the fundraising must have not been approved by the relevant 
authority(ies) or was so conducted under a legal cover; (2) the fundraising was published 
to the social public through channels such as social media, promotion meetings, leafleting, 
sending SMS to public etc.; (3) the fundraiser promises to repay, after a specific period of 
time, the capital and interests, or investment returns in other names in cash, properties in 
kind, shares etc.; (4) the public members targeted in raising fund must be indefinite 
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members of social public. If the fundraising is targeted to the definite persons or entities, 
such as family members or definite members within an entity only, the act does not 
constitute the crime and therefore shall not be punished under the Criminal Law” (Steven 
Wei Su, Partner at Guo Lian PRC Lawyers). 
 
Another Chinese legal expert I interviewed explained, “Today with the rapid rise of 
Fintech41, one of the biggest challenge China faces is with illegal public fundraising . This 
is because it is still very difficult for entrepreneurs to raise money from the banks which 
only usually lend to SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) not private individuals, so if you tried 
to raise money for a business venture from the public you will need either central or local 
government approval depending on circumstances and the nature of the industry. 
Basically, if you raise funds from individuals outside of your family or friendship circles 
without proper approval and a promise of high financial returns then you risk falling foul of 
the complex rules surrounding business fundraising. This obviously present opportunities 
for unscrupulous local officials and police to extract money from you. From an enforcement 
angle it is also quite tricky because it is quite complicated and the police aren’t always that 
knowledgeable about complex and specialist legislations”. 
 
As an example of how the crime of ‘illegal public fundraising’ and/or ‘financial fraud’  can 
be used to extract monies from private individuals is in the case of Wu Ying, an 
entrepreneur from Zhejiang Province, and formerly the sixth-richest woman in China. She 
was convicted of financial fraud and initially sentenced to death. Wu Ying founded the 
Bense Group in Dongyang, her sudden wealth and fame caused a sensation in the Chinese 
media. In 2006, aged only 25, she was ranked by the influential Hurun Report as the sixth-
richest woman and the 68th-richest person in China. She was arrested in February 2007 
for illegal fundraising and fraud, and was tried in April 2009 in Jinhua. She was initially 
charged with illegal fundraising, with a maximum sentence of 15-years imprisonment, but 
the charges were later changed to the more serious crime of financial fraud, which in China 
is punishable by death. The indictment alleged that Wu Ying had illegally raised 770 million 
yuan from the public by promising them high investment returns, and only 380 million yuan 
                                                          
41 Fintech is a term used for online financial services businesses e.g. PayPal 
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was recovered when she was arrested. Wu Ying's attorney, however, contested that she 
merely borrowed the money from 11 of her friends and invested the funds in profitable 
businesses. In December 2009 the court found her guilty and sentenced her to death42.  
 
It is worth noting that she did not approach the general public (as one of the criteria required 
for the charge of illegal fundraising) but had raised money from her close friends and family. 
I was told about this story when I interviewed a Superintendent from the Economic Crime 
Division who said that he had personal knowledge of this case which wasn’t widely reported 
in the Western press. “Wu Ying became a very rich woman in a very short time she would 
not have been able to do that if she didn’t have the right connections in the local police and 
government. She raised funds from her friends and family not the public as claimed by the 
police. Many of these investors testified to the fact that they had all made investments in 
her businesses so they were not defrauded. She was kidnapped by a gang, which included 
the wife of a serving police officer and family members of powerful local officials where they 
forcibly took monies worth several million yuans from her. She tried to report the matter to 
the local police twice but no action was taken and when she continued to report the matter 
she was warned and death threats were issued. She wouldn’t let the matter go and 
continued to complain so the police arrested her and got her convicted even though all the 
investors said that they were not defrauded. The police and the courts took no notice and 
she was convicted. Unusually, for this kind of case, the police and a number of local cadres 
pressed very hard for her to be executed immediately, obviously to shut her up. She was 
lucky that her death sentence was reduced by the Supreme Court. Nowadays, all death 
penalties have to be confirmed by the Supreme Court to prevent local abuse. In China if 
you are arrested and charged then you can be sure that 99% of cases end in your 
conviction43”.   
 
Another example of how economic reforms has impacted the Chinese police in their effort 
to protect the interests of big business rather than the environment or the health and safety 
of its citizens is in the Channel 4 documentary aired in Autumn 2016, “China: Between 
                                                          
42 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Ying retrieved 15/05/17 
43 Conviction rate in China: 99.93% (2013); 99.92% (2015) according to China’s Supreme Court 
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/tag/china-court-statistics-2015/ 
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Clouds and Dream.” A fly on the wall documentary following three groups of ordinary 
citizens concerned about the effects of industrial pollution. One group of villagers who live 
near a number of Chemical plants complains of foul toxic emissions and contaminated 
waste water discharges that are endangering wild life, damaging their crops, affecting the 
land, water and peoples’ health (there are unusually high numbers of incidences of cancer 
in households living near the plant). They complain on camera that local officials and police 
are taking ‘hung bao’44 from the ‘mafia’ plant bosses who ignore their calls for cleaning up 
their operations in accordance to legal standards. Villagers complained that local officials 
ignored their complaints and called them trouble makers. Furthermore, when they went to 
the plant to try and meet the management they were confronted by the local police chief 
who personally beat them for daring to ask for a meeting with the owners. Some of the 
villagers repeatedly said on camera that they were fearful of not only being beaten but that 
their lives will be in danger through ‘accidents’ and claimed that they were being followed 
and filmed by strangers from outside of their village in an attempt to intimidate them.  
 
However, one should have some sympathy for police officers caught up in these types of 
disputes because one of the aims of police in China is to safeguard China’s economy45 but 
at the same time they are called upon to keep the peace. During a number of my interviews 
with senior officers the issue of balancing economic, social and political stability with local 
resident demands on protecting the environment came up, “Deng Xiao Ping said that when 
you open the window a few flies will be let in. Part of our job is to help local government to 
protect and grow the economy. With so many new factories there will be environmental 
damage and when local people complain we have a difficult job of balancing what the 
factory owner wants, what the government wants and what the local people want. What is 
our national interest? It is not that easy to decide which flies to leave alone and which ones 
to swat. We can’t just stand by and let the mobs decide” (SP 25 years of service).     
 
                                                          
44 ‘Lucky money’ given out during Chinese New Year, but here it is used as a euphemism for bribes. 
45 Local cadres are given targets for economic growth for the areas under their administration (Sun and 
Johnson, 2009) and as the PSB is part of the local government structure they have a part to play in ensuring 
economic growth/stability. Some senior PSB officers have dual roles (e.g. deputy mayor) where they are part of 
the decision-making body in regard to a city’s economy. 
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The above examples may appear unusual choices in relation to the types of corruption one 
associate with police officers 46. However, I wanted to use them to firstly illustrate how 
economic modernisation has affected police work in China and secondly to illustrate that 
the PSB have much more responsibility and involved in many more aspects of people’s 
lives than those of their Western counterparts. Moreover, as we shall explore in more detail 
in subsequent sections, the police in China is very much intertwined with the ruling elite. 
Consequently, corruption by local officials would not be able to operate without police 
collaboration/tolerance. This is because the Chinese police are the eyes, ears, teeth and 
claws of the CCP. Consequently, they are entrusted with more responsibilities and wield a 
great deal more power than those given to police officers in the Western world.       
 
For India, the culture of bribe taking/extraction and the use of repressive/unlawful force by 
the police is well document by many commentators who generally attribute it to its colonial 
legacy (e.g. Vadackumchery, 1998; Verma, 1999; Dikshit, 2000; Singhvi ,1990; Singh, 
2002; Jauregui, 2013; Nalla and Madan, 2012). However, scholars (e.g. Kothari, 2010) 
argue that economic progress has led to more money being available and therefore more 
opportunities for corruption in all walks of life. With more money available both central and 
state governments spend money on numerous well-meaning poverty relieving and 
infrastructure building programmes, but this has led to large scale embezzlement taking 
root in the system47. For example, construction of roads and other infrastructure are said 
to be dominated by construction mafias, which are groupings of corrupt public works 
officials, materials suppliers, politicians and construction contractors colluding to defraud 
the system48. During one of the focus group discussions containing a construction 
businessman and a politician (with a knowing smile on their face) they pointed out briefly 
how the scam works, “You pay the public works guy to get the contract then you use cheap 
materials but invoice for top quality stuff. All the paperwork is correct but as soon as the 
monsoon hits the road is washed away so you start the process again. The villagers get 
investment and employment, the road they have may not be perfect, but it is better than 
what they had before, and we get to make some money, it’s a win-win”. This also benefits 
                                                          
46 I.e. ‘petty’ corruption e.g., extracting bribes through traffic violations, etc.   
47 See Kothari (1997); "India aid programme 'beset by corruption' – World Bank". BBC News. 18 May 2011; and 
"Indian rural welfare – Digging holes". The Economist, 5 November 2011. 
48 “Mulayam Hits Mafia Hard". India Today, 16 October 2006 
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the police because they “have an omnipresence in all localities and have traditionally been 
called upon by both officials and the public to oversee or prevent disputes or simply to turn 
a blind-eye, it’s a legacy of the colonial operandi” (DSP 3 years of service).  
 
As highlighted previously, payments for joining the police and for ‘plump’ postings are a 
well-documented and an often-cited practice within the Indian police (e.g. Dikshit, 2000; 
Signh, 2002; Vadackumchey, 1998; Verma, 1999). However, with the growth of the 
economy, the internal market for lucrative postings has also increased both in terms of 
volume of popular slots and the sums of money involved. Traditionally, popular money-
making postings include interstate checkpoints, busy traffic junctions, market places, etc. 
However, due to increased economic activities previously unattractive positions have now 
become desirable, “The western side of UP towards Delhi used to be an unpopular posting 
because you would have to live away from home and it was not lucrative. When economic 
boom came in the form of increased commercial activities and construction it became a 
sought-after posting because you can earn lots of money. These days, any area that has 
construction and commercial activities is a sought-after posting and people queue to go 
there” (ADG 35 years of service).  
 
Additionally, the sum of monies for sought-after postings is vast. For example, during 
my research in Lucknow a local politician, a local journalist and a number of police 
officers of varying ranks all told me independently that, “Everyone knows that whichever 
Inspector is in charge of the central market place in Lucknow is corrupt because they 
have to pay a lot of money to get that posting. I know that the current incumbent paid 
40 Lakhs (equivalent to £400,000) for that posting” (Politician 1). However, unlike the 
Chinese system, which is politically more centralized than the Indian system and the 
Chinese lines of authority are better defined and streamlined (Sun and Johnson, 2009), 
in India, decision-making authority is often more fragmented, as a result there may be 
more cases of “multiple veto powers” in operation. Therefore, unlike in China there is 
more uncertainty around corruption in India in that the bribe-giver is never sure, even 
after the payment, if and when the job will get done (Bardhan, 2014, p.3). Bardhan’s 
observation was borne out by the following quote, “Another Inspector had paid 20 Lakhs 
(£200,000) for that position a few days before but he was outbid by the present Inspector 
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so not only did he lose his 20 Lakh but he had to thank his boss!” big laugh, (Journalist). 
Moreover, there seems to be a general acceptance of the culture of buying positions 
among police officers because they talk about it in a very matter of fact way, “Payment 
for postings is part of our culture, it is dog eat dog. That position is very lucrative because 
it has the main market for the city, has many brothels, seedy hotels and the main train 
station where a lot of trafficking, including human trafficking, goes on. The Inspector 
there has to maximise his earnings because you never know how long you have before 
someone else gets that job. The pressure is on him to get as much money as he can to 
keep his superiors and his subordinates happy, but I am told that he clears the 
equivalent of £40,000 per week even after he has paid everyone off. Everybody knows 
that he operates out of the Deep Hotel rather than from the station house” (SP 28 years 
of service). And, when I enquired as to how a police officer can afford to pay such large 
sums of money, came the response, “From earlier earnings in other postings of course. 
This position is worth the investment because previous position holders have bought 
golf courses, luxury hotels and other assets after having had this posting” (Add SP 25 
years of service). 
 
Reforms of the economy also coincided with decentralisation of political decision-making 
and resource allocation in the late eighties. This meant that “money and the associated 
corruption now filtered from the top of politics in Delhi down to the villages49” DPG K Singh). 
It is claimed that ‘with the genie out of the bottle’, many of the traditional certainties and 
ways of doing things are broken: “In the old days police used to listen and help solve 
problems but since the nineties they no longer listened and only money speaks. Nothing 
gets done without money changing hands these days” (Elderly Village Headman); “As a 
headman we used to sort out disputes based on fairness and what is right and wrong, so 
the headman is someone the villagers respect and trusted. But when the money came, and 
the headman was given control of the budget then all sorts of younger and unsavoury 
people wanted the job so that they can control the money. To stay in that position, they use 
money to buy loyalty and support. The genie is out of the bottle and no one can control it” 
(Retired Village Headman); and “The requirements for the village headman has changed 
                                                          
49 In India a ‘village’ can contain up to 30,000 inhabitants 
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since liberalisation. The respected ‘old guy’ type is no longer suitable, they are being 
replaced by new younger savvy types who has more influence and contacts because the 
system is so broken and stretched that it can only be accessed by fixers and middlemen 
with the politician at the apex who are the ‘Maibaap’ or god father. Modernisation has 
increased wealth and more money is sloshing around. For example, the old village barber 
goes to the city, becomes a bricklayer, and sends money back to the village. His mud house 
becomes a brick house, small house becomes a large house, one set of clothes becomes 
three sets of clothes, etc. People start questioning the type of headman they want as they 
become more aspirational, so they switch loyalties to those who can help them to become 
wealthier, i.e. someone who know how to get the most out of the broken system. Even 
police officers now go to the fixer/middlemen types because disputes are no longer 
resolved on merit but money is the crucial determinator so the nature of privilege has 
changed in our society. Social and physical mobility has increased; city neighbourhoods 
are less communal and less personal. For example, in the nineties textile manufacturers 
moved to Lucknow to avoid the Bombay unions and the city’s population increased ten-fold 
as workers moved to carry on working in these factories. This led to clashes between 
Hindus and Muslims even though historically these communities had lived side-by-side in 
harmony for generations. It is an unpleasant fact that the more new people move into an 
area then there is more agitation and less community cohesion. This uneasy situation 
between Hindus and Muslims still remains today” (DGP K Singh). 
 
4.1(e) Impact on internal organisation/governance 
 
Finally, another impact on the PSB due to the effects of economic growth and as a fallout 
from the rise in local government and police corruption is an internal 
organisation/governance one. The appointment of senior officers had traditionally been the 
preserve of local cadres. However, this central-local power dynamic is apparently 
changing. This is mainly due to the CCP’s desire to control and to stamp out local 
corruption. For example, it is noteworthy that in the PSB survey whilst at first glance 56% 
of respondents believe that local government has more control over the PSB, but on closer 
inspection, this view is largely held by more junior officers within the sample. Whereas, 
those selecting Central Government as having more control nowadays (39%) the 
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respondents include all five of the Superintendents in the sample. It is safe to assume that 
these senior officers would have better insights into the internal workings and politics of the 
appointment and promotion machinery than the rank and file personnel, “Central 
Government is exerting more and more control with sustained efforts to stamping out 
corruption especially at the local level. In Shenyang and Chongqing, for example, when the 
police chiefs were arrested for corruption they appointed one of the Party Disciplinary & 
Inspection Committee members to become the new Deputy Chief for monitoring purposes 
and they were not even police officers. More and more senior appointments are now being 
made by the centre to stop local abuse and manipulation” (SP 20 years of service). 
 
In India, law and order is managed within the state, it is unsurprising, therefore, that in 
contrast to PSB officers only 2.5% of the Indian sample in my survey chose central 
government in regard to having more say in the appointment of senior officers, with 48.5% 
opting for state government and 46% stating that politicians have more say. Therefore, my 
research corroborates with the often-made argument that politicians actively micro-manage 
police operations, as well as, appointments and transfers from the very senior levels to the 
lowest ranking constable. The situation regarding political interference in operational 
matters and politically inspired frequent transfers was seen as such a major issue that in 
2006, the Indian Supreme Court, ordered reform of the existing 145-year-old Indian Police 
Act with emphasis on establishing better rule of law, greater accountability to the public, 
and helping minimize political interference (Nalla and Madan, 2012, p.281). However, this 
ruling has apparently never been fully implemented: “The rules state that a DGP should 
serve for two years but it is never followed. I’ve served under seven DGPs in the space of 
five years, one lasting only 1 month. The reality is that if you upset a politician you will be 
transferred to a punishment posting” (Add SP 20 years of service); “I’ve been in the job for 
24 years and this is my 150th position” (IG 24 years of service). As a consequence, the 
organisation lacks continuity and transformational leadership, “Frequent transfers and the 
resultant short tenures in a posting for senior officers has become so endemic that as a 
result junior officers now directly build relationships and pledge their loyalty to politicians 
rather than to their own superiors. That is why as soon as elections are called thousands 
of police officers throughout India are transferred straightaway. In UP alone we have just 
transferred well over 300 officers because of the election announcement” (DPG K. Singh).  
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4.1 (f) Summary 
 
China and India have taken different but equally complex paths to economic modernisation 
which has yielded material benefits for the masses and lifted millions out of absolute 
poverty. However, critics continue to argue that despite the lauded economic successes 
inequality has grown. Modernisation affects traditional societal structures and communal 
values leading to cleavages between the police and the general population. Rapid 
urbanisation provides fertile breeding grounds for vice, crime, disorder and disputes. 
Unsurprisingly, as in other development examples, economic growth has resulted in more 
capital being available both in the private as well as the public domains. This has not only 
provided more opportunities and temptation for graft and rent-seeking but the nature, 
complexity and volumes of crime50 and disputes has also increased. This is evident in the 
heightened crime statistics of both countries. However, it would seem that the PSB is 
feeling the effects of these developments more so than the Indian police when viewed 
through the prisms of the increased numbers of injuries on duty.  
 
In both countries increase in wealth51 has not only whetted the appetite of unscrupulous 
police officials but has also increased corruption and malpractice opportunities, a potential 
contributing factor in weakening police/public relations. This is evident by both sets of 
officers bemoaning of the more challenging and less respectful relationship with the public 
since reforms. The change in this relationship seems to be more pronounced and impactful 
on the PSB than the Indian police. This is because (according to Dikshit, 2000) the Indian 
police has never enjoyed a great deal of public trust and respect as traditionally the Indian 
masses assiduously avoided interacting with the police because of its ‘colonial’ attitudes. 
The PSB, on the other hand, has enjoyed a better level of trust and respect from the 
Chinese masses. For China, one of the potential effects of economic modernisation is the 
eroding of legitimacy the PSB had once enjoyed. For example, in the early years of the 
PRC, the relationship between the police and the public was alternatively described as 
                                                          
50[In China] “Getting rich by any means has become a national spirit. Under these social processes, crimes have 
increased dramatically…there is corroboration between the patterns of expanding economic motivation and the 
patterns of a faster rate of increase in property crimes” (Jianhong Liu, 2006:128).  
51 See table 3 above for metrics. 
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“flesh and blood” and “water and fish” (Huang and Yang ,1997) but the situation today has 
changed, “…the most critical problem is one of widespread complaints about police 
dereliction of duty, corruption of office, and abuse of powers. The once symbiotic 
relationship and intimate bond between the police and the masses have been…tested and 
found wanting...The public expects the police to live the Lei Feng spirit – totally dedicated 
and completely selfless. Instead, they appear to be corrupt and abusive. From the 
perspective of the police, the public is not respectful of or helpful to the police. The police 
expect the public to behave like model communist citizens, who are totally altruistic, 
completely supportive, and unfailingly respectful. Instead, they appear to be apathetic and 
antagonistic” (Wong, 2012, p.151). 
 
As for the Indian police, although economic reforms seem to have been less impactful in 
their relationship with the public in comparison to their Chinese counterparts, Singh (2002, 
p.63-73) noted that due to urbanisation, increases in crime, housing problems, accidental 
and traffic deaths, growth in mass-media, transportation, communication has increased 
complexity of crime, with mass protest movements as well as organised crime groups being 
better prepared as they can track government and police activities. Increased number of 
motor vehicles allows criminals mobility and increased difficulties for police to track 
suspects or to detect crime. Moreover, Singh also argued that India’s industrialisation and 
urbanisation has led to more labour troubles, more slums, and opportunities for underworld 
and organised crime activities as well as potential large scale political agitations, thereby, 
putting even more strain on an already stretched, poorly trained and poorly equipped police 
service. 
 
For both countries the value of land has rocketed due to economic growth and thus the 
associated disputes, intimidation and fraud. Moreover, in China, where the authorities still 
exert a great deal of control over the ‘capitalist’ economy, the example of   business 
fundraising restrictions is perhaps more unique. But, whatever the dispute, the PSB had 
been tasked with safe-guarding hard won economic growth and ensuring social and 
political stability. These responsibilities put PSB officers in the direct line of fire as they are 
often accused of siding with local officialdom and businesses – whether they are motivated 
by grey money or otherwise. 
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Furthermore, from the horses’ mouth, the effects of modernisation and urbanisation has 
proved to have caused strain and stresses to both the PSB and the Indian police with 82% 
of PSB officers and 74% of Indian officers agreeing to this fact. Moreover, these stresses 
can be seen in the lowering of police morale with 62% of PSB officers and 54% of Indian 
officers stating that they would not wish for their own children to follow their footstep. It is 
also telling that in the Indian case the 46% who said that they would be proud if their 
children join the police but with the caveat that only if they join under the IPS route. In 
regard to whether officers are satisfied in their job 56% of PSB officers and 77% of Indian 
officers said that they were. This might seem contradictory to the other morale responses. 
However, upon further investigation it seems that both Indian and Chinese officers like the 
‘iron rice bowl’ and the positional power they enjoy for protecting themselves and their 
families’ interests. Additionally, both sets of officers seem to have accepted their allocated 
lot in life but they hold greater aspirations for their children in the new economic age than 
they do for themselves.  
 
Paying to becoming a police officer and for career/financially enhancing positions and 
postings seems to be a common practice in both countries. It seems that this practice has 
a more corrosive effect for China because of ‘vertical collusion’ (Pei 2016), with President 
Xi’s promised crackdown as a potential lightening rod regarding the CCP’s recognition for 
something to be done. However, for India, because perhaps due to its long established 
practice and cultural (both organisational and societal) acceptance, the buying of office and 
postings has a more commercial transactional flavour where even if a large bribe is paid 
there is no guarantee of securing the desired position. Moreover, because of the 
fragmentation of loyalties between superiors and subordinates brought about by the ever-
present shadows cast by politicians the effects of vertical collusion do not seem to have 
the degree of importance placed upon it as they do in the PRC.  
 
How police appointments are made is potentially a good indicator of how internal police 
organisation and governance is impacted due to the effects of economic modernisation. 
The appointment of senior officers in China had been primarily within the remit of local 
government but there has been a shift of power to the centre due to a desire to stamp out 
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local corruption which has steadily increased since reform. The fact 38% of the survey 
responders (including all the police managers in the sample) agreed to this development is 
further supported by the practice that non-police officials from the Disciplinary and 
Inspections Committee are placed as deputy chiefs after corruption purges in major cities 
such as Shenyang and Chongqing. In India, the state government has sole responsibility 
for law and order; consequently, it is unsurprising that 48% of respondents made that 
selection. However, it is telling that 46% stated that politicians have more say in the 
appointment of senior officers. What is even more enlightening is that many interviewees 
and survey respondents testified to the level of interference and micro-management of both 
police appointments down to constable levels as well as to actual police operations. Indeed, 
Singh (2002, p.124) noted that due to brazen interference from politicians the “average 
tenure of SPs (superintendents) and SHOs (Station House Officers) in some states can be 
as short as 15 days to 3-4 months leading to the complete breakdown of the command 
structure”. 
 
In short, economic modernisation has affected police workload through increases in crime 
and disputes, as well as (in China’s case at least) increased police/public confrontations 
and injuries on duty. Moreover, these factors may also have affected morale and the 
leadership and management of the respective organisations. However, on the positive side 
the greater enthusiasm for western style techniques (e.g. community policing and public 




4.2 To what extent are the police trusted by the masses? 
      
4.2 (a) Secondary data comparison on trust: 
Nalla and Madan noted as part of their public survey on police trust and satisfaction that 
“relative to the police research conducted in western countries, there is very limited 
Selected summary of my police survey results relevant for this section – see appendix 3 for full results 
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systematic scholarly research on police in India. While it is documented that police 
personnel in India are poorly educated and are notorious for extortion, misbehaviour, and 
poor services to citizens …there is barely any research conducted on Indian citizens’ 
perceptions of police” (2012, p.278). This observation was validated when I asked for public 
satisfaction data and was informed, “It has never been part of police practice to seek public 
opinion on police performance. The attitude of master and servant remain from colonial 
days” (DGP K Singh).   
 
Nalla and Madan also found that “On a scale of 1 to 5, the reported mean for this item is 
2.4 with a  standard deviation of 1.0, indicating that a majority of the respondents do not 
find that police investigations are independent of the social status of a victim...nearly 56 
percent of the respondents do not perceive that police and the public work together when 
it comes to protecting the public from criminals...Police in India do not enjoy a positive view 
of the citizens, and thus citizens report a very conservative view pertaining to satisfaction 
with police services...Almost two-thirds of the respondents do not view police as handling 
calls for assistance with politeness (mean=2.8). This finding can be quite revealing and is 
likely to have an impact on citizen–police cooperation. Since citizens do not view that police 
handle calls for assistance politely, they are rather likely to feel repelled by the police 
presence...Eighty-six percent (mean=4.26) of the sample view that police officers take 
bribes in handling traffic accidents or traffic violations. Even when it comes to the handling 
of criminal cases such as theft, robbery, investigation, etc., police are reported to be taking 
bribes from concerned citizens. Nearly 81 percent of the people agree that police personnel 
allow illegal operation of shops and other businesses in areas where they are not supposed 
to be allowed to operate, and that it is very easy to bribe a police officer these days. Almost 
75 percent of the respondents believe that people get away by bribing the police instead of 
being given a citation. Such is the pervasiveness of police corruption in India, that 71 
percent of the sample reports that they are very concerned that a police officer approaching 
him/her will end up asking for a bribe...When asked about the items measuring police 
corruption, in all cases, more than 80 percent seemed to indicate their existing view was 
police are corrupt” (2012, p.284-287). 
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In China, despite scholars (e.g. Wong, 2012) pointing to the growing and frequent 
complaints about police abuse and corruption and the lack of effective checks and balances 
on police powers, extant research indicates that Chinese citizens generally have favourable 
attitudes toward the police. For example, the findings of Zhang et al. (2014) show that 
Chinese citizens’ rating of police is the second highest in five Asian countries.  Moreover, 
utilising data from the UN’s International Victim Survey conducted in Beijing, Zhu et al. 
(1995) found that over 80% of respondents reported that Chinese police did a good job in 
controlling crime (Wu et al., 2016, p.3-6). According to the Asia Barometer Survey in 2002, 
the level of trust in the PSB was 75.4%; in 2007, it dropped to 67.2% and in 2011, it was 
back up to 80.8%, making the average of 74.4% over the periods covered. This compares 
favourably to the latest South Asia Barometer Survey for India, conducted with the same 
methodology in 2005, where only 41.9% of those sampled trusted the Indian Police.  The 
reason for such a favourable response from the Chinese public may be attributable to many 
factors. For example, although Wu et al. (2016, p.96-101) research found that three-
quarters of the respondents (75%) reported that they trust the police “quite a lot or a great 
deal,” they commented that, “Despite the claim that the police are experiencing a crisis of 
legitimacy (Wong, 2004) and recent incidents of police deviance and malpractice (Sun and 
Wu, 2010), it seems that many urban residents were either reluctant to acknowledge or 
simply ignored these problems and showed tremendous support for their local police. 
...Citizens’ sense of safety exerts a consistently positive effect on their trust in the police. 
Those who think positively about their property’s safety, their personal safety, and traffic 
safety were more likely to trust the police. The strong link between public feelings of safety 
and trust in the police suggests that in China the police are seen as the main social 
institution that is responsible for dealing with crime and disorder problems in society”. 
 
 
4.2(b) Potential factors affecting responses to traditional trust surveys: 
 
In the Chinese focus groups, I found that there were strong suggestions that the above 
views might be part of the reason for such a positive trust rate in these surveys. Many 
participants were generally supportive of the PSB and were willing to ignore misconducts 
because they were seen as doing a reasonably good job in keeping the people and their 
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properties safe in a rapidly changing and economically successful China. A number of 
participants made statements such as: “Chinese policemen are normally very polite”; “Yes 
they make ‘grey money’ but it’s understandable because they are poorly paid compared to 
many people outside the police”; “I’m not too bothered about them punishing bad people”; 
“I’m not afraid to argue with a policeman if I haven’t broken the law, which is not always the 
case in other countries”; and, “Their actions might seem harsh but I much rather see tough 
punishments than the liberal soft sentences  handed out in the West”. However, in general, 
participants seem to hold more favourable impressions of the PSB than other mainland 
Chinese that I was able to canvassed during my fieldwork. For example, a 20-year veteran 
legal reporter working in Shanghai and Shenzhen was more critical, “Three words can sum 
up the Chinese public’s view of the police they are greedy, corrupt and lazy. People are 
usually critical of the police because they do not act in accordance with the law; not 
enforcing the law rigorously; and for using power for personal gain”. 
 
The favourable sentiments expressed by focus group participants may reflect the fact that 
they are generally from families of the elite. Moreover, Chinese culture may have also 
played a part in influencing their attitudes toward police. That is, in Chinese culture 
generally, and in the CCP dominated PRC in particular, deference to authority and 
avoidance of interpersonal conflicts is at its core. Wu et al., argued that, “Traditional 
Chinese values emphasize that citizens should pay loyalty and devotion to the state, seek 
submission to authority, and maintain harmonious relations (Yin, 2003), all of which may 
contribute to a positive relationship between police and public. Shi (2001) examined 
variation in trust in government in China and Taiwan, finding that both measures of 
hierarchical orientation (i.e., support for social hierarchy) and conflict avoidance have 
strong predictive power of the Chinese population’s trust in government. Additionally, 
Chinese respondents may be more collectivist and group-oriented, thus, answering survey 
questions in a more socially acceptable way” (2012:194-195).  
 
Another possible reason one can consider is the nature of trust in police as an integral part 
of citizens’ political trust, reflecting not only how the police perform, but also who the 
citizens are, and how they view the broader world (Liu & Crank, 2010). Public attitudes 
toward police, therefore, are only partially influenced by the police. In other words, “public 
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trust reflects both the instrumental values of the police and citizens’ normative attitudes and 
affective sentiments toward political institutions in general” (Wu et al., 2012, p.190). From 
this perspective, it can be said that the high level of reported trust says more about the 
Chinese citizens’ trust and satisfaction with the central government than that of the police 
per se. For evidence of this trust in the central government one only need to observe the 
thousands of petitioners lobbying central government in Beijing for redress of wrongs 
perpetrated by local officials – which reached more than 30 million in 2002 (Sun et al., 
2013). The image of the benevolent central government dispensing justice against corrupt 
local officials is a staple diet in China’s state dominated media and it is an image that is 
regularly promoted by the regime.  
 
Additionally, one also needs to examine these findings from the prism of respondents’ 
cautiousness in not wishing to be seen to be criticising the state. There have been many 
incidences in recent Chinese history (e.g. The Hundred Flowers Movement leading to the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign in the 1950s - among other things, the movement demanded multi-
party democracy and an independent criminal justice system - and the subsequent Cultural 
Revolution of 1965-1976) where the public was invited to criticise the government only for 
the vocal individuals to be ruthlessly repressed. During my focus group sessions, I asked 
participants who is more respectful of the police, you or your parents. The general 
consensus was that their parents were “more afraid of the police because they grew up in 
the Cultural Revolution. They aren’t more respectful or trustful but just more cautious”. 
Several participants also stated that they were more “cynical and less deferential towards 
the police than their parents”. 
 
In contrast, the negative responses by the Indian samples may be because India is a 
democracy where the media52 can be more critical of the police and state than those in 
China. Thus, affecting respondents through the effects of media influence “because most 
                                                          
52 Studies (e.g. Chan, A. and Chan, V. “Public Perception of Crime and Attitudes towards Police: Examining the 
Effects of Media News”, Discovery-SS Student E-Journal Vol.1, 2012, 215-237; and Edward, B. 2007, “Media: 
Effects on attitudes towards police and fear of criminal victimization.” Electronic Thesis & Dissertation, East 
Tennessee State University) on the effects of Mass Media on public attitude towards police found a degree of 
influence but these are mainly on traditional media not Social Media. There is limited research on the effects of 
social media therefore although it may add a new dimension there is no data on its impact.   
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people derive their knowledge about criminal justice from media consumption” (Nalla and 
Madan, 2012, p.291). Indeed, Dikshit complained that, “Indian police is considered as lazy, 
inefficient and ineffective and lower police functionaries are often painted as stupid fellows 
without any courtesy and manners. Such attributes have their roots in history when 
policemen were recruited as unskilled stout men fit only to wield lathis at command – such 
prejudice continue in movies and media portrayals…no one can deny that corruption has 
permeated all ranks of police department…painted as crude and brutal and lacking all 
consideration for the victims of crime” (2000, p.106). Furthermore, this openly critical 
culture is noticeably different from China as one Chinese student who had studied for two 
years in India noted, “I found that in India people would say whatever they like about the 
authorities because they know that it doesn’t matter as nothing will change and nothing will 
happen to them. But in China we are more cautious about what we say especially if it is 
politically sensitive and we are mindful of portraying a good national image to foreigners”.   
 
Moreover, concerning the point of political legitimacy, de Guzman and Kumar suggest that, 
“...dominant groups use the police more often as means to impose their definition on the 
less powerful groups in society. This means that Indian police had been used as 
instruments of the dominant class in society. Therefore, police practices will reflect, to some 
extent, their biases for the dominant class’ views. Thus, when the dominant class is 
benevolent and upright, the police will uphold such values in their practices. Alternatively, 
when the dominant class is malevolent, or corrupt, such malignant characters would be 
manifested in the existing police practices” (2011, p.405). 
 
From this perspective, it is easy to understand how many Indian citizens view both the 
police and their political masters as being corrupt. Indeed, as people are still more loyal to 
their kin, caste, clan and community than to the larger secular institutions of the state. “This 
results in the sacrifice of societal goals for narrower identities, and promotes nepotism, 
favouritism and corruption” (Gill, 1999, p.34), resulting in the development of clientele 
democracy where voters seek extra bureaucratic material benefits from political patrons. 
Where the latter seek power amid weak institutions, intense political competition, and 
scarce economic opportunities, use patronage to maintain power. “They build personal 
followings, not broad-based parties, yet find them hard to control and expensive to 
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maintain; followers, for whom loyalty depends on benefits that may be a matter of survival, 
shift quickly among competing patrons. Thus, efforts by Indian politicians to create broad 
organizational support often fail because the ordinary voter has an extremely narrow view 
of public responsibility and is not willing to give time and effort without the promise of 
immediate material reward. The Indian electorate is primarily swayed by material and 
particularistic inducements with people voting for whom they think can give them the most 
favour. Thus, governments purchase short-term backing, or engineer defections in 
parliament, through payoffs. Money can even recruit "muscle," that is, through violent or 
criminal groups that extort contributions, scare off opponents, and intimidate voters” (Sun 
& Johnston, 2009, p.10-11). Indeed, one interviewee said, “In the current general election, 
parties are selecting winnable candidates rather than honest candidates because only dirty 
ones can win as it is all about money. Money and politicians now control the police. Voters 
don’t care whether you are honest or upright; they only care about what you will give them 
if they vote for you” (Politician 2). Finally, in contrast to the national pride that was so 
obvious in my interactions with the Chinese students a good many of the Indian 
interviewees noted that, “There are many India(s), not one. We are a very heterogeneous 
intersected by caste, class, religion, ethnicity and region. So, we have many loyalties and 
prejudices” (Development Consultant).    
 
From the surveys highlighted above, the Indian police seems to enjoy less trust and respect 
from the Indian masses than the PSB does with the Chinese population. But just like China 
there seems to be an understanding or even a little sympathy for the police taking grey 
money among the Indian public: “The reasons that the police are not trusted by people is 
firstly of familiarity, we see them every day; secondly, he might harm you or your interests 
sometimes in your life; and thirdly, they are biased towards whoever is in power so cannot 
be trusted if you are not part of that political umbrella. The causes of corruption is financial 
insecurity, it is because people don’t feel financially safe that they need to maximise their 
earnings when they can to cope with rainy days or their retirement because public services 
in India are poor53, it’s not just the cops all of India is at it. Senior cops get housing and 
                                                          
53 Many interviewees mentioned that public servants (including nurses) will only provide the free services 
citizens are entitled after a payment of a bribe. According to the World Bank heath spending per capita in 1996 
for China was US$26.318 and India was US$15.94. It increased to $419.734 (China) and $74.995 (India) in 2014 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP?locations=IN-CN). 
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perks but lower ranks do not, they have low pay, work very long hours they are the hardest 
working public servants in India. Traffic cops are in the sun all day so taking bribes in their 
eyes isn’t doing anything wrong. If Police are better paid, then they would have more skin 
in the game and would not be so easily bribed” (Documentary Maker 1); “They need to be 
corrupt to live because most of them have responsibilities for extended families because 
most likely he’s the only one with a secured government job. You must remember that only 
small numbers54 of jobs in India are in the private sector, so government jobs are the 
majority of people’s only hope of getting food on the table” (IT Consultant); and, “Honest 
cops have a dilemma either family don’t eat or go to good schools or they take bribes. 1,000 
rupees is a lot of money to the cop but not to the Mercedes driver so they can afford it. It is 
just another way of spreading the wealth” (Night Club DJ).  
 
In short, a range of broader social-structural, governmental, and cultural factors should be 
considered when viewing research on public attitudes toward police. The social structural 
thesis55 argues that citizens’ attitudes toward police are structured by their demographic 
positions in the general population (e.g., Weitzer and Tuch, 2006; Wu, Sun, & Triplett, 
2009). The institutional performance perspective posits that citizens’ perceptions of the 
police are shaped by their evaluations of police performance in particular, and government 
performance in general (Larsen & Blair, 2009; Tyler, 1990). In addition, the cultural 
perspective contends that citizens’ trust in police is linked to their cultural orientations, 
including trust in fellow citizens and adherence to traditional values (Wu et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, unlike India, in a supposedly ‘authoritarian’ state such as China the 
cautiousness adopted by respondents to surveys may not be an accurate reflection of true 
opinions and feelings. 
                                                          
54 It is estimated that in 2014 3.55% of India’s work force work in government sectors with 2.3% in the formal 
private sector (i.e. licensed organisations that are registered and pay sales/income taxes, etc. These include the 
publicly traded companies, incorporated or formally registered entities, corporations, factories, shopping malls, 
hotels, and large businesses) and over 94% in unorganised sector (i.e. unlicensed, self-employed or unregistered 
economic activity such as owner manned general stores, handicrafts and handloom workers, rural traders, 
farmers, etc.) Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs.  https://data.gov.in/catalog/employment-
organised-sectors-public-and-private. World Bank Report 2013 estimate 50% of China’s total workforce work in 
SOEs with the remainder in the private sector.  
55 E.g., In the US and UK, a white middle class person is potentially more likely to trust the police than a black 
lower class person because of differences in social capital (gallup polling 2014-16 by Frank Newport 
http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/193586/public-opinion-context-americans-race-police.aspx).     
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To put things into perspective, in Hu and Dai’s study of the Chinese Criminal Justice 
System, it was found that the PSB and the Courts were less trusted than the Procuratorate 
department and that a majority of citizens (55 percent) believed that the system was unfair 
(49.8 percent) or very unfair (5.1 percent). About a quarter of criminal justice officials 
considered corruption as a serious problem, but in contrast, 71 percent of citizens believed 
that corruption in criminal justice was serious or very serious. Additionally, 17 percent of 
officials selected ‘build connections’ as the key factor of winning a case, which is the second 
highest percentage in the sample of officials. Connection in Chinese society often referred 
to as ‘guanxi’ not only plays a critical role in citizens’ everyday life but also appears to be 
an important realistic consideration in legal processing. ‘Bribe the judge’ and ‘get a good 
lawyer’ also received relatively high percentages in the citizens’ sample, with 10 percent of 
criminal justice officials rating these two factors as key factors of winning a case. It is also 
worth noting that criminal justice officials rated ‘criminal justice is not independent’ (26 
percent) and ‘flaws in laws and legal system’ (26 percent) as the top two reasons for 







4.2(c) Police Trust Survey - a different approach: 
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It was for all the above reasons that I decided to explore the level of trust from a different 
angle. Rather than taking a traditional public survey approach by asking the Indian and 
Chinese students whether they trusted their respective police or not and by how much, etc. 
I wanted to find out how they viewed police through using scenarios and vignettes as a 
proxy to establishing a truer level of trust. Additionally, I hoped that by establishing when 
citizens would involve the police in their daily lives as either a victim, a witness or merely 
being a good citizen, we would get a better handle on the real level of trust.  
 
I conducted the survey with the Chinese cohort first and asked the sample to select whether 
they would (1) definitely involve the police; (2) may involve the police and (3) definitely not 
involve the police against a range of scenarios (a/ You’re a victim of crime e.g. assault with 
injury, robbery, burglary; b/ You’re a victim of a minor assault without injury; c/ You 
witnessed a crime e.g. assault with injury, robbery, burglary; d/ Rowdy, noisy youths 
swearing and shouting in the streets late at night outside your house; e/ A street trader tried 
to cheat you by charging you more than originally agreed and refuses to give you your 
change or your money back; f/ Your next door neighbour threatens to hit you or damages 
your property in an argument; g/ You’re involved in a car accident where the other driver 
refuses to give you his details; h/ You see a suspicious looking guy hanging around – you 
suspect that he’s up to no good; i/ You see a man smashes a car window in the street and 
steals a bag from the car and walks off).  
 
I used the UK police as a benchmark by asking them to make the selections against  
when they are in the UK and when they are back in China. The result was that the sample 
would ‘definitely involve police’ in the UK 135 times in total versus only 98 times if they 
were in China. It was surprising that more students would definitely involve the police in the 
UK against all nine scenarios than if they were in China. This is not only surprising bearing 
in mind the reportedly high level of trust in the surveys mentioned above, but also because 
one would expect the students to be more comfortable dealing with the police back home 
where they can articulate their issues better in their own language and in their own culture, 
and being more certain about their rights. Moreover, 19% said that they respected and 
trusted the British Police more because they are always fair with only 3% of the sample 
opting for the PSB. These results are even more significant if one considers the fact that 
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48% of the respondents said that they “have a close friend or family member serving in the 
PSB”. It is also significant that 42% of the sample believes that the PSB frequently uses 
excessive/unnecessary force in comparison to the British Police, with only 19% believing 
the PSB uses less force.  
 
In regard to police misconduct, a total of 42% of the sample believes that an officer would 
“turn a blind eye or wouldn’t react because it is normal practice” if s/he sees a colleague 
stealing jewellery when reporting a break-in at a jewellers versus 38% who believe that 
s/he would make an arrest; only 19% believe that the matter would be properly investigated 
if the store owner made a complaint versus 64% who believe that either the owner would 
not bother to complain because it would get him into trouble, or no action will be taken 
because senior officers will always protect their men, or no action would be taken because 
the senior officer will get part of the spoils or, even if the senior officer investigate the matter 
he/she wouldn’t get anywhere because even honest officers will keep silent to protect their 
corrupt colleagues; And, in regards to the question of police beating up suspects to gain a 
confession (which is illegal in Chinese law) 42% believe that an officer would intervene if 
he walked into the station to find this happening because it is illegal versus 42% who 
believe that an officer would ignore it with (26%) of these respondents believing that this is 
“just part of everyday life in a police station” in China.     
   
The Indian students, like Nalla and Madan’s (2012) findings, also showed less than a 
favourable impression of the Indian police. For example, when asked why they think police 
officers join the police, 46% believe that it is for job security, 33% for seeking power and 
12.5% to make money from taking bribes. Therefore, the sample believes that police 
officers did not join out of a sense of duty nor for altruistic reasons such as a desire to help 
others or for catching criminals – which solicited zero percent. Indeed, 54% of respondents 
believe that it is very unlikely that police officers joined to catch criminals (25%) or to help 
others (29%). In addition, 25% of respondents believe that most Indian police officers are 
“cynical and selfish individuals who are only in it for themselves”.  
 
In comparison, whilst a similar number of Chinese respondents (48%) also believe that 
people join the police mainly for job security, none believe that they joined to earn money 
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from bribes and only 6% believe they did it to seek power. These findings are reinforced by 
the fact that 80% believe that it is extremely unlikely that they joined the PSB for the 
purposes of seeking bribes (61%) or power (19%). Furthermore, unlike their Indian 
counterparts, none of the Chinese sample thought that PSB officers are “cynical and selfish 
individuals who are only in it for themselves”. Indeed, 19% of respondents thought that PSB 
officers are “caring and selfless people who genuinely want to help the Chinese people” as 
oppose to the Indian sample with zero percent making this option.   
 
Furthermore, Indian students, in response to the question regarding whom they would trust 
more - the UK police or the Indian police - 49.5% said the same level of trust, with 42% 
saying that they would trust the UK police more but zero percent opting to trust their own 
police more so than the UK police. For the Chinese sample, only 19% opted to trust the UK 
police more, with the vast majority (64%) saying that they trusted the UK and PSB equally, 
and 3% trusting the PSB more than the UK police.  With regard to having experience of 
paying bribes to police 75% of Indian students said that bribes were paid at least once 
versus only 22% for the Chinese sample with 75% stating they have never paid a bribe. 
100% of Indian respondents said that the Indian police use more force when compared to 
the British police. Whereas, 48% of Chinese respondents said that they believe that 
excessive force was used either at the same level (29%) or less frequently (19%) than in 
the UK with 42% believing that more force is used in China. 
 
 
4.2(d) Perception of how officers react to malpractices:  
 
This unfavourable public perception of the Indian police continues regarding misconduct. 
Firstly, 75% of respondents believe that an officer would turn a blind eye (50%), join in the 
theft (17%) or not react because it is a common practice (8%) if they see a colleague steal 
property during the reporting of a jewellery store break-in, with only 25% believing that an 
officer would make an arrest. In contrast, 38% of Chinese respondents believe that an 
officer would affect an arrest with zero percent of respondents believing that a PSB officer 
would join in with the theft. As to the storeowner’s actions, 50% of the Indian sample 
believes that he would not report it in fear of retaliation or that he would be met by a blue-
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wall of silence even if he does report it, with the other 50% believing that the matter would 
be dealt with properly if reported as a complaint. In contrast, only 19% of the Chinese 
sample believes that the matter would be dealt with properly if reported. 64% believing that 
either the storeowner would not report it or that the matter would be covered up. This finding 
may reflect the fact that there is a lack of transparency or public accountability within the 
Chinese system as opposed to the Indian system – however notoriously ineffective it is 
said to be.          
 
Secondly, in response to the unlawful use of force, 83% of Indian students believe that if 
an officer sees a person being beaten by colleagues they would either walkout of the station 
pretending they didn’t see it or that they would simply ignore it because it is common 
practice, with only 8% saying that he would stop it because it is illegal. For the Chinese 
sample, 42% believe that a PSB officer would step in to stop it, with 42% believing that a 
PSB officer would ignore the beating. This response may reflect the fact that there seems 
to be a degree of intolerance toward the use of force among Chinese citizens versus the 
general Indian population judging from the frequent outcry in the Chinese press and social 
media as opposed to the prevailing attitude of cultural acceptance that “this is what police 
do day in day out, it is useless to complain because there will be no change. Life is cheap 
here in India and police carry on the old colonial behaviour” (Journalist).         
 
 
4.2(e) Willingness of respondents to involve police at home:    
 
In response to the question regarding Indian respondents’ actions in the various scenarios 
listed and whether or not they would involve police, overall, as in the Chinese students’ 
responses, Indian students would involve the UK police (total score of 164) more versus 
the Indian police (total score of 102). However, apart from the first scenario where they are 
victims of a serious crime where they would involve the Indian police as much as the UK 
police, in all the other scenarios, especially dispute resolutions and good citizenship 
scenarios, respondents would be reluctant to involve police. However, this might not be so 
surprising bearing-in-mind that dispute resolution in India is based more on bribery and 
social/political connections than on merit. 
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However, the sample also showed a reluctance to act as witnesses to crime and other anti-
social behaviours. This reluctance seems to support Gill’s assertion that, “Our culture and 
social mores have something to do with this public apathy and individual indifference” 
(1999, p.9), as well as some of my own fieldwork observations regarding the potential lack 
of civic pride and sense of social responsibility in Indian society. On my many visits to India, 
I cannot help but to notice the amount of filth and rubbish littering both urban centres and 
rural villages. This is in stark contrast to China where little old ladies with facemasks armed 
with a broom and pan is a ubiquitous sight56. When I enquired my interviewees and focus 
group participants over why residents and shopkeepers do not simply clean the rubbish 
outside their homes and businesses if public services were so broken/corrupt, the common 
response is, “The prevailing attitude is that it’s not their job or it’s beneath them and no one 
will do anything unless someone pays them. If you think that public servants like nurses 
and doctors in government hospitals won’t attend to you unless you pay them even though 
it is supposed to be free, then you get the measure of the attitude in our society” (Barrister 
3).  
 
Moreover, during one discussion with a group of young professionals and NGO workers 
one of the members said, “If I witness an accident or see a crime being committed I would 
not call the police let alone offer myself up as a witness” (Documentary Maker 2). All the 
other participants agreed citing that, “If you act as a witness then you will be harassed by 
the police and you will not get any protection if the criminal hire goons to intimidate you” 
(Son of a Senior Police Officer). Another participant, an NGO worker who had studied for 
many years in the UK, explained by providing an example, “When I first returned to India, I 
saw an old beggar woman looking very ill outside a public hospital. Fearing that she was 
dying I tried to be a good citizen by asking the doctors to go and help her. They were very 
reluctant to even come outside to look at this woman. I insisted, and they eventually went 
out, took one look at her and said that ‘she’s still alive so what’s the problem’ and went 
back into the hospital without examining her. I was determined to get her proper treatment, 
so I helped her into the hospital. Instead of examining the old woman, they called the police 
                                                          
56 When I used to patrol London’s China Town I observed that many of the Chinese businesses would clean their 
shop front’s pavement each morning even though they had already been cleaned by the authorities.   
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and security and I was interrogated as if I was a criminal. They were trying to accuse me 
of attempting to dump off my ill destitute grandmother. They just cannot imagine a person 
being concerned for a total stranger. Now I would not get involve, in India no one trust 
anyone because everyone has some sort of scam going on”. 
 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this unwillingness to act as a witness is so pervasive and 
distrust runs so deep that it also applies to police officers: “Indian police officers will never 
get involve as a witness. This is because the fear of harassment from fellow officers runs 
so deep that it is an instant reaction of the self comes first. As an example, when I was 
seconded to the UN in Bosnia after the Balkan war one of my fellow Indian officer was sent 
home because when he was driving into work one day he witnessed a major car accident 
on the motorway. If he were in India, he would have simply driven on without doing anything 
but because he was in Europe, he felt that he should at least call it in on the car radio. All 
the European officers were outraged that he didn’t stop to help but to my mind and to the 
other Indian officers’ minds he didn’t do anything wrong because we wouldn’t even have 
called it in if we were in India. In India a police officer will always start from the position of 
suspicion when dealing with witnesses because there is so much scam going on” (Add SP 
35 years of service); “Unfortunately, the general public view is that police lie and you cannot 
trust what a policeman is saying, this is also the case between police officers too so if they 
act as a witness your fellow police officers will think that you are doing it for an ulterior 
motive” (SP 25 years of service); and, “I’ve seen so much distrust in my many years of 
service among police officers including when a policeman was shot none of his colleagues 
wanted to get involve to help him or to act as a witness. I’ve even seen senior officers 
jumping into their jeep leaving their men to face the angry mob” (DGP K Singh). 
Additionally, Jauregui noted that “Even among police themselves there is widespread lack 
of faith in the institution and the individual actors who populate it (Ghosh 1981). This 
structure of feeling emerges strongly in cultural expressions by police themselves. One 
such expression is the mythical tale that many police told me about a self-styled “honest 
cop” who one day asked a group of his colleagues to indicate if they would trust their co-
workers to take care of a family member (usually a female) who was in trouble. According 
to the story, no one raised his hand affirming his trust in fellow police. Police would tell this 
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story when trying to illustrate how degenerate and indifferent the institution has become” 
(2013, p.645). 
 
To do a comparison between how the Indian and Chinese sample would respond to the 
various scenarios in their respective countries, I took a random sample of 24 Chinese 
student responses (as shown in table 8 below) to make the numbers equal to that of the 
Indian sample. I then added up the scores from each scenario of both items of when they 
would ‘definitely’ involve the police and when they ‘may’ involve the police when they are 
back home. It would appear that on most measures the score for both samples is within 
the range of 2 points. Out of the total of nine items, the Indian sample scored higher on two 
items (f/ threats by neighbour and h/ suspects loitering). The Chinese sample scored higher 
on six items (b/ victim of minor assault; c/ witness to a crime; d/ witness to anti-social/rowdy 
behaviour; e/ dispute with street trader; g/ involved in car accident; and i/ witness to theft 
from a motor vehicle). Both sets of samples scored equally on item a/ victim of crime. The 
similarities in items with no range difference or a difference of within 2 points may be 
explained by the fact that these are Cambridge students who are currently studying in the 
UK and may have assimilated similar outlooks during their stay. However, there is a sizable 
difference (the Chinese sample scored higher) on items d/ witness to rowdy/anti-social 
behaviour and e/ dispute with a street trader. We can only speculate as to why there is 
more of a difference in attitude between the samples on involving the police in their 
respective countries, but it raises questions regarding tolerance levels for such activities. 
Overall, the Chinese sample with the total score of 191 versus the Indian sample score of 
174 indicates that the Chinese are more willing to involve their police than their Indian 
counterparts generally. Moreover, the Indian sample scored lower in all items on attitude 
towards being a witness to various scenarios. It can be suggested, therefore, that this 
finding raises further questions on level of police trust and further reinforces the thesis that 
Indian citizens are potentially less likely to be willing to become witnesses than the Chinese. 
If true, then, this may have potential consequences for police effectiveness and community 
safety.      
 




4.2(f) Perception of police esteem/respect held by respondents: 
 
Another perspective on examining trust is by gauging public esteem/respect towards police 
through perception of social status of police officers held by research participants. Many of 
the social theories on policing portray the police as merely protecting the interest of the rich 
and powerful i.e. low status individuals as hired muscle. This is certainly the image 
portrayed by commentators (e.g. Dikshit, 2000; Yui, 2015; Sharma, 2006; Signh, 2002; 
Vadackumchery, 1998 etc.) for the situation in India. In China, however, it is worth noting 
that the police are more of a member of the country’s ruling elite than many western 
scholars realise. As an ex-UK police officer, my experience of the social status of a police 
officer walking the beat in the UK is that s/he is regarded as a blue-collar worker, that is, 
equating to the status of a skilled manual worker rather than a professional such as a 
doctor, lawyer or accountant, and s/he would certainly not be regarded as being on the 
same status level as a judge.  
 
However, the social status of the PSB officer appears to be much higher than that enjoyed 
by law enforcement officers in the West57 or India. For example, in the Student Survey all 
the respondents classed police officers in the white-collar profession category that I drew 
up, with most respondents selecting the police as equal in status to that of a School 
                                                          
57 E.g., UK and USA 
Table 8:  Aggregated score for ‘definitely’ and ‘may’ involve police.  Total Score: China (191) and India (174)  
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Teacher (35%) – in the Chinese culture, a teacher is a highly respected profession – and 
29% equated them to lawyers or doctors. In my interviews with subject matter experts and 
other Chinese legal professionals it became apparent to me that not only do PSB officers 
enjoy a higher social status than their western and Indian counter-parts, but they enjoy one 
of the highest statuses within the Chinese Civil Service itself. We should also note that 
working for the government in China is still very sought after58, “recently there were over 
one thousand applicants for a security guard job in a government department” (Chinese 
Lawyer). To add some validity to this quote, according to Durden (2013), “A total of 1.2 
million candidates took the National Public Servant Exam according to figures from the 
State Administration of Civil Service and according to Global Time for only 19,000 
government jobs”59.  
 
The three main professional categories that the Indian sample classed Indian police into 
include lawyer (25%), teacher (25%) and shop assistant (17%). Whilst it is obvious that the 
shop assistant is firmly in the blue-collar category, at first glance one can be forgiven for 
believing that the equating of police officers to lawyers and teachers means therefore that 
the job is highly regarded. However, unlike China, in India today public-sector teachers and 
lawyers generally are regarded as being low-grade professionals60. This is because “most 
public-school teachers are either poorly qualified or have false qualifications but either way 
they usually paid bribes to get a public-sector job and like most public servants, including 
janitors, they draw their salaries without performing their duties or simply don’t even go into 
work. Lawyers in India are mostly self-employed because they are either unqualified or 
uses false qualifications and because they do not get much legitimate work many acts more 
like fixers and middlemen. They are viewed by most people as unscrupulous. As for the 
constabulary ranks they are viewed as extremely low class by most Indians, even a public-
                                                          
58“In China…job attainment in the state sector was a major indicator of status attainment before the mid-1990s 
since it was associated with a good wage, housing benefits, health care, pensions, etc…Today, employment in 
the state sector is still a treasured achievement given the cut-throat competition in the labor market…It offers 
more job security than the private sector. A job in a government agency or public organization has continued to 
be a major avenue of upward mobility in urban China (Zang, 2008:2341-2342). “Market Reforms and Han-
Muslim Variation in Employment in the Chinese State Sector in a Chinese City.” Zang, X. World Development, 
2008, Vol.36 (11), P2341-2353. 
59 http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-11-25/china-12-million-candidates-apply-19000-government-jobs.  
60 The IPS (Indian Police Service) and the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) are held in high esteem in India.  
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school teacher or a foot soldier in the Indian army enjoy higher status nowadays than a 
constable” (DPG K Singh).  
 
Moreover, police officers in China sit the same civil service entrance exam61 as other civil 
servants – i.e. the same as judges, Prosecutors, Tax & Revenue Inspectors, etc. - before 
being appointed as police officers. This is in addition to having to graduate from one of the 
approved police universities/colleges. Consequently, the “police officers' status is on a par, 
if not higher than, some judges. They are about 40% better paid than their peers in other 
government departments. This is because they are the teeth of the CCP, you have to be 
trusted by the party to be a police officer in China” (Chinese Lawyer and Legal Expert). A 
Chinese judge that I interviewed reinforced this view by saying that, “Even the most junior 
police officer is a Ke Ji (科级) - a Sectional Level Civil Servant within the government 
hierarchy of: Ministry/Department/ Division/ Section/Staff – and they are all Gao Su Zi (高 
素质) – i.e. individuals of high quality”. When I asked how trustful the Judge was of police 
officers, he said: “If I was to rank 1-10 and 10 being the highest then it is at least 8...I will 
always believe a police officer’s word more than any defendant standing before me”. This 
is in stark contrast to the fact that distrust of the Indian police is actually built into the system, 
“Our colonial masters didn’t want police officers to be able to take one of their own to court 
on the basis of confessions or statements made to the police during the investigation. All 
confessions have to be taken in court in the presence of a magistrate before it is admissible 
as evidence” (Barrister 3).      
 
In the PSB case, I personally witnessed this higher status in action both in China and in the 
UK when I was invited to present to a large delegation of Beijing Municipal officials on the 
subject of ‘How to achieve City resilience’ in October 2016. Among these groups of 
delegates, I noticed that a greater level of deference was offered to the senior police officers 
present by the other delegates who included prosecutors and judges and even though their 
business cards all indicated them to be roughly of the same ranks i.e. Directors or Deputy 
                                                          
61 China has had a long tradition of civil service examinations. It is said to have been formalised in 165BC during 
the Han Dynasty based on the principle that appointment to public office should be made not on the basis of 
inherited privilege but on the grounds of an individual’s proven abilities (p109 in Hook et al., 1991, The 
Cambridge Encyclopaedia of China, Cambridge University Press).   
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Directors of various government departments. It was obvious that whenever the police 
officers spoke then the other delegates listened and agreed. 
 
4.2 (g) Summary: 
 
The traditional public surveys on trust for the Chinese and Indian police indicate that the 
PSB enjoys a substantially higher level of trust than the Indian police. But, factors such as 
national pride, willingness to criticise state authorities, political legitimacy and level of 
citizens’ trust of those in power, as well as, influence of the media all may play a part in the 
survey results. However, from the data available, it can be argued that even with all these 
factors taken into consideration the frequency and size of the sampling in favour of the PSB 
versus the Indian police points to potential evidence that, in contrast to the Indian police62, 
the Chinese police are held in higher esteem and are trusted more by their citizens.  
 
Moreover, my research further points to this position as well as revealing evidence to 
support the proposition that the corrosive effects of corruption at every level and in every 
walks of life in India has eroded trust both citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-state generally, 
as well as, trust and respect for the police in particular. The resultant situation of citizens’ 
unwillingness to interact with police or to act as witnesses can have potentially serious 
consequences for police effectiveness and community safety. For China, my research 
indicates that there are questions that need to be answered in regard to the lack of 
willingness on the part of those participating in the research (who, according to Conflict 
Theory at least, are more likely than other members of the Chinese population to have a 
favourable impression of the PSB because they are part of the privileged elite) to engage 
with the PSB verses the UK Police and their sober assessment on the level of PSB 
misconduct. 
 
4.3 Do the police carry out their duties in a fair and unbiased fashion? 
                                                          
62 I conducted my Indian fieldwork in UP during the winter of 2017 and as the weather is relatively colder in 
northern India than in the south. The UP police were wearing their own overcoats as these were not provided. 
During my police career it was said, “If you look smart, you’ll feel smart and you’ll think and act smartly”. The 
wearing of non-uniform may reinforce police personnel the feeling of neglect and may not be conducive in 
creating either a professional attitude or a dignified image.      
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4.3 (a) Class stratification - China:          
 
In China, according to Nee (1996), there is a nearly complete fusion of political and 
economic powers. Party leaders and governmental officials tend to enjoy substantial power 
in all state-owned enterprises, civil service institutions such as schools and hospitals, and 
self-governing committees in villages. Zhang and Liu (2004) argued that China’s newly rich, 
mainly entrepreneurs and investors, also start to have more political power. They highlight 
that many successful businessmen were invited to join the Communist Party, a growing 
number of entrepreneurs became appointed or elected representatives of the Chinese 
People’s Congress, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at all 
levels. Some extreme cases surfaced where rich entrepreneurs were actually rewarded 
with official positions for paying a substantial amount of taxes. 
  
The economic and political power spreads its influence into the legal system too. Galanter’s 
(1974) classic study illustrated that powerful groups of people, or the “haves,” managed to 
come out ahead in the criminal justice process including adjudication in the United States. 
There is no similar empirical research for China, but it would be safe to speculate that such 
patterns exist because the country has a weak tradition of the rule of law and a strong 
emphasis on the role that connections (Guanxi) play in every aspect of social life, including 
police–citizen relationships. There are ample anecdotes and media stories on how rich and 
powerful people can get advantages in the criminal justice process as their money and 
power help them build connections with police officers, prosecutors, and judges.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum are the Chinese migrant workers who are attracted en-
masse to cities to meet the labour needs of China’s economic expansion. Loosening of 
internal restrictions has resulted in millions of Chinese peasants migrating to newly created 
mega cities63. Chan (1996, p.147) argued that, whilst there had always been privileged 
classes in China even under Mao (e.g. cadres, urban residents working in industries, etc.) 
                                                          
63 Siham. G. (2015:2) Highlight that the largest numbers of migrants are the unskilled rural-urban ‘floating 
population’ (non-Hukou) who are classed as “permanent temporary”. Rural-urban migrant numbers jumped 
from 30 million in 1980 to 262.61 million by 2012.      
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when compared to the rural peasants, the mass rural-urban migration has brought about a 
“two class urban society”. This is because “opportunity structures in China are not only 
determined by wealth, education, skills and connections as is typical of other modern 
societies, but also by one’s household registration status defined by birth and cemented by 
law. This has greatly aggravated the disadvantaged position of migrants”. According to 
Siham’s (2015, p.1) study, migrant workers suffer from irregular employment, lack 
employment contracts, possess low wages, wage arrears, low social security coverage, 
poor housing conditions64, and difficulties in accessing public services65. Han (2010) 
argued that though migrant workers have been working and living in the cities for years, 
they are still rigidly marked by the Hukou system as forever ‘‘temporary’’ urban residents, 
who are taken advantage of for their cheap labour while being denied urban citizenship. 
He also argued that lives of migrant workers in cities are extremely difficult and that the 
lack of an urban Hukou ‘prohibits’ migrant workers and their children from receiving social 
welfare, such as housing, medical care, and education.  
 
However, due to recent relaxations by the central government, access to these provisions 
have become less restrictive for some migrants but it remains the case that lives for migrant 
workers and their families are still challenging. For example, reflecting on my own 
experience as an immigrant living in a neighbourhood full of racial prejudices and poor 
housing in the poorest part of the city it is generally the case that public facilities such as 
education and health care are not as good as those in richer neighbourhoods. 
Consequently, as “most migrants live in the most deprived part of the city where access to 
schools are based on distance from your home66 it is inevitable that children from wealthy 
                                                          
64 32.3% live in dorms; 10% at construction sites; 6.1% at sites of production or business operations; 19.7% share 
rented housing (Siham, 2015:4). 
65 Goodburn has written similar observations in her various works on migrants in China/India. She note that 
children (especially girls) of rural-urban migrant workers in both China and India finds it more difficult than other 
residents in accessing health and education services due to administrative, financial and discriminatory barriers. 
See: Goodburn. C. a/ (2010) Poverty among rural migrant children in India and China: A comparative study of 
two cities. PhD Thesis. University of Cambridge. Department of Land Economy; b/ “Learning from migrant 
education: A case study of the schooling of rural migrant children in Beijing” (September 2009) International 
Journal of Education Development. Vol. 29, Issue 5, p495-504; and, C/ “Rural-urban Migration and Gender 
Disparities in Child Health Care in China and India.” Development and Change. Vol. 45, issue 4, (2014 Jul) 
201407:631-655.    
66 Many migrants cannot afford to live within the city and have to live in cheaper villages outside. This 
disadvantages them and their families in terms of access to health and education services. However, a study 
conducted on the commuting patterns and durations of migrants residing in these villages indicates that they 
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families are first in line and prejudicial against the life chances of migrant children. Also, 
you will find that relaxations on access to public services are rather patchy because it is 
left to local governments on how to implement it. In some locality these relaxations only 
apply to migrants who migrate to cities within the same province” (Shenzhen Journalist). 
Furthermore, Goodburn (2010, p.58-59) noted that, “Despite recent much-publicised 
reforms of the system, rural migrants’ situation has not improved. Although many city 
governments now set their own admission criteria and Hukou quotas, most grant local 
Hukou to wealthy investors and the highly educated or family members of existing urban 
residents…Since decentralisation, large cities with more state benefits put up the most 
stringent Hukou transfer conditions… [Consequently] migrants are still discriminated 
against for access to schools, health insurance schemes, unemployment benefits and 
pension. Although in 2004 state council regulations abolished restrictions on non-local 
residents in various types of work, many employers continue to discriminate against those 
with non-local Hukou”.     
 
Commentators (e.g. Tan, 2015) highlight that, low skilled rural migrants make up the 
majority of the urban poor living in [relative] poverty who suffer from class discrimination. 
Bian (2002, p.91) commenting on class stratification in China argues that “In China…the 
egalitarian rhetoric of communism, mass grassroots campaigns against elites and genuine 
redistributive land reform has meant that the morality of egalitarianism is generally 
accepted in society. This does not mean that deep social stratifications did not and do not 
exist. In post revolution times powerful status hierarchies between cadres and workers; 
between red (or propertyless classes) and black (or land owning) classes; and between the 
rural and urban populace evolved. It is this last division that presents the most persistent 
fault line, stretching well into the post economic reform period. It is also the stratification 
that underlies the category of internal migrants, a group that is one of the most institutionally 
and socially discriminated against in contemporary China”.  
 
                                                          
still had good access to jobs. (Zhu. P. Zhao. S. and Al Yammahi. S. “Residential Segregation and Commuting 
Patterns of Migrant Workers in China. Transportation Research Part D”: Transport and Environment Vol. 52, Part 
B, (May 2017) p.586-599    
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Moreover, it is not only in social stratification discussions that migrants come off worst in 
China, but official statistics indicate that migrant workers are heavily involved in the criminal 
justice system as both offenders and victims in such major migrant destination cities as 
Shanghai and Guangzhou (Xu, 2014). Scholars highlight the rates of crime by rural 
migrants are generally overestimated, whereas their victimization is frequently overlooked 
(Xu and Song, 2005). Migrant workers’ marginalised class status has made them primary 
targets of urban policing. That is, "similar to racial profiling in the U.S., police control of 
migrant workers also involves discriminatory policing practices based on the physical look 
of people” (Han, 2010).  
 
In short, far from being a class-free society, China today is divided by social stratums based 
on wealth and connections (Wu et al., 2009). Despite economic prosperity and international 
standing, “China remains a high-power distance society, where an uneven distribution of 
power and weak public participation in government decision-making are commonly 
anticipated by the less powerful people (Hofstede, 2001)” (Wu, Sun and Hu, 2016, p.185-
6). As a small example from my research on what the effects on the in-group and out-group 
experiences look like on the ground in regard to police service can best be illustrated from 
the horse’s mouth: “The CCP is maintained by money so its members will mix with business 
people” (PS 10 years of service); and, “It is a fact of life, rich people will get better treatment 
because if you report an economic crime you’re expected to pay all the police expenses 
such as air tickets, hotels, food, car hire, etc. so that we can investigate the matter. If you 
can’t pay then you go to the back of the line” (SP Economic Crime Division, 20 years of 
service). 
 
4.3(b) Class stratification – India: 
 
Nalla and Madan (2012, p.288) argued that, “Similar to any modern society, India has a 
population that can be broadly classified as a high social class versus a low social class. 
In this context, the social class of an individual is likely to largely influence the behaviour or 
attitude of a policeman in India. For instance, the likelihood of a victim’s complaint/ report 
being followed up by a police officer can be influenced by whether or not they are bribed 
by the victim or whether or not the officer recognizes that the victim may have social/political 
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influence. For instance, a large percentage of the respondents agree that police are more 
likely to follow up the victim’s complaints only if they are bribed (67 percent) or if they have 
social or political influence (79 percent) ...In order to assess police fairness, citizens were 
asked their opinion on whether police are concerned about respecting a citizen’s individual 
rights...51 percent did not believe that police are concerned about respecting a citizen’s 
individual rights. Assuming a likely relationship between social influence and police attitude, 
citizens were also asked if the police officers in their neighbourhood investigate in a fair 
manner regardless of the difference in social status of the victims, to which only 15 percent 
of the sample respondents answered in agreement”.  
 
In addition to the above disadvantages of being in the lower classes, the internal rural-
urban migrants of India67 have to contend with other challenges such as the lack of job 
security and protection 68(Breman, 1996). Moreover, many have very little choice in 
adopting a “labour nomadic” life-style in order to survive (Breman, 2013). Many of the 
migrants are from the north eastern regions69 of India migrating in search of work in 
megacities such as Mumbai and Delhi. However, unlike China, free movement of Indians 
to settle and work anywhere inside the Indian Union is guaranteed by the constitution of 
India. Nonetheless, according to numerous press reports rural-urban migrants in India not 
only suffer from poor living conditions one associates with the urban poor in Indian cities 
but that they are also subjected to further difficulties that come as victims of 
xenophobia70, racial discrimination71, Prejudice and violence72.  This is because anti-
                                                          
67 Internal migration statistics in India is unreliable due to the fact that there is no registration process for rural-
urban migration, but it was estimated that in 2009 the figure was over 100 million. Goodburn (2010)    
68 Breman argued that: a/ while there are lots of horizontal mobility within the informal sector, there is a distinct 
lack of vertical mobility into the permanent/organised sector; b/ Urban migrants hiring tended to be clustered 
around workers from the same village/caste thus making it difficult to organise (e.g. forming unions) with other 
workers; and c/ half of those working in the informal sector are on daily contracts or are daily casual workers. 
Breman, J. (1996) “Footloose labour: Working in India's informal economy”. Contemporary South Asia, vol. 2. 
Cambridge University Press.          
69 E.g., Bihar has had slower economic growth than the rest of India in the 1990s, and as a consequence many 
Biharis have migrated to other parts of India in search of work. Bangladeshis, Bengalis, and Marwaris also make 
up large part of the migrant population in India. 
70 Vir Sanghvi, The Bhaiyya Effect, Hindustan Times, 27 September 2008 "The roots of Raj Thackeray's attack on 
the Bhaiyyas [migrants] lie in India's economic transformation”. 
71 Calcutta Diary, Economic and Political Weekly, July 21, 2001. How come Bihar has such a negative image in the 
rest of the country? 
72 K P S Gill, ‘Outsiders’ must be welcomed, Sinlung, 22 March 2008, "But Manipur is not alone in these 
isolationist excesses. In neighbouring Assam, six migrant workers have been killed in two attacks this year, and as 
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migrant feelings in India are common “due to strong nativism” and local “states 
championing rights of ‘bhumiputr’ (Sons of the soil)” Goodburn (2010, p.56).    
 
4.3(c) Caste – unique Indian phenomenon: 
 
However, one must also note that India is a caste-based society which influences and 
controls most segments of Indian society. The racial discrimination and violence faced by 
migrant communities may reflect discriminations against caste73 rather than towards 
migrants per se. Consequently, in addition to the usual consideration of social class based 
on wealth and inherited privileges, when discussing fairness and police bias in India it would 
be extremely negligent not to touch on the issue of caste74. The ancient system of 
differentiation known as Varna, divides Indian society into four broad castes (Varna): 
Brahmins (priests, scholars and teachers); Kshatriyas (rulers, warriors and administrators); 
Vaishyas (merchants); and, Shudra (untouchables, consigned to work as labourers – 
denied all privileges enjoyed by the others. Regarded as polluted hence prohibited from 
learning Vedas - Sanskrit literature -, denied access to education, segregated and made to 
live on outskirt of villages. They are also commonly referred to as Harijans, Dalits and 
Scheduled castes). 
 
Moreover, according to Sengupta (2010, p.723) “in the reconstructions of caste hierarchies 
over time, the system would become effectively five-fold, while encompassing a complex 
range of hierarchies that included the categorizations of jati or community. Gupta, in fact, 
asserts that the process of interrogating caste implies understanding it as discrete 
categories with multiple hierarchies, as each caste tends to overvalue itself in relation to 
others (Gupta 2000). Regional diversities in the caste hierarchies made it possible for 
groups to undergo Sanskritization, while constitutional innovation created the Scheduled 
                                                          
many as 88 were killed, and 33 injured in 12 such incidents in 2007. Indeed, waves of xenophobic violence have 
swept across Assam repeatedly since 1979, variously targeting Bangladeshis, Bengalis, Biharis and 
Marwaris." Archived 5 October 2008 
73 Racial Discrimination Against Migrants From North East India. By Madhu Chandra. 28 November, 
2011Countercurrents.org 
74  Aiyar suggests that it might be more relevant to compare the situation faced by internal Chinese migrants 
with India’s lower castes because they are “co-numerous” in size. INDIA’S UNTOUCHABLES AND CHINA’S 
INTERNAL MIGRANTS: Social Stratification and mobility as factors in explaining differential outcomes in 
governance across the Himalayas. Pallavi Aiyar. Reuters Fellowship Paper, Oxford University. Michaelmas 2007. 
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Castes and Tribes, and electoral politics seemed to reinforce the dominance of caste, not 
dilute it. According to Kaviraj, historically there has been a sort of class-effect of caste, 
whereby caste has taken over some of the political functions of class (1997, p. 18), although 
the opposite has also occurred: amongst the metropolitan middle class, for instance, caste 
tends to be an idiom for status distinctions along class lines (Fuller 2000)”.  
 
Kumar estimate that there are roughly six thousand castes in India (2014, p.29). From my 
field observations I found that there are so many categories of sub-castes within each caste 
that: “You will always find that there is a caste lower than you so no one can say how many 
castes exists. You should also disbelief government officials who tell you that caste no 
longer matters. You only have to listen to how strangers interact; the first thing an Indian 
would ask another Indian when they first meet is to ask for their family name or what part 
of the village they live in. This would tell them what caste you are from and once they have 
established that they will then behave accordingly. Discrimination still exists in all walks of 
life and you only have to point to the overrepresentation of dalits75 in the criminal justice 
system to see that police are bias” (Barrister 1). Another participant in the focus group (a 
bank manager) continued: “It is generally accepted that 80% of deaths in police custody 
are from the lower classes that are usually also from the lower castes. I’ve not heard of a 
rich person dying in a police cell”. The senior police officers in the group (an SP and ADG) 
both nodded in agreement without challenging these statements.  
 
Kumar (2014, p.29-30) noted that caste is a division of ‘labourers’ rather than ‘labour’. This 
is because an individual has the capacity and choice to choose an occupation, whereas 
caste is based on collective identity and thus is no an individuals’ choice. Moreover, the 
lower castes continue to be exploited and discriminated against as evidenced by the fact 
that although they make up approximately 85% of the Indian population, they only make 
up approximately 10-15% of India’s major institutions such as polity, judiciary, industry, 
bureaucracy, university, etc. where the minority castes (Brahmins, Kshatriya, and 
Vanishya) which only makes up 10-15% of the population dominate.          
                                                          
75 According to Subodh Varmall The Times of India 24/11/2014 ‘Muslims, dalits and tribals make up 53% of all 
prisoners in India’: “The three most vulnerable section of Indian society makes up 53% of total prison population 
when they make up only 38.6% of the total Indian population”.   
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4.3(d) Muslim minority - India:              
                                                                        
Religion has been the other ‘traditional identity’ in India and “while there is no existing data 
to demonstrate the levels of actual representation of different castes and communities, 
there is a tacit acceptance that Lingayats and Vokkaligas are numerically dominant within 
the police as well, with a growing number of SC/ST officers through the reservations 
process, while Muslims are numerically insignificant76...” (Sengupta, 2010, p.723). Jauregui 
(2013, p.646) noted that “police in India are widely known for mass-level misconduct. This 
usually takes the form of discriminatory treatment of social minority groups—especially 
Muslims and persons of lower castes”. This mistreatment can be gauged during communal 
riots where according to Yui (2015, p.865) “During Hindu-Muslim riots, Indian police have 
historically been unable to effectively deal with illegal detention and indiscriminate 
shootings against citizens and participated in arson and looting with the rioters”. Yui 
identified the colonial police model with a repressive culture and the “Hindu domination in 
the composition of police personnel” as the main causes of these bias acts. Yui also noted 
that “Hindu personnel (110,536) are predominant within the Maharashtra state police force. 
Muslim personnel (5,758) are underrepresented compared to the 11% of the general 
population identified as Muslim (10,136,567) in the 2001 Maharashtra state census.  We 
can point out similar problems in most states in India as well as Maharashtra. So, Rai, 
Additional Director General of the Police in the Uttar Pradesh state, conducted interviews 
with riot victims, 200 Hindus and 200 Muslims...For 97% of Muslim victims, the police during 
Hindu-Muslim riots are more like an enemy than friend. On the contrary, 71.5% Hindu 
perception for police is friend in riot situation. And the appreciation of police behaviour is 
neutral for Muslims is just 1.5% against 22% Hindu’s. Namely, we ascertain biased Indian 
Police has acted hostilely for Muslim and friendly for Hindu during riot situation on victims’ 
perception. Therefore, Hindu dominated police have acted violently in prejudiced illegal 
detention and indiscriminate shootings. Local police have been isolated from the [Muslim] 
                                                          
76 India’s National Crime Record Bureau 2012 figures indicate there were 108,000 Muslim police officers out of 
the total strength of 1660,000 i.e. approximately 6%. But a majority of these were in the Islam dominated states 
of Jammu and Kashmir. If these were stripped out, then the average across the other states stood at only 4%. 
According to 2012 Population Census, the total number of Muslims in India is approximately 172 million i.e. 
14.2% of the total population.     
123 | Page 
 
area because local residents have felt increasing dread and mistrust toward local police” 
(2015, p.865-867). 
 
Furthermore, Ali and Narang (2007, p.122-123) found that, “...the ordinary constabulary is 
heavily prejudiced against the Muslim minority community. This is rooted in stereotypes 
perpetuated by Hindu nationalists. They draw especially on the memory of Partition and 
the existence of Pakistan as a hostile "other" through which to demonize the Muslim 
population. Poorly paid and lacking in professional training, policemen vent their 
frustrations and enmity on innocent victims in riot-torn situations...these actions can be 
undertaken with impunity. Officers share the prejudices of their men. Moreover, they are 
under political pressures when riots occur. Those officers who seek to act impartially are 
liable to transfers and may have their careers blighted. The contributors see police 
prejudice not only in terms of the treatment of different communities at the times of violence, 
but in the tardy investigations of killings and in their frequently callous attitudes to riot 
victims. Failure to prosecute known perpetrators, especially when they are political figures, 
reinforces the sense of impunity”.  
 
Indeed, DGP K Singh admitted that, “I was told by senior ministers on numerous occasions 
throughout my police career to go even up the scores especially after communal riots or 
whenever a Muslim kills a Hindu, if you refuse then you would be transferred to a 
punishment posting. The constitution says that we are a secular state but you will find Hindu 
shrines in most police buildings and officers openly celebrate Hindu festivals when officially 
on duty. Even today, there are sporadic atrocities against Muslims, for example, police 
have entered Muslim households to beat up, kill or even commit rapes but not a single 
officer has been punished in all my years in the police”. Furthermore, a number of focus 
group participants also made similar claims, “Hindu newspapers usually blame Muslims for 
crimes or disturbances even though it isn’t true. I’ve heard many horror stories of police 
making barbers shave off the beards of Muslims while they standby laughing, or a crowd 
has lynched a Muslim for allegedly eating beef and the police took the pot away to check 
whether the meat inside was indeed beef rather than investigating the murder. India is a 
nation in disguise there is a lack of civil society and we still have a feudal mind-set” 
(Cambridge Indian student).  
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4.3(e) Muslim Minority – China: 
 
There are 55 nationally recognized minorities in China, comprising just less than 9% of 
China’s total population. These 55 groups were first formally recognized by the 
government following a country-wide study that began in the 1950s. The government 
sent tens of thousands of researchers around the country to survey the population in 
order to identify the various unique histories, customs, languages, and religions of the 
people (Wang, 2005). Among these minorities are 9.82 million Hui (Muslims)77 living 
throughout China78 among the Han majority and 8.4 million79 Uyghur Muslims80 within 
the Autonomous Region81 of Xinjiang Province to the west of China among the Tianshan 
Mountains.   
 
Myer et al., (2013, p.236) argued that, “Autonomy generally amounts to the preservation 
of language and customs by the local minority, as well as local representation in the 
autonomous government. The constitution requires regional representatives to be 
members of the local minority, though they are always under the unified leadership of 
the central government. The idea is that minorities can craft policies that fit their 
lifestyles”. However, when these regions are viewed from the perspective of border 
security82 and the management of natural sources then their strategic significance for 
the central government becomes clear. For example, Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, and 
Tajiks, share religion and language with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; and, 
Xinjiang province has China’s largest oil and gas reserves. Therefore, the PRC’s 
nervousness and subsequent “strike hard” response in the face of Uyghur Muslims’ 
                                                          
77 They have their own autonomous region, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The earliest Hui were 
descendants of Arabs and Persians who came to China to trade in the seventh century (Wang 2005) 
78 Many Hui also resides within their own Ningxia autonomous region.  
79 Samuel L. Myers Jr. & Gao Xiaoyan & Britt Cecconi Cruz (2013). 
80 The Uyghur have a distinct religion, language, and culture (Zhu and Blachford 2006). Historically, the Uyghur 
had independent status and were only brought under China’s rule after the fall of the last feudal empire in 1911 
(Zhu and Blachford 2006). Unlike the Hui Muslims, Uyghurs are of Turkic origin. 
81 Today there are five autonomous regions, supported by a constitution that recognizes their presence. The five 
regions are Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang Uyghur, Tibet, Ningxia, and Guangxi Zhuang. These five areas occupy 
approximately 45% of the land area of China (Wang 2005).   
82 Almost all of China’s borders have been disputed (Myer et al., 2013). 
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separatist activities may be difficult to condone but easier to understand. For the most 
part, China’s ethnic minority policy has resulted in a relatively peaceful coexistence with 
the Han majority, especially with minorities residing in the southwest and central 
regions. However, Myer et al. (2013, p.238) argued that, “the clear exceptions are 
Xinjiang and Tibet where there are strong calls for independence”. But, contrary to the 
Tibetan case,83 the Uyghur independence movement has received much less 
international media attention (Terhune & Matusitz, 2016; Marquand, 2003). Terhune 
and Matusitz (2016, p.139) arguing from a Realistic Conflict Theory perspective propose 
that the Uyghurs have resorted to terrorism because of their “disagreement over 
objectives and competition over limited resources leading to intergroup conflict [with the 
Han majority] …By the same token, as an “in-group” mentality emerges, a great amount 
of discrimination and negative stereotypes are the consequences for the out-group. The 
Uighurs (a Muslim people) have had complicated relations with China, so much so that 
they are increasingly bent on creating their own independent state. As the People’s 
Republic of China grew more powerful, its stance toward the Uighurs was reflected 
through a shift from mild hostilities to more acute persecutions”.  
 
Chuah (2004, p.155) argued in broader terms regarding Hui Muslim’s relationship and 
response to the PRC’s assimilation efforts proposes that Muslims (including Uyghurs) 
respond in three phases, “First, there is peaceful co-existence between the two groups 
while the Hui resist the great force of assimilation and acculturation of non-Muslim ways. 
In the second phase there is intensification of discrimination and persecution of the Hui 
by the non-Muslim Chinese who perceive them as a threat, and both parties entertain 
mutual stereotypes, suspicion and hostilities. In the third phase, the Muslim Chinese 
cannot take the pressure of the intensified prejudice, persecution and discrimination, 
and so they revolt against the Han. These three kinds of relationships continue to exist 
                                                          
83 “Tibetans are not a dominant ethnic minority because of their size (only 5.41 million), but due the controversy 
surrounding their independence. They live on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Like the Uyghurs, Tibetans have a very 
distinctive religion, language, and culture. They have a relatively exclusive ‘homeland’, of which they comprise 
95% of the population. Tibetans also spill into the neighbouring provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and 
Yunnan. During Imperial China, Tibet had independent status” (Myer et al., 2013:234). Due to wide publicity 
because of the support from various celebrities and the high international profile of the Dalai Lama the Tibetan 
independence movement has become a cause célèbre in this field.      
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between the Muslim Hui and the non-Muslim Han in China depending on the delicate 
and complex situations of the two groups in various parts of contemporary China”. 
 
It is perhaps debatable whether these descriptions and theories are accurate and 
represent the whole reality but what is apparent is that like many other minorities in 
China the Uyghur Muslims lag behind in terms of education and other socioeconomic 
measures vis-à-vis the Han majority. For example, in Rong and Shi’s (2001) study they 
found that minorities had nearly twice the level of illiteracy as the Han (30.8% and 17.8 
%, respectively) and suffered from lower educational attainment. Of particular concern 
were illiteracy rates among women of ethnic minority groups, eight out of 10 women 
were illiterate and in some ethnic minority groups, all rural women were illiterate. The 
gap in achievement between minorities and Han exists despite a Chinese law, enacted 
in 1986, that mandates nine years of schooling for every Chinese child (Myer et al, 2013, 
p.238). Reasons for this education gap in spite of the various well intentioned positive 
discrimination policies and measures that have been put in place by the PRC to help 
minorities to progress put forward by scholars are that while national examinations 
beyond primary education are in Chinese, many minorities educate their children in their 
own language at primary schools thus creating a barrier to entry and progress into top 
institutions (e.g., Myers et al., 2013; Thakur, 2005; Zang, 2008; Fischer, 2014; Kaltman, 
2007). Moreover, scholars (e.g. Fischer, 2014; Thakur, 2015) argue that some 
minorities with strong separatist movements (e.g. a number of Tibetans and Uyghurs) 
choose not to learn Chinese as a passive form of resistance to the forces of Han 
assimilation. Zang’s (2008, p.2341) study into the effects of economic reforms on ethnic 
minority employment in the state sector showed that due to the increased competition 
based on merit and “survival of the fittest” in today’s China many of the positive 
discrimination policies designed to reduce inequalities are having a limited effect in 
helping minorities to achieve social mobility. Indeed, Zang conclude that “Minority 
ethnicity is the main determinant of labor market discrimination”. 
 
In addition to the above situation faced by minorities generally, the Uyghur Muslims also 
face a high rate of “Hanization” where Han Chinese are given incentives (e.g. tax 
breaks) to migrate to the region thus it is easy to understand how the influx of Han 
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Chinese84 who are better educated and qualified than the Muslims are seen as a threat 
by many Uyghur who are already feeling vulnerable because of their human capital 
deficit.  
 
Moreover, other factors add to the feeling of discrimination among the Uyghur. For 
example, “anyone joining the army or police or governmental institute for training will 
not be provided the facilities to practice their faith, and even the food provided by the 
training institute may not be halal” (Chuah, 2004, p.161). These perceived 
discriminations seep beyond the Xinjiang border and reinforce stereotypes and 
prejudices between the Han and the Uyghur population. For instance, Kaltman’s (2007, 
p.137) study observes that “a striking 99 per cent of the Han respondents claim that 
they might be victims of a Uighur-committed crime, while an even more striking 100 per 
cent of the Uighur respondents in Shanghai claim that they might be the victims of a 
Han-committed crime”. To the author, these findings serve to explain what he coins as 
“criminal stigmatization regarding the Uighur” (Ibid., p.73). Moreover, Kaltman also 
argued that “the Uighur believe that the Han discriminate against them in almost every 
aspect of their lives, and this perception of racism provides impetus for the Uighur to 
harbor their own prejudice against the Han” (back cover Ibid.). 
 
As a consequence, some Muslim Uyghurs view themselves as second-class citizens 
who are economically disadvantaged, and their culture threatened by a steady influx of 
Han Chinese. “The result: resentment and unrest. The past decade has seen bombings 
by suspected Uighur separatists and crackdowns by the Chinese authorities. At the time 
of last year's Beijing Olympics, an attack in the Xinjiang town of Kashgar killed 17 
Chinese police officers” (Elegantand Ghosh, 2009, p.20-20); And, in July 2009, one of 
the deadliest riots in recent years erupted in Urumqi, the Capital city of Xinjiang. “Uyghur 
demonstrators clashed with police forces and attacked innocent Han bystanders, 
followed by Hans’ retaliation, resulting in the deaths of 197 people” (Wu, Sun & Hu, 
2016, p.184-5) and over 1,000 wounded (Elegant et al., 2009). Although western media 
                                                          
84 Elegant; Ramzy; & Ghosh. Time. 7/20/2009, Vol. 174 Issue 2, p20-20; According to the Xinjiang census 2010 
the total population in Xinjiang was 21.82 million. 45.84% are Uyghur Muslims; 40.48% Han; 6.50% Kazakh; 
4.51% Hui and 2.67% Other. Stanley Toops, Nottingham University, Spatial results of the 2010 census in Xinjiang. 
Uyghur Human Right Project, March 7th, 2016. 
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reports usually only highlight discrimination by the Han dominated state security 
institutions towards the Uyghur Muslims, it is worth noting that “China has an avowed 
policy of positive discrimination towards its 50-odd minorities and appears quick to 
tackle insensitivities displayed towards Uighurs. It banned a popular book last year 
called "Weird Sex Customs", which gives a rather imaginative description of Islamic 
sexual life. In an unprecedented case, the government investigated and publicised the 
sexual harassment of a female Uighur soldier by a Han general” (The Economist; 1997, 
p.33-34). 
 
In short, to promote ethnic relations and regional development, the Chinese government 
has provided economic, political, and social privileges to ethnic minorities, such as less tax, 
more governmental subsidies, relaxation of the one-child policy, and lower requirements in 
admission to schools, universities, and state and public work positions (Han, 2010). One 
such notable group are the Muslims, especially those from Xinjiang. According to Hillman 
(2006), compared to the Hans, many Uyghur Muslims do not speak Mandarin, have less 
education, and consequently, have to work in jobs with lower pay and live in older and less 
well-off neighbourhoods. Han people also hold some negative stereotypes about Uyghur, 
portraying them as aggressive, violent, and unreasonable. It was evident that many of the 
Chinese students in my focus groups held resentments85 against the ‘privileged’ minorities, 
“Tibetans and Muslims in particular get a lot of benefits that we don’t and yet they are 
always causing trouble and are unappreciative of their advantages”. It is hard to obtain 
insights into the policing of the Xinjiang region due to political sensitivity. However, from 
my personal experience of how police officers operate, it is reasonable to surmise that 
against the above backdrop (coupled with the widely publicised global Islamic extremist 
terror) it is inevitable that many Han PSB officers would be highly suspicious of Uyghur 
Muslims.  
 
To elaborate further, as discussed in the literature review section, the police culture86 is 
generally morally and socially conservative in nature. Police officers usually identify 
themselves with society’s in-group (i.e. people with similar characteristics: the same 
                                                          
85 See China’s race problem, Gray, T. Foreign Affairs. May/Jun2015, Vol. 94 Issue 3, p39-46 
86 See Banton 1964; Skolnick 1966; Wilson 1969; Westley 1970; Bittner 1970; Van Maanen 1974 
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nationality, religion, politics, sex, and/or the same righteous cause). Police officers, in my 
experience, generally view those who seek to challenge or protest against the status quo 
as the out-group (i.e. consists of those people who do not share these characteristics and, 
therefore, are given labels: stupid, lazy, inferior, aggressive, violent, freaks, scums, 
criminals, terrorists, trouble-makers, etc.). The in-group will often label the out-group 
negatively even when the out-group is not doing anything that a neutral party would 
consider bad (e.g. a typical British Bobby in the 1970s and 1980s may readily regard a 
Rastafarian’s rhythmic walk as a “disrespectful chip-on-the-shoulder strut and must be as 
the result of him smoking too much ganja”). In the process it reinforces and underscores 
their differences, their less human qualities, their evilness, their opposition to what is good 
and what is right87. For some officers in the frontline such people are the enemies and they 
view the out-group as the cause of their problems. Many in the police may view the out-
group as disrupting the peace, causing mayhem, damaging property, and wasting tax 
payers’ money. They see these people as having the potential to injure or kill them, causing 
them to lose their days off, and forcing them to be away from their families. Those acting 
with violence due to separatist motives are ranked at the top of the out-group for this is the 
ultimate betrayal and challenge to the status quo, therefore must be treated with extreme 
prejudice. As an example, the UK (a country that prides itself on upholding human rights 
and for being fair and transparent) there were strong suggestions that IRA suspects were 
deliberately shot dead instead of being arrested in the notorious shoot-to-kill-policy 
allegations of the 1980s which led to the scandal regarding the removal of the Deputy Chief 
Constable of Greater Manchester (John Stalker)88 at the eve of him announcing the findings 
of his investigations into these allegations – which were never officially made public. It is 
not suggested here that this is the case for Xinjiang but it is reasonable to speculate that 
there would be proactive patrolling and stop and search of suspects and sympathisers by 
police. The frequency and the communicating of suspicion of illegal activities as well as the 
likelihood of abrasive conduct in these encounters could have the potential to negatively 
                                                          
87 See In-Group, Out-Group: Two Sides of a Hot Issue. Loren W. Christensen, December 5, 2011 
http://legacy.ymaa.com/articles/in-group-out-group-two-sides-of-a-hot-issue 
88John Stalker claimed in his memoirs and in newspaper interviews (e.g. in The Times 09/02/88) that while the 
policy was never written down but “There was clear understanding that the officers were expected to enforce it” 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shoot-to-kill_policy_in_Northern_Ireland 
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impact trust89 of police by the Muslim population and the reinforcing of the in-group 
mentality of Han officers.   
   
4.3(f) Police prejudices against out-groups and favouring in-groups:  
 
In my research I tried to gain some insights into how police would favour or bias in-group 
and out-group segments of both China and Indian society. The result showed that being a 
member of the elite, wealthy and connected means that you are more likely to be treated 
favourably than if you were from the poorer or less well-connected section of society. 
    
In the Chinese Survey, I listed Government Official; Wealthy Businessman; Factory 
Worker; CCP Member; Peasant; and Migrant Worker. I placed them in various comparative 
combinations and asked the sample to circle the person whom they believe would be better 
treated by the police during a dispute (see table below). The result showed that the 
Government Official came top with 53; second was the Wealthy Businessman (45); third 
was the Factory Worker (36); fourth was the CCP Member (29) and the Migrant Worker 
came last with only 12. I then asked the PSB officers during interviews whom they believe 
their colleagues would treat better in a dispute. All of the PSB interviewees stated that the 
government Official would come first, then the Wealthy Businessman and then came the 
ordinary CCP member. However, most went on to say that, it would be very unlikely for a 
government official or a wealthy businessman not to be also a CCP member especially if 
they were middle-aged. Therefore, the idea that there was an ‘ordinary’ CCP member who 
has no other status would simply be unlikely.  
 
                                                          
89 See effects of frequent stops/search of out-groups by police Tyler et al., “The Consequences of Being an Object 
of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of Proactive Police Contact,” Volume 12, Issue 4 December 2015:602–636, Journal 
of Empirical Legal Studies 
 




Getting hold of the percentages of CCP membership among PSB officers is virtually 
impossible and it appears that the Chinese public themselves are not sure of the situation 
either. For example, the Student Survey showed that only 13% believe that it was below 
50%, with the majority opting for 100% (26%) and 80% (19%). Estimations given to me by 
a number of PSB interviewees puts the number at approximately 90%, “Students from the 
two national police universities will be granted CCP membership upon their graduation. 
Those from the provincial colleges will have to wait a couple of years and those from the 
county or city colleges will have to wait a little longer. It is very difficult to become a CCP 
members before you are thirty so joining the police is seen as a fast track to getting into 
the party. If you are in the CCP you can build up your guanxi quicker and get into personnel 
department, so you get to know how things are decided and build up your guanxi. You 
won’t get promoted if you are not in the CCP and if you don’t get promoted by the time you 
are thirty then you’re very unlikely to get very far in the organisation. Being a CCP member 
in the PSB is important not only for promotion but also for protecting your family and friend’s 
interests, it gives you more power than those who aren’t party members. If you have a rival 
who is also a CCP member then there may be a bit of tit-for-tat to stop your rival from 
getting ahead of you and your clique” (Insp 10 years of service). This information supports 
Bian’s proposition that CCP membership is an “…imperative and survival strategy 
[emphasising] the importance of guanxi network for securing jobs and promotion” 
(2002:107).      
 
In comparison with the Indian Student Survey (see table above), as noted regarding the 
CCP identifier of never being an item by itself, that is, you are a CCP member plus being 
an official, a PSB officer or a wealthy businessperson. The same can be said in regard to 
the identifier for Brahmin and Scheduled/Dalit caste. Therefore, whilst in the Indian survey 
as in the Chinese survey the government official (Chinese score was 53 and Indian score 
Survey Result on who would be favoured in a 
dispute - China 
Survey Result on who would be favoured in a 
dispute - India 
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56) and wealthy businessperson (Chinese score 45 and Indian score 48) came out on top 
as being treated more favourably by police. In the case of the scheduled caste for India 
although it acquired the same score (16) as the Brahmin but when aligned with the category 
of ‘peasant’ or ‘factory worker’ (categories that are more likely to be associated with the 
Scheduled or Dalit caste) then the combined score is much lower (Scheduled+Peasant = 
30 and Scheduled+Factory Worker = 32) than if one combined Brahmin with either 
government official or wealthy businessman (Brahmin+Official = 72 and 
Brahmin+Businessman = 64). Similarly, it can be said that a Brahmin is more likely to be a 
government official or a wealthy businessperson than a Dalit even with the advent of 
positive discrimination policies introduced in 1995. This is because access to better 
education and social/professional network improve their life chances in comparison to a 
majority of people from the lower castes. It is still a general truth that whilst the scheduled 
castes have made some progress the fact remains that the higher echelons of the police 
(IPS) and civil service (IAS) is still overrepresented by the upper castes (Sengupta, 2010, 
p.723). 
 
Furthermore, I asked Indian police interviewees who would be treated more favourably a 
Brahmin or a Dalit by the police. Although most interviewees reminded me that it was 
against the law to discriminate against a Dalit, the majority of interviewees privately 
admitted that a Brahmin would be treated better, “The majority of police will treat a Dalit 
less favourably during interactions. In my experience, decision-making at the street level 
caste is always a factor. For example, when I was a Deputy Superintendent responsible 
for an area with Thakur (Warrior) caste cart pullers who beat up one of my Dalit inspectors 
badly when he tried to clear them off the highway because they were causing a traffic jam. 
I went in and arrested 54 suspects who were responsible but had to let them all go because 
the SP and the local BJP politician, who were both from the same caste as the cart pullers, 
told me to do so” (IG 24 years of service). This example is telling because in my policing 
experience the camaraderie between police officers is usually very strong and if a suspect 
is arrested for seriously injuring a police officer then (even in 1980s Britain) he is very 
unlikely to escape retribution while in custody and the most serious charges possible would 
be brought against him. Therefore, the fact that this senior officer was told to release those 
responsible for seriously injuring a gazetted officer by a superior because of caste loyalties 
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provides a potential indication of how deep rooted and powerful caste identity remains in 
modern India.  
 
Indeed, “senior officers tended to view internal caste politics as the biggest problem for the 
effective functioning of the police system” (Sengupta, 2010, p.723). This is because caste 
values affect judgement and action where “higher caste policeman might not accept an 
equal position for the Harijans; or unwilling to go against the dominant caste in the area as 
it will affect his career” (Mehra, 1985, p.42). It is noteworthy that in addition to maintaining 
law and order, and the prevention and detection of crime, the Indian police is also charged 
with the implementation of social legislations such as  “preventing discriminations of 
untouchables or Anti-dowry act and dowry death probes when the police are themselves 
steep in these traditions, and whom are India entrusting to get rid of these feudal values – 
almost illiterate constables or semi-literate ASIs, SIs and Inspectors in whom these values 
are deeply entrenched”. Consequently, not only is the “Indian police failing to enforce the 
untouchability (offence) act 1955...but police turn a blind eye when upper caste Hindus 
attack untouchable settlements… because their view is that they should not complain 
against upper castes who provide them with a living therefore never take Harijan complaints 
seriously. In certain cases, the police also indulged in acts of violence against Harijans, 
going to the extent of raping their women” (Mehra, 1985, p.90-91). 
4.3(g) Police stereotyping of out-groups reinforcing prejudices: 
 
The PSB like many other police forces around the world uses stereotypes in order to make 
sense of the world (e.g. in my time in the Metropolitan Police, inner city black youths were 
targeted for stop and search because many officers shared a common prejudice that they 
were more likely to carry drugs or weapons and to engage in criminal activities) and to 
guide them in the performance of their duties.  In China, a good example of how some of 
the ‘out-groups’ are given special attention by the authorities is in the PSB’s twenty-four-
seven operation in Tiananmen Square to prevent potential protests, demonstrations or 
petitioning by “Tibetan Separatists, Muslim Terrorists, Extremists and other Nutty Religious 
Cults like the Falun Gong90 means that all thirty of China’s police forces has to send teams 
                                                          
90  1/ Practitioners of Falun Gong aspire to eliminate attachments, and ultimately to achieve spiritual 
enlightenment. It is widely speculated by western press that this organisation was branded as a religious cult and 
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of officers to Beijing. This is the most hated duty because it means that you are away from 
home for three whole months at a time. Our job is to patrol in plain clothes, look out for 
people who are obviously not local by listening out for regional accents, especially Muslims 
because they are extremists and violent. There are many animosities towards Xinjiang 
Muslims because they are terrorists looking to kill Han Chinese. If we hear anyone talk 
about protest, demonstration or petitioning, etc. we pull them out straightaway and they are 
taken back to their home region by the local teams from that force and dealt with. We have 
a song for the Falun Gong to help identify them. The lyric goes like this, ‘They wear 
traditional Chinese clothes, cloth shoes, carrying a plastic bag, standing there with a distant 
gaze’. We have sympathies for petitioners especially if they had lost their jobs, etc. but the 
religious cults are weird – who would set themselves and their child on fire just to make a 
point?” (Insp 15 years of service).  
 
Similarly, in India, Singha (2012, p.96) argued that there is clear “evidence of 
institutionalised prejudice and stereotyping, insensitivity to cultural differences, unfair 
harassment and use of excessive force with marginalised communities”. An example of 
how these stereotypes are institutionally reinforced is the VCNB (Village Crime Note Book) 
held at police stations. It is very similar to what in the Metropolitan Police we used to call 
the ‘Collator’s or Local Intelligence Officer’s Book’. This book contains daily 
comments/rumours written by officers to inform colleagues on what they have heard on 
their patch because it is not of good enough quality to be classed as intelligence and 
entered into the official system. Unsurprisingly, I was told that the VCNB is a legacy of the 
colonial system. Although the VCNB is used in a similar fashion to the British example, 
there is one very clear difference in that it contains commentaries on the history of the 
locality and its village inhabitants to the point of describing their tribes and wholesale 
classification of the village area as Thieves, Dacoits, Rustlers, Moonshiners, etc. This has 
the potential to reinforce traditional stereotypes and prejudices of certain castes and 
religious groups in a particular locality, thus, affecting police attitudes and behaviour toward 
the inhabitants.  
                                                          
band because it was seen by the CCP leadership as a potential threat due to its ability to mobilise large numbers 
of its members to protests; 2/ Observations made earlier regarding the effects of police treating some Uyghurs 
as ‘out-group’ also holds true for other out-groups such as the Falun Gong.       
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It is also worth noting that similar resentments of perceived preferential treatment for 
minority groups in China held by the Han majority also seems to hold true for the Hindu 
majority in India. DGP K Singh showed me a police WhatsApp91 group that circulate hate 
contents regarding Muslims and Dalits out of resentments against these groups for what 
police officers see as favourable treatments since the rise of caste-based politics. 
Apparently, derogatory terms (e.g. ‘Musalle’ – similar to the term ‘Paki’ in the UK or ‘Katuwa’ 
– ‘castrated Jew’ for Muslims; and ‘Chamarwa’ for Dalits) are frequently used to describing 
Muslims and the lower castes. This group is said to have chosen to use WhatsApp instead 
of the social media site Facebook because it “cannot be shut down as it is not in the public 
domain” (DGP K Singh). He then went on to state that “no training is ever given to police 
regarding how to properly treat the lower castes or the Muslims, which is a good indication 
of how little regard we have for their needs as an institution”.               
 
4.3(h) In-group/out-group classification effects on police: 
 
Moreover, not only does an organisation dominated by majority Hindu police personnel 
discriminate based on caste and religion against the public but there are prejudices 
perpetrated against its own members. For example, Sengupta (2010, p.728-29) proposes 
that, “The more obvious politics of caste and ethnicity, however, are exemplified by the 
processes of transfers and the actual authority of officers in different positions; these are 
forms of ‘control’ over the police department that tend to be immediately established by 
new governments. In the first two months of the new BJP government coming to power in 
Karnataka, for instance, over four hundred transfer orders were given for officers from Sub-
Inspectors to Additional Director Generals...there is always resistance to positions that are 
not seen as ‘important’ or ‘good’, euphemisms for relative power and authority, as well as 
money-making potential. While corruption has always tended to accompany the transfer 
processes within the Indian state (see Wade 1982; de Zwaart 1994), and different 
governments with different caste and community constituencies have also manoeuvred 
their ethnic preferences...The transfers involved shifting officers who had been in a largely 
                                                          
91 An instant messaging application allowing smartphone users to communicate for free. 
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Vokkaliga-dominated government of the BJP and Janata Dal coalition, which was later 
headed by the Governor, under President’s Rule (imposed in November 2007), to what 
was ubiquitously perceived as a Lingayat-dominated department...As officers at different 
levels told me, the most significant moves were the appointments of Lingayat officers to 
the positions of the Commissioner of Police, Bangalore, bypassing strict seniority in the 
process, as well as the officer in charge of State Intelligence, a position which is commonly 
seen as being the most critical position in the police department, even more than that of 
the nominal head (the Director General and Inspector General); he is considered to control 
the hotline to the Chief Minister. In fact, the nodal officer for State Intelligence is normally 
the rank of an Additional Director General of Police; in this case, the position was 
downgraded to Inspector General to conform to the existing rank of the Lingayat 
officer...Throughout my fieldwork, I observed that the most important positions in a police 
station, apart from that of the Inspector or Sub-Inspector, are the police ‘writer’ (who 
documents the cases) and the officers in charge of intelligence gathering, courts summons 
and warrants. These are all considered powerful and lucrative roles for station-level 
officers. Depending on the inclinations of the Inspector, these positions are normally given 
to officers of his/her own caste and community, while others are given less important and 
often more arduous duties”. 
 
For China, Wang (2014) argued that the PSB Leadership has been incorporated into the 
core of CCP leadership in order to ensure regime resilience leading to the PSB having 
stronger budgetary bargaining powers and influence. Incorporating PSB leaders into party 
core by increasing their rank and associated benefits aligns the interests of both the CCP 
and the PSB leadership. Consequently, PSB officers enjoy higher status than their other 
government officer peers. For example, in theory, only provincial/ministerial-level (buji/fu 
buji) cadres are included in the provincial leadership teams. Provincial public security chiefs 
are de jure bureau-level (juji) leaders. However, in most provinces at most times PSB chiefs 
are the de facto provincial level-leaders and serve as members of the provincial leadership 
teams, whereas, Presidents of provincial courts and Procuratorates are rarely included in 
provincial leadership teams. This is where issues such as budgets, security, economic 
plans, law-making, personnel decisions and urban planning are discussed by leadership 
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team members (non-members are excluded even when the subject being discussed is in 
their jurisdiction). 
 
Additionally, this allows PSB Chiefs to have access to classified information beyond those 
enjoyed by their peers. Being members of the Provincial Leadership team, PSB Chiefs 
enjoy better benefits including salary, pensions, VIP rooms in hospital, bodyguard, etc. that 
their peers in other departments does not. PSB chiefs’ presence in leadership teams was 
informal until 2003 when Central Committee made it formal “to make sure that public 
security organs better enforce the Party and government’s policies and decision because 
Western powers never give up westernizing and sabotaging our country…At present, we 
are at a critical stage of reforms, some deep contradictions constantly emerge, criminal 
offences and economic crimes are detrimental, mass incidents and emergent events are 
affecting social stability, the problem of the internet influencing stability looms large. To 
maintain social stability at this strategic stage is a daunting task that is extremely important 
(People.com.cn 2003. ‘CCP’s Central Committee’s decision to further strengthen and 
improve security work’ 18/11/2003)” (Wang, 2014, p.625-636). It is also worth noting that 
many PSB Chiefs also hold other important governmental positions, for example, the 
Deputy Mayor of Hangzhou is also the local police chief. 
 
Conflict theorists argue that the “dominant groups in a society use the law and law 
enforcement to preserve a social order that can maximize the protection of their own 
interests and control those groups that are considered threatening and subordinate, 
including the poor and racial minorities, among others (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971). 
Members of the dominant group (i.e. the in-group) tend to share a sense of superiority, 
viewing members of the subordinate group (i.e. the out-group) as intrinsically different and 
alien as well as significant competitors for political and social prerogatives (Bobo & Tuan, 
2006). Consequently, they are more likely to think positively of the police because they 
perceive legal authorities as protectors of their interests and superiority” (Wu, Sun & Hu 
2016, p.181). 
 
For example, Sharma’s (2006, p.62-63) review of India’s community Policing Initiatives 
found that, “There is hardly any patrolling in the low-income group localities such as JJ 
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clusters, resettlement colonies or slums. The beat officers pay more attention, within the 
available time, to the areas inhabited by ‘powerful/influential persons’ such as retired civil 
servants, high-level businessmen/industrialists, politicians, the well-educated class, 
members of the advocacy groups or the press. Explaining such behaviour, they stated that 
it was the fear of such people lest they should complain to the SHO or some other senior 
police officer even higher in the hierarchy against the non-visible beat police. Such a class 
of persons is given immediate attention by the officer-in-charge consequent upon which 
the constable or head constable of the beat may be issued with a censure or even 
suspension. On the other hand, if the resident/s of the low-income localities do(es) the 
same, the attitude of the senior ranks is different. The SHO is generally dismissive of the 
complaint and the complainant and often may defend the absence of the officers from the 
beat. Such attitudinal difference on the part of the SHO is a clear behavioural signal to the 
patrolling staff, which leads to the neglect of the areas inhabited by the poor and the 
weak...Their views remain unsolicited... a state of alienation between the police and the 
poor on the one side and an attitude prohibitive of an empathic and sympathetic treatment 
by the police of the deprived and marginalised sectors of Indian society. In turn the police 
acquire a pro-rich tag from the public”.  
 
Furthermore, commentators such as Mehra (1985, p.42-97) point to the fact that the “British 
had carefully designed a police force which was repressive in nature. Not only that, they 
carefully assigned an oppressive role to the police and successfully created a fear, 
suspicion and distrust syndrome regarding the police among the people...Due to improper 
political influences the police in India have been known to become the tool of ‘self-serving 
elites’ (Bayley 1969:369). They have successfully helped government to suppress popular 
movements and other social disorders...conflict arises because of the proclamation of an 
egalitarian social order and the unpreparedness of the groups who are higher in social 
status to accept the constitutional proclamation of equality for all social, religious and ethnic 
groups. While these people are not prepared to acknowledge an equal status for the 
traditional intermediate or lower castes, the people belonging to the lower castes and 
minority groups are also not prepared to accept an inferior position in society. The feeling 
of self-assertion and competitiveness take a serious turn at times and leads to serious 
conflicts”. In consequence, the “indiscriminate use of force, discrimination on the basis of 
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caste, religion or status are not uncommon with the police in India. Public meetings 
organised by political parties inciting people over petty affairs, organised demonstration 
which most of the time go out of the hands of the organisers and pose law and order 




Social stratification has always existed in China92 but it can be said that  it became more 
formalised during the Mao era where the masses were segmented into peasants, industry 
workers, cadres, intellectuals and rural or urban, etc. and people were allocated places to 
live based on their Hukou designation. The liberalisation of the economy leading to 
increases in rural-urban migration has brought the disadvantages for those with a rural 
hukou designation to the fore if they moved to the cities in search of a better future. Internal 
Indian rural-urban migrants similarly experience discrimination and harassment from the 
locals but the unique Indian phenomenon of caste may also play a part for the experiences 
of migrants. However, unlike China where one’s Hukou designation can be changed in 
India one can never change one’s caste. Moreover, in terms of discrimination, even if you 
are not a migrant your low caste status will always present obstacles in every aspect of 
both yours and your children’s lives.    
 
Moreover, race and religion also play a part in both China and India in regard to social 
justice. In both countries Muslims are seen as both a racial and a religious minority and 
the potential enemy within. This is because in China “the religion of Islam as a complete 
way of life has a great impact over the lives of Chinese Muslims, which makes them 
different from the Chinese non-Muslims. Because of these differences, social conflict, 
prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping occur and various degrees of acculturation 
and assimilation determine the nature of their relationship” (Chuah, 2004, p.155). 
                                                          
92The ideal Confucian social hierarchy places the degree-holding literati at the top, acclaims the high standing 
and worth of the large farming population, and groups below them artisans and then merchants. Both in pre-
modern times and in the communist era the Chinese have professed a remarkably egalitarian ethic. Although 
they have acknowledged the leadership of an elite, its justification rests on dedicated preparation and individual 
performance rather than on privileged birth or material standing (pp93-94 in Hook, B. and Twitchett, D. (Ed), 
1991, The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of China, New Edition. Cambridge University Press.      
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Additionally, with the rise of global Islamic extremist terror coupled with the call for 
independence by Uyghur separatists and the PRC leadership’s desire to maintain its 
strategic military and energy assets the duel approach of striking hard and positive 
discrimination are the carrot and stick to maintain order and control. Sectarian violence 
and police brutality against Muslims in India are well documented throughout India’s 
history. However, the memory of partition and the continuing tit-for-tat between India 
and Pakistan has solidified the distrust and prejudices between the Hindu majority and 
the Muslim minority.  
        
In regard to the police, it can be said that both in China and India the police are not always 
fair and unbiased when it comes to the execution of their duties, especially in relation to 
the groups highlighted above. In India, the “police strongly favour the rich and powerful 
including organised criminals but are discriminatory against the poor, needy, and down 
trodden in society” (Dikshit, 2000, p.87-88). They are “rude, selective and partisan in their 
enforcement of laws, are in the pockets of politicians, criminals and the rich with no 
cognisance of grievances of the poor or the uninfluenced so there is no redress for wrongs 
done to them” (Singh, 2002. p.117). This state of affairs has led to what “many within the 
Indian police call the ‘snake reflex’ where the instinct of the masses acquired and engrained 
into their psyche over time is one of distrust and avoidance of the police” (Add SP 25 years 
of service). In China, the police profile the out-group just like police forces all over the world 
in order to do their job. However, the PSB does not only patrol the borderline between the 
in-group and the out-group but they are in fact very much part of the in-groups’ ruling elite 
– as illustrated above by their high CCP membership and the special status assigned to 
senior officers within local governments. This makes them not merely tools of the ruling 
elite, as in the case of the Indian police, but also they are in fact at the very core of the PRC 
system. 
 
4.4 What does corruption/malpractice look like and why does it persist? 
 






In India, police corruption/malpractices are well documented (e.g. Vadackumchery, 1998; 
Sharma, 2006; Wahl, 2016; Jauregui, 2013; Belur, 2009; Dikshit, 2000, etc.). For example, 
Verma (1999, p.264-267) who had served as a senior police officer in Bihar noted that 
“corruption within the Indian police is well recognized and pervasive. Corruption exists 
within every rank, from the constable to the chief of police and in every police department 
of the country...although I have largely served in the state of Bihar these police practices 
are seen in every other state”. He used his personal experiences to comprehensively 
highlight many tricks of the trade employed by unscrupulous officers to earn grey money 
and showed how ingrained the culture of corruption really is, “Every rank, from the lowest 
"chowkidar", the village watchman to the highest-ranking director general of police is known 
to have tainted hands (Times of India, 1997a). The middle ranking officers, junior inspectors 
and inspectors who do most of the investigation work, prey upon the common people by 
misusing their powers to extort money from the complainants, witnesses and naturally the 
accused. The constabulary extorts money from hawkers, footpath dwellers (Anandan, 
1997; Indian Express, 1997), truck and bus drivers and claims a share from the collective 
earnings made by the police station staff...The IPS officers make money from the transfer 
and postings of subordinate officers, take bribes and give favours (Indian Express, 1999). 
They demand cuts from vendors supplying uniforms, office equipment and vehicles to the 
department; even extort from the business houses and subvert investigation of cases on 
pecuniary or political considerations (Kumar, 1996). Corrupt practices are now part of the 
Indian police system and are found in every department, in every rank and even in police 
colleges...The malaise has spread all over the country and in every aspect of policing”. 
 
Selected summary of police survey results relevant for this section. See appendix 3 for full results 
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In China, according to Sun et al., (2013a), rapid economic growth accompanying major 
societal changes has led to a deteriorating relationship between the police and citizens. 
Police–community relations have been particularly plagued by an unprofessional style of 
domestic policing that fails to meet such internationally accepted standards as human 
rights protection, transparency, and accountability. Commentators (e.g., Bracey, 1989; 
Leng and Chiu, 1985; Wang, 2000) argue that the heart of the problem rests in the broad 
and virtually unrestrained power the police has and a lack of an independent, non-party 
oversight system to effectively prevent and discipline police misconduct. With little judicial 
and public oversight, police-run detention centres, jails, and work camps have become the 
hubs of police brutality and corruption. Chinese police have the authority to impose 
administrative sanctions, on minor and public order offenders (e.g. prostitutes, gamblers, 
etc.) ranging from fines to detention for re-education-through-labour on any “unproductive 
person” and send the person to work in a labour farm for 1 to 3 years without any judicial 
review. Ma (2003) highlights that Chinese police do not need the court’s approval but only 
the police chief’s permission to conduct searches and seizures.  Wu et al., (2009) also 
highlight that police in China, in addition, can supervise the attorney’s performance and 
work, for instance, they can set time limits on the suspect–lawyer meetings and be present 
at the meetings too. The “awesome powers given by the state create an unequal 
relationship between officers and local residents, with police as superiors and residents as 
subordinates. As Chinese society become more modernised and wealthier, such 
unchecked power and abusive behaviours have increasingly alienated ordinary people 
from the police and undermined their perceptions of police legitimacy” (Wu, Sun & Hu, 
2016, p.184).  
 
Moreover, “Governmental efforts to control police misconduct were largely ineffective; 
partly due to the lack of respect for the law in the police culture and partly to the over-
reliance on monetary incentives to carry out police work in the market economy, and the 
reluctance of the government to expose large-scale police corruption” (Wu et al., 2012, 
p.191). An example of how monetary incentives have affected police culture through the 
PSB’s performance management process discovered during my research can be seen in 
the following quote, “The Chief in Shenyang gave everyone tough target even to officers 
working in administration. This created an internal black market for arrests with a price list 
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for types of offences, the more serious the crime the more expensive the price. Officers 
who weren’t able to achieve their targets paid others to allocate their arrests to them; some 
even went outside their own force area to buy them. We have always ‘given’ suspects more 
crimes to improve the clear up rate. For example, if we arrested someone for burglary we 
would tell them that they must have done some others that are already reported but not yet 
solved. But due to these tough targets a lot more cases are allocated to more suspects. 
Most experience guys usually achieve their quota within the first few months of the year 
this then allow them to concentrate on their other business – if you understand my meaning” 
(PS 10 years of service). 
 
According to Wang (2007), these and other types of police abuses have resulted in the 
numbers of illegal and corruptive cases involving police officers rising alarmingly since the 
early 1980s. From 1993 to 1997, more than 40,000 police officers were involved in over 
33,000 criminal cases or disciplinary violations, with an average of 8,000 officers – or 6 
percent of the total number of officers – investigated and punished annually. Wu, Sun & Hu 
(2016) argues that the extent of police misconduct has surfaced as, and continues to be, a 
serious social problem in China.  
 
Moreover, according to Wong (2012), a large number of criminal justice practitioners 
consider the current legal procedures regulating police powers as a burden and waste of 
time and money. This has potentially led to a lack of confidence by the public in the legal 
process where complaints lodged with the nation’s procuratorate organs and courts 
dropped sharply from 1986 to 1991 as the chances of having a prior police action or court 
decision reversed is very low. Additionally, when officials are facing a penalty, higher 
officials are treated much more leniently than lower officials are. Wong concludes that the 
issues in the criminal justice system in China are attributable to two cultural factors: (1) the 
legal culture in the rule by man rather than the rule of law and (2) the lack of belief in limited 
government with checks and balances93.  Additionally, according to commentators (e.g. 
Wong, 2012; Wong, 1998; Pei, 2007) survey data that is available consistently indicates 
that corruption is one of the main concerns of both officials and citizens. In surveys 
                                                          
93Hu and Dai (2014) makes similar observations. 
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conducted between 1999 to 2004 respondents ranked corruption (including police 
corruption) as either the most serious or the second most serious social problem in China. 
Similarly, in late 2006 the State Council’s Development Research Centre asked 4,586 
business executives (87 percent in private firms) to rate their local officials in terms of 
integrity. Almost one-quarter said that their local official was “bad”; 12 percent said that 
they were “very bad” (Pei, 2007). 
 
According to other scholars (e.g., Hillman, 2014; Pei, Sun and Johnston, 2009; and 
Johnston, 2007), in China, bureaucrats work hand in glove with businessmen in order to 
get a piece of the economic action through abusing their powers such as evicting peasants 
from their homes in order to acquire land to build new factories, luxury hotels, whole new 
cities and infrastructures, etc. There is very little research into the Chinese police by 
western scholars generally and even less in regard to police corruption (Wong, 2012). 
Newspaper reports that are available usually show the police as the tools of the local party 
cadres who pay their salaries and who have the power to hire and fire the local police chiefs 
as well as rank and file officers. In China, the governance of the PSB is a duel governance 
model where the MPS issues guidelines, procedures and national priorities but local PSB 
officers are paid and hired by local government. Wong (2012) argued that this dual 
governance model in the past has caused great legitimacy issues for the PSB in terms of 
conflicts of interests because in effect they have two bosses. However, as highlighted in 
previous sections of this thesis it seems that central government is beginning to exert more 
control over senior PSB officers’ appointments in their desire to stamp out corruption by 
local cadres. Nonetheless, as highlighted earlier, local police chiefs are at the core of local 
government whose priority for maintaining hard won economic gains usually outweighs 
environmental or social justice concerns. Consequently, police are still called upon to help 
local officials to collect taxes and evictions of people from their homes are sometimes still 
done without due process. 
 
4.4(b) Police violence: 
 
In China the most frequently publicised complaint of police malpractice is the excessive 
use of force and abuse of power that (according to Wong, 2012) has led to widespread 
145 | Page 
 
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system as evident in a number of incidents that were 
well known in China during 2008 and 2009. For example, the killing of six police officers by 
Jia Yang in a police station on 1 July 200894, the riot in Weng’an, Guizhou Province on 28 
June 200895, and Qiaoming Li’s death in a local detention centre on 8 February 200996, 
were extensively discussed on the Internet, in mass media, and among legal scholars (e.g., 
Fu, 2009; Li, 2009; Meng, 2009; Zu, 2010). The above well-known cases all share the same 
feature, that is, public anger was triggered by a relatively simple criminal case and then 
developed into a large-scale serious incident involving people’s outrage at the formal legal 
and political system. According to Wang and Hou (2010) modern communications 
technology, such as smart phones and the Internet, help the quick spread of the information 
nationwide, diminishing the efforts of some local officials to suppress news. In a very short 
period of time, a large number of people, a majority of whom have no direct relationship to 
the incident, protest either online or in the locality of the incidents, and sometimes engage 
in violent behaviour... these incidents, the perceived corruption and brutality of criminal 
justice officials was always the key factor triggering the whole event. Immediately after the 
incidents took place, for example, “evading the cat” (i.e. ‘duo mao mao’ in Chinese pinyin) 
and “doing push-ups” (i.e. fu wo cheng) became the hottest terms online and in other social 
media. Hu and Dai (2014. p.506) pointed to the fact that, “people used these terms to 
ridicule the government’s improper handling of criminal cases”. 
 
My police survey indicate that 39% of PSB officers would ignore beatings by fellow officers 
because “it is part of our culture” (PC 6 years of service) and while 52% said that they 
                                                          
94 Yang was arrested by Shanghai police for riding an unlicensed bicycle. He sued the police for brutality but lost. 
On 1 July 2008, he stabbed nine officers, six officers died. Yang was sentenced to death, but his experiences 
raised tremendous sympathy on the Internet and suspicion of an unfair trial. 
95 On 22 June 2008 a girl was found dead in a river in Guizhou Province. Police determined that she had 
committed suicide by jumping into the river and drowning while her male friend was doing push-ups on the 
bridge. However, local residents believed that she was raped and murdered by the children of local officials 
leading to a riot involving thousands of residents. Police cars were overturned and burnt, and the police 
buildings set alight. Videos and photographs of the event quickly made their way onto the Internet. The term 
‘doing push-ups’ became one of the hottest searches on the Internet, signifying distrust of police. 
96 On 30 January 2009 Li was arrested in Yunnan Province for illegally cutting down trees and detained in a local 
detention centre. On 8 February he was taken to hospital on account of an injury, and four days later he died 
due to a severe brain injury. Police reported that Li hit the wall while playing a game of ‘eluding the cat’ (i.e. 
blindman’s bluff) with other inmates. This official explanation provoked public anger, as many people believed 
this was extremely absurd. Similar to ‘doing push-ups’, ‘eluding the cat’ has become another popular euphemism 
on the Internet for ridiculous excuses used by police.  
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would not ignore it but many of these respondents said that they would not report it either: 
“you might tell them to stop it if it is getting too serious but no officer will report it because 
we’ve all done it” (PS 7 years of service); And, “most people won’t report it because you 
don’t want him to lose his job” (Insp 20 years of service). Moreover, some officers said that 
their intervention is dependent on “the circumstances and what the suspect has done” (SP 
22 years of service). In comparison, Indian respondents fared better with 41% of the sample 
saying that beatings would be ignored and 59% stating that an intervention would be made.  
 
However, my study also found that despite the above scores there does seem to be a 
culture of beatings in the Indian police: “We are so overworked, there is no time to waste” 
(HC 20 years of service); “Whatever others say, it is still common practice to beat suspects” 
(PC 10 years of service); “It is part of our standard practice. If you keep reporting or stopping 
it then nothing will ever get done” (Insp 23 years of service); “If it is to extract information 
regarding a crime then he will ignore it” (SP 25 years of service); “Police often do it because 
you won’t get the truth otherwise” (SI 15 years of service); “The use of force against anyone 
is bad but without fear of force no one will tell the truth” (HC 37 years of service); “In today’s 
service many officers will ignore taking bribes or beatings because interference will lead to 
problems for them - particularly if a politician is involved” (SI 19 years of service); “Most 
junior officers will go with the flow because they cannot change anything” (SI 19 years of 
service); “The present UP government is very corrupt and high handed. They do not allow 
the police to work in a legal manner. Politicians bring a lot of pressure to do the wrong 
things and want us to do all their illegal work” (SI 19 years of service); “To punish someone 
you need to beat them” (HC 34 years of service). The culture in favour of the use of unlawful 
force was shown by the following comments: “I estimate that 90% of police have used 
excessive/unlawful force in their lifetime of service” (DGP K Singh); and, “9/10 times 
suspects are beaten by police in my experience” (Barrister 2) – the other two Barristers in 
the discussion agreed with this estimate.  
 
The mismatch between what interviewees told me in private and the survey result may be 
explained by the fact that beatings are illegal in India (as many police interviewees kept 
reminding me) and some respondents may be acting cautiously so as not to incriminate 
themselves on paper. Moreover, the questionnaires in India were largely distributed and 
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collected by senior police contacts to personnel in their department or command areas. 
Therefore, even though it was made clear that the answers were anonymous; this may 
have affected how the sample responded. In China, due to access issues, the 
questionnaires were distributed largely by non-police contacts in a less structured manner. 
This factor may also have affected the more favourable result of the Indian sample versus 
the PSB.           
 
In regard to police violence in India, Wahl (2016, p.298-308) found that, “The Indian police 
frequently engage in torture, extrajudicial killing, and illegal arrests...police typically refuse 
to register cases against other officers. Since the majority of incidents are not reported, 
exact figures are unknown, but human rights groups attest that police violations such as 
torture as prevalent to the point of being routine...Moreover, the Indian criminal justice 
system is stymied by pervasive corruption and inefficiency. A perception that criminals 
manipulate this “broken system” and avoid punishment, and that as such Indian society is 
plagued by a lack of security, is widespread among police and civilians alike. This 
perception exacerbates officers’ belief that it is right to use violence beyond what is legally 
permissible... Most of the police interviewed for this study believe that torture is necessary 
to do their jobs and in some cases is ethically right. Of the 33 officers interviewed, only one 
police officer consistently expressed strong opposition to the use of torture...a high-ranking 
officer from Madhya Pradesh asserts that human rights should not “defend criminals” and 
insists, “how can you say someone who is not observing the human rights of others has 
human rights?” These officers articulate a conception of justice that is based on 
distinguishing between different types of people...Police express deeply held beliefs that 
run contrary to human rights. They also work in an environment that they believe requires 
violations and in institutions that reward them for violating rights”. Indeed, there seems to 
be a belief that beatings are not only justified but that it is necessary to set the tone between 
the police as master and the masses as servants, “When I first joined the police an old sub-
inspector said to me ‘don’t forget sir you must show who is boss so anyone you come 
across who is disrespectful or don’t do as he is told you should hit him with your stick on 
the joints such as elbows, ankles and knees. That way whenever the winter wind blows he 
will always remember you, and he’ll wish he had paid you the proper respect.’ My cane had 
a metal tip, so you know it when you’ve been hit with it (laugh)” (DGP K Singh).   
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However, the level of police violence also includes extra-judicial killings – ‘Encounters’. 
Belur (2009, p.237) describes encounters as “Police use of deadly force in situations known 
as encounters are a peculiar feature of Indian policing. The term encounter is part of 
everyday discourse in Mumbai and is used to describe a spontaneous, unplanned “shoot-
out” between the police and alleged criminals in which the criminal is usually killed with few 
or no police injuries. In Mumbai, police encounters were a type of crime control introduced 
in response to burgeoning organized crime in the city. The striking aspect of such police 
uses of deadly force, however, was the near absence of public censure or calls for police 
accountability. Moreover, given that the police “cover story” (Hunt & Manning, 1991) of 
encounters from official sources and the media is always the same, suspicions have 
consistently been raised that it is a cover-up for facts that might not be legally defensible 
or permissible. Between 1993 and 2003, there were a total of 453 incidents of encounters 
in which 589 alleged criminals were killed, with the numbers killed reaching a peak in 2001 
and tapering off thereafter (Crime Branch statistics, Mumbai Police)”.  
 
According to the Human Rights Watch 2009 report ‘Broken System – Dysfunction, Abuse, 
and Impunity in the Indian Police’ (where the authors interviewed 80 police officers from 
UP, Delhi, Jammu-Kashmere, Karnataka and Bangalore) not only are these killings routine 
as illustrated by the following quote from an officer called Singh, “This week, I was told to 
do an encounter, I am looking for my target, I will eliminate him” (Ibid., 2). But, officers feel 
pressurised into doing encounters, as Officer Singh goes on to say, “The SP 
(Superintendent of police) will say, “Under my regime, so many criminals were 
‘encountered.” I fear being put in jail, but if I don’t do it, I’ll lose my position” (Ibid., 9). The 
report concludes that “...it is likely that state officials and senior police are not only aware 
of these killings, but allow, unofficially sanction or even order these killings”. Moreover, the 
report found that “...fake encounter killings occur frequently. Many takes place in Singh’s 
Uttar Pradesh state, where the National Human Rights Commission reported 201 
complaints of such killings in 2007, more than any other state” (Ibid., 9).    
 
It was explained to me by DGP K Singh who had headed up the Special Task Force set up 
to tackle UP’s Dacoit (bandit) problem in the 1990s that the situation of lawlessness had 
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gotten so bad that bandit gangs heavily armed numbering well over 50 members would 
roam freely, descend on a small town or village, cut it off from the outside world and 
systematically loot its inhabitants. Against such odds a small police outpost consisting of 
approximately twelve policemen, poorly armed, poorly trained and ill-equipped were of no 
match. Consequently, he was tasked with eliminating these gangs: “Sometimes we would 
lure gang leaders with dancing girls, who would get them drunk or drugged while we wait 
to pounce. Politicians want us to do their dirty work, but they won’t put it on paper, but we 
were expected to eliminate them with no questions asked. Off-course, there were fake 
encounters. The setup is you arrest the guy in the morning, wait until it’s dark, take them 
out to a remote area, staged the scene with a couple of spent rounds in the chamber of a 
gun placed by his side and a few bullet holes in the wall. The usual story is that the Inspector 
saw them acting suspiciously, when challenged they opened fire and it turned out to be this 
wanted fellow. Resolution through elimination not conviction was the practice. The main 
thing is to make sure all the paperwork is in order and that you have some witnesses - 
which are easily arranged. It did get very hairy at its height I was getting death threats 
regularly, so I taught my wife how to shoot and told the kids what to do and where to run to 
if our home was attacked” (DGP K Singh); “Encounters were set up to kill these people 
because it’s difficult to get convictions. Encounters from 1990s to 2005 was common 
practice, hundreds were killed in various districts in UP. It got to a point where it was like 
competition among police officers. At the weekly SP meetings with the DGP they would 
boast how many they’ve killed, people were killed left right and centre. It became 
prestigious for Inspectors to claim scalps because they were treated like heroes as no one 
condemned it. Having a tough guy reputation also helped them with corruption because 
criminals would seek them out to sort out their problems. Encounters still happen today, 
although they are more targeted” (Add SP and Staff Officer to DGP with 20 years of 
service). 
 
Indeed, Belur (2009, p.239-249) made similar claims in regard to status of officers 
executing this unofficial policy; political pressure placed on the police to stage encounters; 
the importance of correct paperwork, as well as, acquiescence of the use of these methods 
by the wider criminal justice system, the media and the general public. “Officers 
emphasised the importance of ensuring that the “paper trail” is properly maintained...the 
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“management of appearances” was of vital significance. ...Active participants were proud 
of the image they had cultivated and fed the media image that portrayed them as “cleaners 
of scum” ...Some officers boasted of the number of “scalps” they had to their credit; one 
officer described his first encounter, “That was my first. Since that day I have not stopped 
killing...My name is a brand today. Prisoners stick my photos on the walls of their cells” 
(Lakshmi, 2003). Active participants enjoyed a special status within the 
organization...Officers by and large felt that there was general organizational approval and 
support for encounters...the High Court took a favourable view of the police action...officers 
felt that other relevant agencies approved of police action and thus cooperated or 
supported in whatever way they could...Almost all the officers believed there was political 
support, if not open encouragement...Senior officers admitted that at various points in 
time... there was a lot of political pressure on the police to be seen as being effective and 
proactive in the war on crime...However, in interviews with senior members of the ruling 
government and the opposition that were also conducted as part of this research, they 
admitted in the conversation following the interview that they had given directives to senior 
management officers to take care of members who were on the wanted list of criminals and 
that they would monitor police action against such persons on a regular basis. The overall 
impression received was that...there was no political interference as such but...political 
support for these actions...it becomes clear that the police would not pursue such a 
potentially controversial policy if it did not have the political mandate, as one Crime Branch 
officer clearly admitted that they would not be able to continue operating the way they had 
been if political support were withdrawn. This is manifest in the fact that the state 
government has the power to order magisterial or departmental inquiries into alleged 
misconduct of police officers...Thus, the political party in power wields considerable powers 
to either protect or prosecute police officers, making their approval for encounters of utmost 
importance...The attitude of the media toward encounters was summarized by one officer 
as follows: “Generally they are not adverse. After about 200 encounters somebody may 
complain about a single case, or in one or two cases they make allegations, but basically 
they are not against [encounters]” (T1: Inspector) ...“In the beginning, 1992, 1993, up to 
1997, they used to feel that encounters are big news. Now encounters are not that 
sensational… But overall there is less criticism, for encounters.” (T27: Inspector, active 
participant) ...However, underlying all these conflicting opinions was the firm conviction that 
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the press and media on the whole approved of encounters and that this provided a morale 
boost to the organization...In all, 25 of the 38 officers in the sample felt that the public 
attitude toward encounters was one of unconditional approval...The lack of public outcry or 
sustained campaigns against this policy might have been the result either of public apathy 
or a sort of resigned acceptance of other fake encounters as collateral damage...In 
conclusion, officers overwhelmingly believed that there was social consensus and approval 
for encounters…A very senior officer summed up the attitude of the majority of officers: 
“There is a silent and now no longer silent, but rather vocal, acceptance of this police 
approach [encounters] from the public at large. In the debates in the State Assembly, the 
people’s representatives have defended this—rather demanded it openly from the floor of 
the house. The media has also supported it, and the public at large feel relieved that these 
dangerous elements are given a dose of their own medicine” (T30: Senior management)”. 
 
In short, “a combination of factors, actual and/or perceptual, such as societal approval 
complicity of other criminal justice agencies, organizational and political directives, nature 
of police role, and a belief that good intentions are adequate to justify use of deadly force, 
were cited by police officers as explanations for encounters being an acceptable crime 
control method in Mumbai...The interview data make clear that police officers are 
convinced that they had the mandate and support of the press, politicians, and the public 
and, therefore, society as a whole...The implications of this research are important in policy 
terms; blame cannot be laid squarely on the police organization or on a few officers (“rotten 
apples”) but in accepting that a whole culture of complicity, apathy, and/or even approval 
(whether real or perceived) exists and which is partly responsible for police abuse of and 
justification for deadly force. Unless this is recognized, merely introducing organizational 
or legal reforms might not prove to be as effective as envisaged. This research suggests 
that societal approval facilitates police abuse of deadly force, especially in a democratic 
context” (Ibid., 250). 
 
4.4(c) Earning grey money: 
 
According to Wong (2012) in China police officers are used to collecting taxes and to 
enforcing commercial contracts by local government officials – even though these are 
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strictly not within the PSB’s official remit and in spite of central directives for local cadres 
to desist97. Additionally, Wong (2012) noted that local police units (especially rural units 
away from the main metropolitan areas) are poorly funded and officers are routinely not 
paid their salaries therefore are actively encouraged to issue fines in order to literally keep 
the lights on because they need the money to pay the office rent, utility bills, etc. In this 
environment, it is perhaps easy to see how officers are provided with the opportunities to 
be corrupt because they are in the right place at the right time and with the powers to take 
advantage of the situation. Wong (2012) argued that a legacy of the Mao era in the form of 
administrative powers give the PSB wide-ranging powers to detain and fine people (e.g. 
prostitutes, drunks, drug addicts, etc.) without going through the criminal justice process. 
The MPS in recent times have reduced the limit of fines and length of detentions and 
introduced stricter rules on how fines are administered. But, according to commentators, 
these powers still exist, and they are regularly abused by the PSB.  
 
For example, Jeffreys (2010) points to one such opportunity for abuse in the form of mass 
campaigns against prostitution. There have been numerous reported cases of the so-called 
“virgin prostitute scandals” in China in recent years. The scandals usually entail police 
arresting a girl, beating her up until she confesses to being a prostitute, forcing her to sign 
a confession and providing or agreeing to a previously prepared list of (apparent) client 
names. She is then not charged under the criminal law but is dealt with under administrative 
law where a hefty fine is imposed. The girl is released and her ‘clients’ are approached 
where they are fined or blackmailed into paying hush money. However, a few of these girls 
would subsequently withdraw their confessions, seek the help of a lawyer and get medical 
proof that she is in fact a virgin and the local media takes up the campaign for justice. The 
most famous virgin prostitute case was the first such scandal in 2001 involving the 18-year-
old girl Ma Dandan and subsequent scandals up and down China since that case are also 
referred to as “another Ma Dandan” in the Chinese press. In a good many of these cases 
police officers have been prosecuted and jailed. 
 
                                                          
97 Jeffreys (2010) made similar observations. 
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One possible reason for the lack of media reporting in China in comparison to India on the 
more traditional graft, rent-seeking and grey money type corruption is that these activities 
are usually hidden and much harder to prove than someone beaten up or killed in 
unjustified circumstances. However, from my fieldwork I found that these forms of 
corruption exist in China. These ‘tricks of the trade’ in earning grey money is best illustrated 
from the horses’ mouth:   
 
“My old patch included a large wholesale market so there were always disputes about copy 
rights, etc. whatever I decide goes so businessmen will always show their appreciation if I 
decide in their favour...If there was an awkward shop keeper I would threaten to close down 
his shop for a number of days and they would always seek to avoid losing income so 
accepts my decision” (Insp 19 years of service).     
 
“We’re responsible for issuing temporary permits for migrant workers and collect the fees 
on behalf of the local government. My team and I would go to the factory dormitories at 
night and count the heads in the bunks. If we count say 50 heads then the factory boss 
would want us to charge him for 40 and we put down 30 in the paperwork, pocketing the 
difference” (PS 15 years of service). 
 
“We only deal with economic crimes that involve large sums of money. A wealthy guy 
reports a crime and we tell him that we are really busy and short of staff. They will always 
offer to pay not only all our expenses but a little extra to show his appreciation if we speed 
up his case” (SP 25 years of service).  
 
“Being responsible for fire control and health & safety puts you in a good place, especially 
if you have lots of restaurants, bars and clubs in your district. You visit an existing business 
or a new business waiting to open, all you need to do is to say that it will take some time to 
give them approval to operate. The owners always want to get things signed off quickly 
and are always very grateful when we accept their token of appreciation” (Insp 17 years of 
service). 
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In India, Verma (1999:268) argued that “Station House Officer (SHO) is the most coveted 
and lucrative office in the department. The SHO enjoys a large measure of autonomy, is 
the "gatekeeper" for registering criminal cases, controls most of the criminal investigations 
and makes the decision to arrest suspects...Ghosh (1978, p. 158-59), who was a retired 
inspector general of police described the collection of "hafta" or weekly payments from 
shopkeepers, hawkers, businesses and of course from the criminal operators within the 
police station areas as perhaps the most pervasive form of police extortion in India. It is 
therefore not surprising that posting as SHOs of those police stations that have large 
markets, trade centers, industries or transport junctions are greatly in demand...It is 
believed that even a few months of such postings enable the officers to earn much more 
than what they could receive in salaries for their entire service. In fact, postings at police 
stations in Delhi's Chandani Chowk, Bombay's Jewellery Bazaar or Calcutta's New Market 
that are large business centers are directly "controlled" by the chief of police. Reportedly, 
these postings are at the behest of ministers in charge of police departments since even 
the daily extortions from these markets runs into hundreds of thousands of rupees, money 
that allegedly gets "shared" right to the top... Other lucrative postings include police stations 
situated in coalfield areas, near large industrial complexes, on highways and border check 
posts are equally notorious. Such postings are a major source of remuneration for the 
senior officers too including the chiefs of police who make the decision to post the officers-
in-charge of these stations”.  
 
During my fieldwork I also unearthed similar evidence of these types of lucrative postings. 
This is especially the case where they include major market areas, where they are given 
to the highest bidder for the equivalent of several hundreds of thousands of pounds. 
Moreover, in relation to Verma’s observation on the autonomy of the SHO, as an example, 
during one of the regular morning visitor sessions that I witnessed at DGP Singh’s house 
that I had highlighted in previous sections. One visitor was a developer who had purchased 
a piece of land. However, as he did not pay the local SHO initially and even though he had 
all the required permits to do so, he was nonetheless unable to start building on this land 
because the SHO had sent a constable to tell him of his displeasure. The developer then 
paid this SHO some money, but he still would not allow work to go ahead. Consequently, 
DGP Singh made some phone calls to Lucknow HQ to get the matter resolved. However, 
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on a repeat visit from the same developer, he informed Mr Singh that his contacts had 
indeed called the SHO but the response from the constable was that “It doesn’t matter who 
you know at HQ, it is the Inspector who decides on what goes on here”. The rest of the 
message was that the SHO wanted more money. It would seem strange to western eyes 
that even though construction is clearly outside the jurisdiction of the police, but I learnt 
that, apparently, in India “even if a person wanted to cut down a tree on his own land he 
better first pays the police in case they claim that you have cut down a protected tree or 
one requiring a permit” (DGP K Singh).                  
 
Additionally, the “investigation of cases, decisions to arrest a suspect, submit a charge-
sheet or close some pending investigation are all processes that are generally influenced 
by pecuniary considerations. Money is extorted from the citizens in a variety of ways...It is 
usual for the SHO or his officers to demand money to register any citizen complaint and if 
someone is to be named as a suspect then the charge is naturally more. Furthermore, the 
complainant has not only to pay for instituting a complaint but also to bear the costs of 
"entertaining" the officers who come for inquiries. The complainant also ends up paying for 
the investigative "expenses", especially transport as the department provides few vehicles 
to the investigating officers. Subsequent inquiries, arrest of the offender(s), prosecution in 
the courts are of course additional costs that the complainant has to bear if he/she is 
interested in pursuing the matter...poor supervision, and… a serious lack of forensic 
assistance, poor training and dearth of facilities for collecting and preserving physical 
evidence have implied that most evidence is in the form of witness statements... 
Furthermore, the decision to send any case for trial is also that of the superintendent and 
prosecutors have little control over the cases sent for trial. This is a colonial legacy where 
most senior officers were British while the prosecutors were Indian lawyers appointed by 
the state. Consequently, police officers controlled the decisions to send cases for trial. The 
status of the IPS officers remains similarly much higher in comparison to the prosecutors. 
Thus, even at present, prosecutors are in no position to criticize the decision of the 
superintendent...There is no departmental practice of evaluating the performance of the 
investigators in terms of the cases investigated, cleared and prosecuted...These practices 
have made the position of the SHOs very powerful in the department and most of the 
superintendents are unable to keep effective control over their actions. It is therefore not 
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surprising that those who are concerned about the fate of their complaint usually continue 
courting the investigating officers. The lack of any organizational changes and 
accountability has implied that corruption continues to grow amongst the investigators” 
(Verma, 1999, p.269-270).  
 
Regarding the issue of naming suspects and the reliance on witness statements, during 
my fieldwork I learnt that the practice of naming suspects is a routine practice in India and 
that once a suspect is named then owing to pressure (usually from local politicians allied 
with the alleged victim’s family) and the lack of time and resources to investigate and/or 
combination of bribes, police will usually arrest and charge the named suspect. “In UP and 
in many other states politics and caste intersects. They play a key part in every aspects of 
life. For example, in my experience if a serious crime happens or as in many occasions an 
alleged crime is maliciously made up then the family will name a suspect and they would 
bring along some so-called witnesses all pointing to an individual. On many instances these 
named suspects are actually innocent people whom the family has a long-standing grudge 
against, so they use this crime or allegation as an opportunity to get even rather than let 
the police find the true culprit if an actual crime did occur. Unfortunately, this is the mentality 
of many people based on caste prejudices and vengefulness. Police will arrest and charge 
the suspect even though there is no evidence that the named person committed the crime 
either because they have been bribed or they are simply too busy to conduct an 
investigation. In my estimation approximately 60% of such named suspect cases are in fact 
miscarriages of justice” (DGP K Singh). The dangers relating to the practice of naming 
suspects were also pointed out by a Barrister in one of my focus groups, “In India police 
take an aggressive substantive justice approach; if you’re a named suspect then you are 
guilty until you can prove your innocence even though the system says otherwise. You will 
find what is said on paper doesn’t translate into reality on the ground in India. Money and 
connections especially political connection counts for more”. 
 
Moreover, “apart from taking bribes in investigations, the Indian police personnel are also 
notorious extortionists. Their power to institute criminal cases and arrest anyone on mere 
suspicion enables them to extort money from businesses...A notorious form of corrupt 
practice is to check the drivers for their licenses and vehicle registrations. Now, the 
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bureaucratic red-tapism involved in purchasing vehicle registrations and driver licenses is 
immense...which also involves high costs. On the other hand, the penal fine is low and the 
problems of enforcement on crowded Indian roads create easy opportunities to evade 
checking by the police. Furthermore, for any citizen the problem of going to the courts to 
settle the matter is a time consuming and costly process that makes them wary of 
confronting the police. All these factors have forced most citizens to operate their vehicles 
without registration and proper licenses and bribe their way out. Thus, the police power to 
check the vehicles plying on the roads has become a lucrative form of extortion… obtaining 
special permits to cross the borders of the states is another bureaucratic nightmare. Every 
state has imposed tariffs upon the goods being brought in from other states and these are 
collected at border checkpoints. The tax collectors have powers to inspect the trucks, 
compound the offense and impose fines or send the matter to the courts for prosecution. 
Again, these are operations that cause delay and a great deal of harassment to the truck 
companies. Moreover, it is also lucrative to "smuggle" goods across the state boundaries 
to avoid sales tax and other levies. A system has therefore been created where it is cheaper 
and convenient to pay the police rather than attempt to operate honestly and pursue the 
case in the courts. Thus, all border check posts are dens of corruption in which the police 
play a major part since all enforcement is done through officers posted at these border 
crossings…” (Verma, 1999. p.270). 
 
The collaboration between police and tax inspectors to extort money was also evident 
during my fieldwork, “I was at the wholesale market this morning and by the time I got back 
to my shop I had paid at least 6 bribes to tax inspectors and police officers along the way. 
Most business people don’t mind paying tax inspectors because they can be quite useful 
when they help you to avoid paying taxes, as bribes are usually cheaper so you get 
something in return. But most business people don’t like paying the police because you 
don’t get anything back but we all do it because it’s less trouble” (Shopkeeper). Additionally, 
police officers will adapt their extortion practices as necessary, as one businessman 
pointed out: “They used to make money by charging smugglers money when they cross 
state borders with cheap cigarettes, alcohol, etc. from a low tax state to a higher tax state 
like UP but as soon as these loopholes are closed the police would still pull your truck over 
saying that they want to check papers. If you have a truck full of perishables in the back, 
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then you would pay rather than to wait for hours knowing that your goods will go off. Even 
if you are carrying non-perishable goods you still don’t want to waste time because every 
minute a truck is parked up you are not making money so everyone pays just to get going” 
(Electrical goods supplier). Moreover, in regard to the improper licensing of vehicles, during 
one of my visits to a Lucknow Chowk I witnessed a sudden rush of three-wheel cab drivers 
paying fines to the SHO and I was told by the SHO that, “We’ve just been told by the SP 
that we had to gather in a large sum of money by midday so the easiest thing to do is to 
round up all the three-wheel taxi drivers and get them to pay because most operate illegally” 
(Insp 20 years of service). 
 
In regard to Senior officers, Verma (1999, p.270-271) noted that in addition to the various 
opportunities for corruption through selling of postings98, getting a share of the spoils from 
subordinates, embezzlement and/or receiving kick-backs from vendors for police 
equipment/supply contracts, etc. “Another visible form of corrupt practice common amongst 
almost all the senior officers is their lavish life style maintained from official expenses. The 
officers are provided large government accommodations that are "decorated" from official 
funds diverted from many sources. Senior police officers keep police constables as 
orderlies; enjoy personal guards, official cars for 24-hour usage and many other privileges. 
Not only the officers but their family members and friends too share these advantages. 
These are all seen as "perks" that go with the office although there is no official sanction 
for them. The corrupt practices described here have a long historical antecedent...The 
burden of entertaining visiting police officers always fell upon the local subordinates and 
police constables served as orderlies to senior officers - a cultural tradition from the British 
period. The lavish life style amongst the police leadership has evolved from the system 
promoted by the colonial policies and administrative ethos of the British rulers and is one 
which continues today”. “Whenever senior officers’ family members visit a district they take 
what they want from shops, including expensive clothing and jewelleries, without paying 
because they expect the local SHO to sort it out. All our servants in the house are police 
officers. We have over 20 police officers who cook, drive, clean, manage the gardens; take 
                                                          
98 Pei (2016) made similar observations regarding the buying and selling of public (including PSB) offices in China.   
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us to school when we were young. I was even taught to drive by our police driver” (ADG’s 
Daughter). 
 
Moreover, during my fieldwork, members of the public were very free with giving me their 
experiences of various police tricks of the trade across India to extract money from the 
masses: “In Pune there is a pretty tree lined street where courting couples go at night. 
Police will show up when dark to get bribes by threatening the young couples that they will 
tell their parents. India being a very strict country where most marriages are arranged 
means that many of these couples are dating in secrecy so they all pay – including me” 
(College Student); “On the beach in Goa near my house the rules are that there should be 
no hawkers or deck chairs on the beach, but they are there. Except of course when an 
inspection is about to take place and miraculously somehow every beach vendor and 
hawker seems to know in advance and disappears. The local beat officers are obviously 
being paid by these guys because I’ve seen them giving them money regularly, it’s like part 
of life here. The police stop me regularly and on occasions when I’ve infringed minor traffic 
violations like a broken light I would pay to avoid a fine. But even when I haven’t done 
anything wrong they would still stop me and literally ask for money. They would usually 
stop all cars driven by tourists and just ask for money, a few rupees here and there make 
up a lot of rupees” (British Expat living in Goa); “I have lots of examples, but here’s a few: 
A celebrity friend of mine was caught smoking weed by police. They blackmailed him for 
three months where he paid them a lot of money so that they would not go to the press; 
They also regularly come to the club where I work and ask the owner to pay them money, 
he pays because otherwise there would be trouble if he doesn’t; and, whenever you have 
a party the police will show up about 11pm and tell you they want it shut down but all they 
want is for you to pay them a bribe and they go away” (Night Club DJ from Delhi); “1 out of 
100 cops are honest in my experience most people hate police because they are all corrupt. 
I regularly see them beat up other cab drivers, smash up their vehicles or slash their tyres 
if they refuse to pay bribes. Hospitals and clinic are not supposed to be in residential areas 
and alcohol shops cannot be within certain metres of schools, but they are, and that’s 
because they bribed police” (Lucknow Taxi Driver); “People would pay TV companies the 
equivalent of £20,000 for journalist credentials and these false journalists will then pay the 
TV companies another £5,000 per month. This then enables them to collaborate with police 
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to blackmail people and extort money from them by threatening to expose their wrong 
doings like going to a hotel with a prostitute. These journalists will also use their police 
contacts to act as middlemen to get people gun licenses, etc.” (Journalist in Lucknow); and 
finally, “In the old days the process of going to police to make a complaint is not interfered 
with. Nowadays, you make a complaint the police will go to the other party and tell them 
that they can make the complaint go away if they pay them and once they’ve taken the 
bribe they come back to you to tell you to withdraw it otherwise they’ll arrest you. I had to 
pay on four occasions when false allegations were made against me. The going rate for 
such a fee is Rs.10,000 minimum” (Village Headman). 
 
In my police survey, I found that 52% of PSB officers would ignore bribe-taking as it is “part 
of our culture” (Insp 20 years of service) and although 39% said that it would not be ignored 
by colleagues. The majority went on to say that they would “not report it because it would 
be trouble” (PC 8 years of service) or that they would “not want colleagues to lose their job” 
(PS 16 years of service) and others say that they would only intervene “depending on the 
situation” (SP 20 years of service). For India, 49% of respondents said that it would be 
ignored, with 51% saying that an intervention would be made. Once again as in the 
question(s) regarding police violence, the Indian sample seems to be less tolerant towards 
bribe-taking than the PSB. However, the observations regarding potential cautiousness on 
answering questions regarding beatings may also apply to bribe-taking.   
 
There is evidence to support this as the opinions expressed by Indian police interviewees 
indicate that corruption is pervasive. Moreover, most expressed the view that it is extremely 
unlikely that anyone would actually report corruption or misconducts out of a sense of duty: 
“Don’t have the time to report others taking bribes as it happens so frequently” (SI 15 years 
of service); “Most people will ignore it because everyone is thinking about themselves” (SP 
20 years of service); “No officers ever get involve if they see bribe taking unless they are 
jealous” (Insp 22 years of service); “It’s engrained in our culture, everyone take bribes and 
take shares in the proceeds” (PC 18 years of service); “In the present system if you report 
corruption you will not get any support and you will be seen as a snitch” (SI 15 years of 
service); “Don’t get involve or you will end up in a lot of trouble” (Insp 19 years of service); 
“Corruption is like blood circulation, it’s what keeps us going. It goes on so much we ignore 
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it. It is so deep it’s like a runaway train, you can never stop it” (PC 19 years of service); “I 
have been in the job for 40 years and the only time when someone reported a bribe taking 
matter to me was because of personal jealousy or rivalry not ethics” (ADG 40 years of 
service); “It’s not good for comradery if we interfere” (Insp 25 years of service); “Senior 
officers develop links with criminals and politicians. This is now being emulated by 
subordinates. There is a falling of esprit-de-corp. It is now a place of everyman for himself” 
(Insp 36 years of service); “At the ground level and especially at the station house all sorts 
of things happen. Most policeman at street level are not honest and no constable will report 
another for corruption, especially one more senior to himself” (HC 34 years of service); 
“Many policemen take bribes because of poor pay, lack of proper procedure, and poor 
funding so this leads to prevalence of corruption. It is unlikely that any police officer would 
report another because it happens so often” (PC 10 years of service); “If you report him he 
will lose his job and cause hardship for his family” (SI 8 years of service); “Reporting him 
would bring bad reputation to the department and trouble for you” (Insp 15 years of service); 
“At the ground level this happens all the time so you have to go with the flow” (SI 5 years 
of service); and, “Our salary is so low and working condition is so bad that you have to take 
bribes to survive” (PC 18 years of service).  
 
Furthermore, others highlight the fact that bribe-taking is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the police99: “Station officers use their share of the loot to pay station 
expenses like paper, petrol or burial of unidentified/abandon bodies so not all bribe-taking 
is bad and go directly into policeman’s pocket” (Insp 25 years of service); “If we don’t extract 
fines to fund police work then this will hinder the successful solving of cases” (HC 37 years 
of service); and, “Police take bribes because we have to spend our own money to perform 
official duties like petrol, mobile phones, etc. we are funding our work” (PC 5 years of 
service). This point is collaborated by Sharma’s (2006, p.57) research where he pointed to 
the fact that, “The patrol staff makes use of cycles and motor cycles/scooters besides foot 
patrolling for better coverage and mobility. Patrolmen were of the opinion that the 
allowances for the cycle/motor cycle/scooter given by the department were insufficient in 
view of the area to be covered by each one of them. This again results in meeting the 
                                                          
99 Wong (2012) made similar observations regarding PSB in rural locations.  
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requirements through illegal means and each senior officer of the police at each level is 
aware of this”.  
 
Whatever the rights or wrongs of these practices, what is apparent is that the Indian police 
is in a situation where: “These days senior officers cannot tell Inspectors to do something 
if it prevents him earning money because they too are now compromised because of bribes 
that they too have taken” (SP 29 years of service); “India police are seen as Domestic 
Mercenaries” (Development Advisor); “Main purpose of police is to make money, they pay 
money to join the police so they need to earn it back as soon as possible. They will try to 
make money out of every situation, it gets to the point that people offer them money even 
if they don’t ask for it and if they don’t take it then people would feel uncomfortable. The 
situation has gotten worst in the last 10 years because there are lot more money floating 
around” (Politician 2); “I reckon that 9/10 policeman take and/or demand bribes as part of 
their daily duties” (Barrister 1); and, “I estimate that 80% of police officers has accepted 
bribes in the lifetime of their service. Many of these bribes are from organised criminal 
gangs for them turning a blind eye to their activities” (DGP K Singh). 
 
4.4(d) Factors contributing to persistence of corruption/malpractices: 
 
As to the connection between police and organised crime, I found that in China, as in the 
case of India, there were admissions by police interviewees that organised crime is in 
collaboration with some police officers. “Some businesses are owned by organised crime 
gangs which have protections from higher up so they are very difficult to deal with. If they 
didn’t have senior guanxi then the lower ranks would be able to shut them down but we are 
not allowed to do so” (PC 5 years of service).  
 
Pei (2016, p.185-198) noted that 197 senior police officers (chiefs and deputy chiefs) were 
convicted from a published list in 2011 and were sentenced for corruption. Apparently, 
“among the 197 disgraced police chiefs, 39 or 20% were explicitly linked to organised 
crime”. He explained that organised crime involvement is rife in the real estate and mining 
sectors and that, “unlike an average private entrepreneur who typically resorts to bribery, 
a crime boss mixes bribery with intimidation and violence… such as assaults and murder, 
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to drive out the competition in these sectors. Once they gained control of these assets, they 
continue to pay the government officials and LEOs [Law Enforcement Officials], practically 
putting them on retainers...many organised crime organisations have legitimate large front 
businesses in the form of conglomerates”. Furthermore, “in several cases in our sample, 
the leader of the criminal gang was either a family member of a powerful local official or an 
official himself. Their family background or contacts inside the government provided them 
with political and social capital to gain protection from the local authorities”. Just like the 
criminalisation of politics in India, Pei also asserts that increasing number of crime bosses 
are gaining “membership in their Local People’s Congress or People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (PPCC)...such status not only provide a useful legitimate cover 
for their illegal activities but also facilitates the building of political networks and expansion 
of their criminal operations. Among the fifty sample cases selected for this study, thirteen 
crime bosses, or one-quarter of the total, were members of their Local People’s Congress 
or the PPCC...without exception they all owned and operated profitable businesses in real 
estate, mining, loan sharking, and prostitution. Their financial resources gave them the 
means to bribe local government officials, whose sponsorship was indispensable to 
introduction into these two bodies”.   
 
Meanwhile, Wong’s (2012) observation that China is a place that is based on the ‘rule of 
man’ rather than the ‘rule of law’ may potentially be illustrated by the following example. I 
was a guest of the Public Security University in Beijing in 1995 where I befriended the Chief 
of Detectives from a major city. During dinner one evening, he told me in confidence that 
he was investigating the death of the deputy mayor of his city who was being investigated 
for corruption. He was certain that he was murdered to prevent higher officials being 
implicated. He came to this conclusion because the mayor was left-handed, but the bullet 
wound was on the right side of his head. However, despite this fact he was being 
pressurised to write it up as a suicide and close out the case. My assumption as to why he 
had confided in me was that in addition to his cathartic need to tell someone, he also 
needed to store away evidence as insurance in a safe deposit box in case he needed it 
later and I was one of those safe deposit boxes – i.e. someone outside of the system and 
a protected guest of the central government. I met up with the now retired chief on my 
fieldwork and asked him if such a cover-up would still occur in China, to which he replied, 
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“Much has changed, much has improved, but much remains the same. If you go onto the 
internet while you’re here in China, then you should search for the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre and see what you get and that will answer your question”. I did as he had 
suggested, and the website came up with ‘Tiananmen Square Massacre Myth’.  
 
However, the above examples notwithstanding, it seems that central government’s attempt 
to impose reforms are having some effect in some places, “We are no longer officially 
allowed to collect taxes, sort out commercial disputes, etc. they may still do it in the rural 
areas especially in the west of China but not in large cities like Beijing or Shanghai where 
supervision is stricter” (SP 25 years of service). Nevertheless, other interviewees paint a 
less rosy picture, “It is more difficult these days, you just have to be more careful. As they 
say, the mountain is high, and the emperor is far away. Even though we are not actually 
collecting taxes or solving trade disputes these days, the officials responsible will always 
ask us to go along with them” (SP 20 years of service). There is further evidence that in 
China the demarcation between various civil servants’ roles is still often blurred. “In China, 
the idea of professionalism still has a long way to go if you are a public servant. In the eyes 
of the authorities, you are a civil servant first before you are seen as a judge or a policeman, 
which means that you can be used by government for any duty they see fit whether or not 
it’s within your responsibility. For example, recently judges in Beijing were used to go out 
into the streets to promote the campaign to encourage people to have more than one child 
or during flooding, judges and prosecutors were used to salvage government properties 
including livestock” (PRC Academic).    
 
In India, Mehra (1985, p.94-95) argued that “Police fabricate and concoct evidence in order 
to secure conviction – the undesirable practice of concoction is more or less part and parcel 
of present day police working…cases placed before the courts are in large-measure frame-
ups and they are supported by fabricated evidence and extorting confessions through third-
degree methods...frame-ups are a legacy of the British Raj where evidence was fabricated 
to ensure conviction of persons representing a threat to British rule”. In my fieldwork many 
examples of frame-ups were given by interviewees and focus group participants and they 
also claimed that police employ the practice of creating scenarios from outstanding arrest 
of suspects for crimes unrelated to new cases in order to have it as a ready-made case 
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when needed at their convenience, “You often see in newspaper or on TV the statement 
that ‘police report 2 killed and 3 escaped in the darkness’. Whenever you see this you laugh 
because we all know that this is a trick they use to create an excuse for future purposes of 
fitting someone up with this crime when it suits them” (Barrister 3).  
 
Legacy of the British Raj is a popular reason provided by commentators, academics and 
practitioners for police malpractice. They propose that the effects of the organisation’s 
colonial legacy have instilled a mentality of master versus servant leading to a culture of 
abuse and repression on the part of the Indian police that continues to today. This legacy 
also manifests itself in the ubiquitous police presence in areas of life beyond the 
jurisdictions one usually associates with policing. Although the span of control enjoyed by 
the Indian police is similar to those of the PSB, they are nonetheless much more expansive. 
For example, the Indian police are there whenever any kind of enforcement is being applied 
whether it is tax collecting, protection of wild life or forests, disputes regarding water rights 
and land ownership, to being on show at weddings of the rich and powerful: “Police are the 
arms of state government whatever need doing it is the police who are there to do it 
including handing out relief or any other activities politicians see fit to deploy the police for. 
We are at weddings, public gatherings, we are involved in all aspect of people’s lives 
because the police had been in existence longer than any other agency so any area where 
there are rules e.g. construction, transport, excavation, trade, etc., the police are involved. 
This is a historical legacy where no one did enforcement apart from the police and is now 
part of our national culture. Other government agencies did not exist in colonial days so 
nowadays rather than dealing with matters in a negotiated fashion, these agencies rely on 
the police for enforcement. The presence of police seems to add glamour and authority in 
Indian society” (DGP K Singh). However, I would argue that there are other factors beyond 
the colonial legacy theory that need exploring when attempting to unearth reasons why 
corruption/malpractices continue to thrive in modern democratic India.  
 
Firstly, one of the “effects of modernisation is that it has generated better-educated 
candidates joining the junior ranks of the police. Due to the fact that they have more 
aspirations than their elder colleagues they soon become dissatisfied with their lot which 
can attribute to an atmosphere of ‘us versus them’ between officers and men” (DGP K 
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Singh): “There is no promotion prospects for the junior ranks” (PC 3 years of service); 
Police work in very adverse circumstances not helped by the fact that those he works for 
do not trust him!” (HC 10 years of service); “Lowest rung are not allowed to think or be 
independent. I am not allowed to have my own opinions. As a constable, you get no respect 
and officers never take any notice of my opinions. If a constable speaks his mind then you 
are told you are insubordinate or indiscipline, it is suffocating. Officers are treated very 
differently from the Constabulary, we aren’t given any respect, get no allowances, have 
poor pay and welfare, there aren’t any concerns for our families. Our expenses are never 
paid on time and constables have to fight for their rights and entitlements unlike gazetted 
officer (HC 19 years of service with a masters degree100); and, “Lower ranks have no 
facilities whereas senior officers have lots” (PC 6 years of service). Additionally, better-
educated constables can also have the effect of making it harder to unearth malpractices, 
“Police officers are better educated these days so they have a much better understanding 
of what they need to put into their evidence – even though it’s not true! (raising both arms 
into the air)” (Barrister 2). 
 
Moreover, during my fieldwork I read a newspaper article that summarises my own 
observations on this matter: The Indian Express dated 23rd January 2017 entitled ‘An 
uneasy force’ - by Prakash Singh. It describes the “growing hiatus between the officers and 
the men. The kind of fellow feeling, the bonhomie and camaraderie, which marked the 
relationship between the two, is gradually fading...The non-gazetted levels today are much 
more educated than they were in the past. These personnel have higher expectations – 
and their loyalty cannot be taken for granted. Police officers, on the other hand, do not have 
the power and authority, which they enjoyed earlier. Politicisation has eroded the chain of 
command. Junior ranks also cultivate political masters, exploiting caste loyalties and 
political alignment to further their careers. Senior officers are quite often not able to transfer 
or punish delinquent junior officers because of their political linkages. The officers blame 
                                                          
100 This interviewee claimed that he joined the police because his father was taken ill when he was about to 
embark on his PhD, being the eldest he had to find a government job to support the family. Even though he had 
sufficient qualifications to become a gazetted officer but the only positions available was in the Constabulary. He 
took this position anticipating gaining promotion through passing the officers’ exam. He claimed to have passed 
the exam twice but failed to get promoted because he could not muster the funds necessary to pay the required 
bribes. I was informed by DGP K Singh that this kind of case is common and that he personally knows of a 
number of constables who holds a PhD.      
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the men – the men blame the officers. All this has created a divide between the officers 
and the men”. In this atmosphere of mutual distrust, poor morale and the sense of not being 
valued has led to police personnel’s attitude of “it is everyman for himself because no one 
else will look after you” (HC 19 years of service); or, “No one cares about you, we have 
poor working conditions and my pay does not meet my family’s expectations, so the only 
way is to take bribes if I don’t want to feel like a failure. I want to give my wife and kids what 
they want, for my kids to go to a good school and be able to pay the hospital bills if they 
become sick” (SI 6 years of service). 
 
Secondly, politicisation of the Indian police is another factor that many of my research 
participants pointed to as the reason for corruption/malpractices persisting. As previously 
highlighted some politicians would demand police be assigned to their VIP detail and the 
numbers demanded are usually beyond any reasonable threat level but asked for out of 
the desire by the individual for the purposes of appearing to be the ‘big man’: “...one’s 
position through visible displays of the ability to displace other bodies. You show that you 
are a “big man” (or woman) by having as large an entourage as possible. Quite literally, the 
more bodies (and other material objects, like vehicles, houses, and guns) guarding the 
space you occupy, the more respect and deference you may presume to demand. This is 
especially the case if the bodies are wearing police uniforms or carrying arms because 
these are themselves signs of state authority” (Jauregui, 2013, p.658-9). Once these 
officers are assigned to politicians, they in effect become their personal police doing their 
bidding, “If you are assigned to a politician then you have to do as he tells you, whether 
you like it or not” (Insp 20 years of service). 
 
Moreover, politicians not only interfere with police priorities (e.g. unofficial policy of 
‘encounters’) and operational matters - “You arrest someone for murder but when the Chief 
Minister calls you and say he is so and so’s son, release him. What choice do you have but 
to do as you are told” (ADG Delhi Police) - but, also on the appointment and postings of 
officers based on bribes and/or caste loyalties. One 30-year-old politician I interviewed 
paints a graphic picture of how some politicians think, “As a politician it’s more beneficial 
to you personally if you wait for things to fail and then you step in so that you can say look 
I sorted this out so that people will become your supporters because they think that things 
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can only happen if you are the ‘god father’. 60-year-old men come up and touch my feet 
whenever they see me on the streets because they know I will take care of them. When 
you’re in power police will do as you say. When you’re not in power, they will act according 
to your wishes only if the other party doesn’t have the backing of the politician in power. 
You have to maximise the benefits whilst in power because life is precarious” (Politician 1). 
 
However, it is not just politicisation of the police that India has to contend with but also the 
criminalisation of politics. For example, Jauregui (2013: 659) noted that, “...at least 28 
percent of Indian Members of Parliament had been charged with crimes, almost half of 
them categorized as “heinous” crimes of murder, rape, extortion, dacoity (banditry), inciting 
and participating in riots with weapons, robbery, assault, and kidnapping...These charges 
were not limited to persons in particular political parties or particular states, but spread 
across the country, and the most of the figures in 2009 had increased since the 2004 
parliamentary elections…”. The criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of policing 
in India have similarities to the situation in China as highlighted by Pei (2016). Moreover, 
the rule of man over the rule of law as pointed out by Wong (2012) for China also holds 
true for India, where “right or wrong doesn’t matter, if two people are in dispute then you 
just have to lock up the supporter of the opposing party. Accused persons with political 
connections will always get away with it because the politician will help them” (Add SP 19 
years of service). Indeed, as one Barrister in one of my discussion groups noted (with the 
other two barristers and senior police officers present all gesturing in agreement): 
“Suspects will first call a politician, then lawyer and family last if given the choice. The power 
of politician is very strong. He can do anything with the police to get someone released or 
booked. I had a murder case where I argued for bail, police refused but when a politician 
attended he just said to the Station House Officer I’m taking so and so then he is released 
without any argument”. 
 
In short, the criminalisation of politics combined with politicisation of the police in India 
means that “police is used to achieve political aims, politically connected people gets away 
with murder/rape regularly and having a DGP is actually an inconvenience to politicians” 
(Add SP 19 years of service). This situation results in the “Indian police not abiding by the 
principles of the rule of law or procedural justice but rule of man by state politicians in power 
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at that particular time. With so much political change every 5 years no progress in police 
reform is made because new governments have their own agendas and priorities to secure 
their vested interests” (DGP K Singh). Furthermore, “dirty politics takes no notice of public 
opinions. A local politician was pillared for not building a road he had promised by 
supporters, but he replied by saying you took the food I gave you, accepted the blankets I 
distributed and the money I’ve given you and you will vote for me because I will give you 
those things again, he got re-elected. Police are used to oversee and protect your illegal 
business interests whether it is in mining, leather production, animal slaughter or 
smuggling. Police are also used to tell voters who to vote for” (Politician 2). Indeed, Dikshit 
(2000, p.101-102) argued that, “India’s corrupt politics of money and muscle power where 
politicians are in cahoots with criminals and unscrupulous businessmen created an 
atmosphere where corruption was granted respectability and considered the norm. Now 
politics in certain regions has been reduced to mafia activity and only hardened criminals 
can contest”. Faced with this environment and mode of operandi by their political masters 
where “politicians are guilty of politicising policing by inducing them to take illegal actions. 
If a person is forced to take illegal actions, after some time he will not hesitate to do so on 
his own. Finding that others are being benefited by the powers he possesses, he will 
misuse the powers for his own benefit. The same is true for the police” (Mehra, 1985, p.95).  
 
Finally, commentators (e.g. Witsoe, 2011; Michelutti, 2009; Jauregui, 2013) argued that, 
“...many lower-caste persons have come to perceive that practices deemed “corrupt” or 
“criminal” had helped to build and maintain upper-caste dominance in government and 
society at large for decades, perhaps even for centuries. As members of the historically 
disenfranchised lower castes gained positions of power over time—especially with the help 
of government reservation (affirmative action quota) policies—they co-opted, tolerated, and 
sometimes even celebrated practices deemed corrupt and criminal as expressions and 
means of upward mobility” (Jauregui, 2013: 663). Caste politics no doubt play a part but 
my own observation is that deeply embedded in Indian societal attitude is what can be 
described as pragmatism expressed by the term jugaad which provides the nutrients for 
malpractices to flourish. The term jugaad was originally used to describe taking a substitute 
part to fix a broken bicycle. This part is not the proper part needed but it nonetheless is 
good enough to make the bike useable again. Jauregui (2014, p.77) described it as a “quick 
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and dirty fixes or problem solving through improvisation, especially in a context of scarce 
resources”. In this context, it can be said that the underlying jugaad attitude plays a part in 
the rise, tolerance and continuation of the criminalisation of politics. 
 
For example, Jauregui (2014, p.77) argued that, “People in India deploy a variety of 
euphemisms for corruption, one of which is jugaad, which refers to goal-oriented 
improvisation, especially the use of informal social networks to advance one's interests. 
But as often as it is conflated with corruption, jugaad is also conceived as necessary for 
“getting by” and even as virtuous practice”. Moreover, jugaad can be seen as a “provisional 
agency, to explain what appears to be routinized legitimation of corruption among a wide 
swath of people inhabiting variegated social positions. Provisional agency has the dual 
meaning of a desired capability to provide a social good and a temporary means of mobility 
geared toward a better future. Building on previous anthropological analyses of the 
complexities of corruption in everyday practice, I deploy the concept of “provisional agency” 
in a way that compels us to turn away from conventional questions about how immoral 
activity helps people realize power and toward understanding how expressions of agency 
help to realize shifts in, and contestations over, moral boundaries”.  
 
It is this moral boundary that we need to explore concerning Indian society. As mentioned 
in previous sections, centuries of caste, class and religious repressions and conflicts has 
led to deep seated resentment and distrust in this heterogeneous and still largely rural and 
poverty-stricken society, where a large part of its population struggle to survive on a daily 
basis. Against this backdrop it is little wonder that filling one’s family’s empty belly, getting 
an education for one’s children in the hope for a better future, or paying for medical bills for 
an ill member of the family are far more of a priority than any notion of ethical practice. This 
understandable obsession for physiological and financial security can be gleaned from the 
following quote, “I was on a train journey recently and two obviously well-off ladies were 
chatting about one of the lady’s sons’ futures. The elder woman told the younger one to 
teach her sons to be dishonest because that is the only way to get on in the world. If they 
are honest they will not succeed she told her. Unfortunately, right or wrong, this is how 
most Indian’s think” (DGP K Singh). I was also struck by the fact that many of my research 
participants all pointed to jugaad whenever they described corruption as a means of 
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justifying their actions. That is, it is just part and parcel of everyday life where pragmatism 
prevails over ethics and what is right or wrong - at least from a western perspective. 
 
In terms of how jugaad works in the Indian police Jauregui’s (2014, p.8) research in which 
she uses a cases study of an investigation into cutting down a tree without a permit. She 
describes how police got to the scene via an illegal public bus vendor because their official 
jeep was not available. They rounded up a few ‘suspects’ and gathered some wood as 
‘evidence’. She notes that, “These kinds of symbiotic arrangements reflect a cultural order 
in which activities that many would readily categorize as corruption are collectively 
legitimated in everyday practice. Evidence in a criminal case is potentially compromised, 
and a businessman profits without having the legal permits to do so. And yet there is a 
mutual recognition of both need and desire among all parties involved, leading to a web of 
exchanges allowing police to proceed with an investigation, laborers to acquire paid work, 
and a vehicle owner to conduct a profitable business that, even if not fully licensed 
according to the black letter of the law, is relatively harmless and constitutes a kind of social 
provision, not only of needed transport for local persons without other means of mobility 
but also of a job for the driver. The “spirit of the law” may be compromised, but people also 
experience and express a sense of agency and responsibility as jobholders, householders, 
working citizens, and protectors of the peace”. 
 
During my fieldwork, I was told by a doctor who worked in a drug rehabilitation clinic in 
Lucknow that “Police would get their heroin from a street dealer to feed addicts in custody. 
It is illegal but it’s jugaad because if they don’t he might die in the cell or he would cause a 
disturbance in the station if he suffers from withdrawal. Either way it will cause them 
trouble”. A senior officer explained, “Jugaad is getting around things or a system that is not 
working. It is being adaptable and practical to make things work even if not how it should 
work. It is deep in Indian culture - there is the right way and a wrong way and then there is 
the jugaad way!” (SP 20 years of service).  
 
Moreover, it can be argued that some of the daily practices one sees in the lives of the 
Indian population can be potentially attributed to the prevailing underlying attitude that 
comes with jugaad. For example, the blatant disregard for traffic regulations on Indian roads 
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where drivers will come around a roundabout the wrong way or drive onto the pavement to 
avoid red traffic lights when in traffic so that he/she can progress with apparent disregard 
for their own or other road users’ safety. One day while stuck in a traffic jam in Lucknow I 
noticed the usual numerous traffic violations taking place right in front of an officer directing 
traffic. I said to my driver “why don’t the police stop these law breakers?” He replied, 
“Because there are so many of them where do you start”.  This disregard for traffic laws 
and regulations is observed to be taken to the extreme when I was on a modern motorway 
from Lucknow to Agra where there were three lanes in each direction divided by railings 
and flower beds, etc. as in motorways one sees in Western Europe. However, the 
difference is that in the early morning fog visibility was poor so one would expect drivers to 
exercise caution. However, to my amazement, even though we were travelling at speed on 
the fast lane; out of the fog, coming the wrong way towards us was a bright yellow school 
bus full of kids. All along the 4-hour journey on this road, we had to weave and swerve to 
avoid on-coming traffic, including pedestrians, herders with flocks of sheep and cattle all 
heading the wrong way. I noticed that my driver did not react emotionally at all to this 
onslaught of rule breakers and drove as if this was normal, I said, “Why do they go on the 
wrong side of the road, especially as the three-lane carriageway for the direction they are 
going is empty” (pointing to the correct three lanes they should be on)? To which he replied 
nonchalantly as if it should be obvious, “Because they want to get where they want to 
quicker, if they go on the other side they would have to come off at a junction further down, 
or they would have to pay at the toll booths”. I then asked, “This is a motorway and the 
signs clearly say motor vehicles only, how do pedestrians, cyclists, farm tractors and animal 
herders get onto the motorway?” He replied, “They just build an earth ramp onto the road 
at whatever location they need to get access from their village” – giving me a look as if it 
was obvious. 
 
Moreover, this jugaad attitude of adapting whatever is necessary to achieving one’s goal  
can be seen in other practices -  to Western eyes maybe considered unethical. I have 
described in previous sections how public-sector workers would not do their job just for 
their salary but demand an additional fee from the public. However, I was very surprised to 
learn that even in banking fees are expected by the bank staff for doing their job. “We make 
money by saying to a person wanting a loan why should I lend you money and they would 
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then agree to pay us a fee out of the loan we give them. When they come to collect state 
aid, which we call ‘free money’, we would say you are causing me work giving you this free 
money, what is in it for us? They would pay us a fee out of the money they collect from the 
state. This is just being pragmatic by both parties, we both benefit” (Bank Manager).   
 
Some commentators (e.g. Jauregui, 2014) suggest that jugaad may be similar to guanxi in 
China. However, from my discussions with experts who are both familiar with China and 
India, including two Hong Kong Police Assistant Commissioners (HKP AC) who have 
worked extensively with both the Indian and Chinese police, as well as from my own 
observations and experiences of both cultures, I have concluded that they are different. 
Guanxi is about using one’s network to gain access or to get an insider’s edge. Jugaad is 
similar to guanxi to the extent of gaining access by leveraging one’s relationships. However, 
I would suggest that it is different because jugaad’s underlying connotation is that one 
needs to go beyond just using one’s network but to go further in precipitating whatever 
actions and means necessary to achieve one’s purpose. Moreover, jugaad also relates to 
not just access as in guanxi but actions or use of materials and resources to ‘make it work’ 
even if it is not designed for that purpose let alone whether it is morally right or wrong – 
indeed, some Indian men use the term jugaad when sleeping with prostitutes as to mean 
using her as a substitute for one’s absent wife. Furthermore, jugaad also relates to the 
physical mending of things to make it work as well as a focus on immediate outcome rather 
than the longer-term reciprocal relationship investment associated with guanxi. “I was in 
India for a police conference. I was lodged in a government VIP guesthouse. There were 
no towels in the room, so I called reception. After about an hour and three phone calls later, 
there was still no sign of a towel. I went out to the corridor and saw an attendant; I gave 
him a tip and asked him to get me a towel. Within about a minute there was a knock on the 
door and this guy was standing there with a large stack of new towels. I said, ‘I only need 
one’, he replied ‘it is ok sir they’re yours to take home if you like’. I related this story to my 
Indian host, and he just laughed and said now you just performed jugaad” (HKP AC1). 
 
4.4 (e) Summary: 
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Police corruption/malpractices in China are widespread and whilst much has been exposed 
in the media, these have largely been cases relating to physical violence, abuse towards 
detainees or major corruption cases involving police and local officials leading to large-
scale protests, with little detail regarding how officers earn grey money. However, my 
research has shown that the traditional forms of corruption in terms of bribery/ extortion 
exists within the PSB and there is a culture of tolerance within the organisation, “It’s difficult 
to tell your guys to stop because we’ve all done it when we were in their shoes” (SP 25 
years of service). Furthermore, the tricks of the trade in extracting grey money are subtle 
thus hidden from public gaze. The reasons for such a situation are largely due to excessive 
police powers and the wide remit of PSB responsibilities leading to opportunities for graft, 
rent-seeking and collaboration with organised crime.  
 
Furthermore, in Wong’s 1998 study of the PSB’s use of the more restrictive criminal law 
powers where the PSB is under the supervision of People’s Procuracy. He found that even 
in this more restricted environment the rules were frequently broken. Wong concluded that 
the factors contributing to these abuses are rooted in the Chinese culture of rule by man 
and institutional despotism - “We are the father and the citizens are the children” (SP 20 
years of service) - rather than the principal of the rule of law. This is further compounded 
with the preference for pragmatism over theory and bureaucracy - “Most cases we just slap 
the offenders a few times and tell them to pay the victim compensation rather than go 
through the legal process. It saves everyone lots of time and trouble. We have so few police 
officers to do so many things” (PC 8 years of service) - and the utility of substantive justice 
- “Things are changing but all officers has a desire to lock up criminals so the practice of 
beefing up your evidence or use all means to extract a confession is still part of the fabric 
of our culture” (Deputy Director 26 years of service) - over procedural justice in both the 
police and Chinese society – e.g. Hu & Dai’s 2014 study found that one-third of criminal 
justice officials and citizens did not oppose the use of extortion in the daily operation of the 
criminal justice system. All these factors play a part in enabling the persistence of police 
malpractice. As one insightful student said in one of my focus groups, “We are seeing bad 
stories about police across china so there must be an institutional problem behind these 
cases”. 
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Moreover, many of the tricks of the trade in relation to bribery in China are very similar to 
those found in India. However, it can be said that in the case of India this seems to be more 
insidious, obvious and less subtle than in China. Moreover, police brutality and the culture 
of using excessive force is also similar in both countries except that in India the practice of 
staging encounters has become almost an unofficial policy where “elimination rather than 
conviction” is suggested to be more or less tolerated by politicians, the masses and the 
media. In contrast, there seems to be a degree of intolerance towards unlawful or excessive 
police violence among the Chinese masses judging from protests and online outcries when 
such injustices occur. The reasons for the persistence of police corruption/malpractices lie 
in many factors. First of which is that police in India, similar to China, are involved in many 
more aspects of the daily lives of the population than is expected in western societies, thus 
affording them more opportunities for confrontation and corruption. Although, it can be 
argued that in China clamp downs by central government have reduced, in metropolitan 
areas at least, these interactions (e.g. tax collection and leveraging fines to fund police 
operations, etc.) and hence corruption opportunities. 
 
Secondly, whilst in China the wide ranging administrative powers and attitude of father 
versus child derived from the Mao era continues to play a part in the PSB’s culture and way 
of working. In India, similarly, the legacy of the British colonial policing system and its 
attitudes are still writ large on the daily lives of the masses because of the influence it has 
over the behaviour and values of the average Indian policeman, where the master versus 
servant relationship still dominates. In both countries, the positional power of senior police 
officers is greater than those of the state prosecutors. This may have a bearing on 
operational decision-making. Moreover, in both forces there seems to be a culture of 
tolerance towards corruption/malpractice. My survey indicates that 52% of PSB officers 
and 49% of Indian police would ignore bribe-taking with 39% of PSB officers and 41% of 
Indian officers ignoring unlawful beatings. Indeed, whilst 39% of PSB officers and 38% of 
Indian officers saying that they would not ignore it if they see a colleague taking a bribe 
and 52% of PSB officers and 59% of Indian officers saying that they would not ignore it if 
they see a colleague using unlawful violence. The caveat is that most would not officially 
report the incident for a myriad of reasons not least because of the concerns of being 
alienated as a “snitch” or not wanting a colleague to “lose his livelihood”. Furthermore, my 
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personal experience of the universal police culture of ‘protecting your ass’ and the desire 
to ‘play it safe’ in answering these types of surveys lead the author to suggest that the 
percentages of officers saying that they would ‘intervene’ is more likely to be much lower 
in reality than the result indicates. However, whether this is the case or not the results 
above are still sizable in favour of ignoring corruption and malpractices. Therefore, an 
indication of the size of the gap in achieving a professional service based on the rule of 
law.              
 
Thirdly, in China, the PSB is the eyes, ears, teeth and claws of the state/CCP and therefore 
not only the tools of the political elite but senior PSB officers are part and parcel of those 
elite. Consequently, the politicisation of police and criminalisation of politics seem to be 
playing a part in both India and China, as well as, the potential risk for the proper 
administration of justice by the rule of man rather than through the rule of law. In China this 
is being addressed by the central government’s efforts to exert greater control over the 
police. However, in India, there seems to be little appetite by the political classes for police 
reforms. The desire by some politicians to directly control the strong arm of the state to 
affect their goals and further their interests has led to the loss of effective police leadership 
due to frequent transfers of those not willing to tow the party line. This has resulted in the 
lower ranks developing loyalties to politicians rather than to their own superiors. 
Consequently, there is distrust between superiors and subordinates and us versus them 
mentality between officers and men. Moreover, the “Indian police has remained static and 
stagnated whilst society is constantly changing. There is a lack of a political will to improve 
the quality of the police. In most of the states there is not the adequate funds for the police 
to meet 21st century challenges while those states that have the resources have no will 
power to make their police modern and independent” (Dickshit, 2000, p.39-40). This lack 
of adequate investment and the political will to transform the police has led to a great deal 
of stress and discontent within the organisation where the attitude that if “no one cares” 
then “why should I” prevails. Poor morale no doubt also contributes to the reinforcement of 
the culture of abuse and apathy. Additionally, in India, the criminalisation of politics in recent 
years has exaggerated the officer and men divide as well as adding a darker shadow over 
the politicisation of policing.  
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Finally, there is a culture of tolerance within both police organisations towards corruption/ 
malpractices. However, in India the tolerance for bribe-giving and bribe-taking, and other 
forms of corruption is underscored by the notion of jugaad in wider society. The desire to 
get a quick fix and taking short cuts to be practical has meant that corruption is rife in many 
walks of Indian life. Indeed, this tolerance is the norm in Indian society and one interviewee 
summed up thus, “Bribery and beatings are tolerated and even expected in India. Today, 
if police don’t take a bribe then there is no peace of mind by either the public concerned or 
from fellow officers” (SP 25 years of service). The situation is not just isolated to a few 
states but “malpractices and corruption is seen in every state” (Verma, 1999, p.276) and 
“across all India” (Nickel and Verma, 2008, p.94).  
 
4.5 What are the key influencing factors for decision-making at the ‘moments of 
truth’? 
 
One area of my research is an attempt to identify the structural/institutional factors (e.g. 
policies, culture, governance, impact of media, etc.) that may influence ethical decision-
making rather than the situational factors (e.g. suspect’s’ race/class/demeanour, time of 
day, environment, etc.) that affect an officer’s operational street craft and for which have 
traditionally been the focus of research.  
 
4.5(a) Findings for China: 
For China, the lists of the twenty (A to T) structural/institutional factors are shown in figure 
1 below.  
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Figure 1: List of factors for China
 
My survey101 on assessing the impact of these factors indicates that the overall Chinese 
sample selected items (A) Government Policy/Directives/Legislations; (B) MPS 
Initiatives/policies; (K) Increasing media criticism/attention; and (F) Effects of 
targets/objectives of performance management/appraisal system, as the most influential 
factors on decision-making. This is based on the frequency of selection and the officers’ 
rating on influence, resulting in the said items being placed in the top right quadrant (High 
Frequency and High Influence/Impact) of the two-by-two matrix in figure 2 below.  
 
Additionally, items (H) Lack of consistent & effective independent operational inspection of 
complaints; (M) Increased expectation of urban public – which police are frequently unable 
to meet due to a variety of reasons not least because of the lack of resources & funding; 
(L) Speed & transparency of internet communication making individual incidences & 
officers’ conduct being debated virtually simultaneously, openly & by a much wider & 
diverse group of people; and (Q) Poor training & legal knowledge, were also most 
frequently selected by respondents but were not deemed to be as influential as items in the 
                                                          
101 See Appendix 3 for full results  
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top right quadrant, thus, are shown on the bottom right quadrant of the matrix. During the 
interviews many of the interviewees made their selection roughly in-line with these results. 
 
Figure 2: Overall decision factor result – China (n=23)
 
Moreover, interviewees highlight that Government Directives/Legislations and MPS 
Initiatives/policies set the tone for police priorities and tactics in China. However, due to 
China’s attempt to introduce the rule of law, it has led to “an ever increasing volume and 
complexity of new laws and directives” which “not only increase the fear of falling foul of 
these leading to losing your job but there are so many of them that we simply don’t have 
time to read them let alone understand them, and most of the time it is unclear as to what 
and how we should do it because no one is prepared to write these instructions down in 
case they get blamed if it turns out to be wrong” (Insp 15 years of service). This lack of 
clarity is further compounded by poor in-job training, “We don’t get any skills training all we 
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get is a video with the new laws and are expected to understand from watching someone 
talking with no chance of asking questions, our training is really bad” (PS 8 years of 
service).  
 
An example of how poor training and opaque directives add to operational stresses is in 
the area of how and when to use force. An interviewee sent me the following email: “This 
was on a police Wechat group. It was reported on China's Daily (Chinese version 人民日
报) on 26/07/16. It is an instruction from the Ministry of Public Security in relation to how to 
legally enforce law by the Police in China in a national Police training event. The original 
content is: 面对执法对象或其亲友突然下跪抱腿的，民警可站在下跪者身 侧搀扶起起身，
弯腰或半蹲进行劝说和法制教育，促其尽快起身"。its translation is ‘when the suspects or 
their relatives suddenly knee down and hold your leg, the Police Officers would stand by 
the individuals' side and help them to stand up, or bend over or crouch to encourage, 
persuade or educate them to stand up’. This shows that many policemen in China are 
unsure of how to do their job today. We get this kind of unhelpful advice all the time” (Insp 
22 years of service). 
 
Furthermore, in addition to the already wide range of policing responsibilities, additional 
pressures are added to the already straining PSB officers with endless campaigns. “My 
officers already work round the clock and are never off-duty. Many of them don’t even get 
the chance to go home to sleep but just snatches the odd wink here and there. But on top 
of our normal work there are always campaigns Summer, Autumn, Winter, and Spring they 
just come one after another. Work stress is very high and morale is low. In 2008 an officer 
jumped to his death because he couldn’t cope with the pressure” (SP 25 years of service). 
 
Additionally, the top down targets set within the performance management system not only 
encourage abuse as described in previous sections but also add to the pressure. “Targets 
can be as high as arresting and clearing 120 cases per year. Don’t forget we also deal with 
disputes and accidents among other tasks. This puts pressure to get the results, so people 
take shortcuts” (SP 28 years of service). The heavy workload is further reinforced by the 
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effects of low numbers of police as a ratio to the population. Surprisingly, for an apparent 
‘authoritarian’ state, according to Wu et al., (2016), in 2007, the total number of public 
security police personnel in China was approximately 1.8 million, which yielded a police–
population ratio of 13.8 per 10,000 citizens. This ratio is significantly lower than those in 
most western countries. For example, the USA and Germany have a police–population 
ratio of approximately 30 per 10,000 citizens, the UK is about 26 and Japan is around 22. 
According to the Police Research and Development Bureau of India the police ratio in India 
is 18.2 per 10,000 in 2015. It can be surmised that this situation may have in part 
contributed to the need for pragmatism in the PSB thus reinforcing the culture for 
sustentative rather than procedural justice. 
 
On top of work pressures officers are also subjected to internal politics and the continuing 
struggle for power and influence between the local government and the MPS. “Conflicts 
between central and local government are numerous, for example, Ministry of Public 
Security always nominate their preference for Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs, but the local cadres 
have their own candidates...there are also many battles between centre and local on 
different priorities, and we’re stuck in the middle” (SP 22 years of service). These 
sentiments support the findings of a study conducted in Jinan where “78% of beat officers 
and 76.5% of superior officers stated that they would want to change the system to one 
where the local police are being centrally controlled by the MPS only” (Wong, 2012, p.256).  
 
However, many officers point to the increase in negative press and social media coverage 
for the growing criticisms they receive from the public and their lack of deference towards 
them as a result. This coupled with poor legal knowledge, opaque directives and poor 
training has potentially led to a great deal of stress and reluctance on the part of street 
officers on how to deal with confrontational situations. “Two of my young officers tried to 
arrest a violent man who was beating one of the officers. The other officer was more 
concern about videoing the incident than helping his colleague because he wanted to show 
evidence to justify their use of force. This would never have happened when I was a 
constable...we now have body cameras, car cameras and even cameras in the cells to 
record everything we do” (SP 25 years of service). 
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In comparing the differences between police managers102 versus rank and file officers – 
see figure 3 below. My findings suggests that whilst rank and file officers selected - in 
priority order - (A) Government Policy/Directives/Legislations; (F) Effects of targets/ 
objectives of performance  management/appraisal system;(K) Increasing media 
criticism/attention; (H) Lack of consistent & effective independent  operational inspection 
of complaints; (M) Increased expectations of urban public – which  police are frequently 
unable to meet due to a variety of reasons not least because of the lack of resources & 
funding; and, (B) MPS Initiatives/policies; as worthy of being placed in the top right quadrant 
of the matrix. Police Managers, however, only selected A, B and K as top right quadrant 
candidates. Suggesting that rank and file officers feels the effects of the target-based 
performance management system, the lack of an independent complaint 
investigation/supervision process, and the increased expectation of the public more so than 
managers. This difference may be explained by the fact that junior officers are at the 
frontline and are called upon to do most of the day-to-day policing. 
 
Junior officers placed (N) Public’s disrespect & low esteem of police officers post socio-
economic reforms; (T) Increasing fear of criticism or losing one’s job if an officer falls foul 
of new directives/regulations or a powerful local cadre, etc.; and, (S) Sense of the lack of 
promotion and career progression opportunities unless one has (Guanxi) the right network 
leading to cynicism; into the bottom right quadrant. This indicates that whilst their 
impact/influence on them might be lower than the items discussed in the previous 
paragraph but that they are nevertheless significant. Senior officers selected (L) Speed & 
transparency of internet communication making Individual incidences & officers’ conduct  
being debated virtually simultaneously, openly  & by a much wider & diverse group of 
people; (Q) Poor training & legal knowledge; (M) Increased expectations of urban public – 
which police are frequently unable to meet due to a variety of reasons not least because of 
the lack of resources & funding; (N) Public’s disrespect & low esteem of police officers post 
socio-economic reforms; (C) MPS public-relations campaigns (e.g. Spirit of Lei Feng) 
potentially leading to increased expectations amongst the public that cannot be met; to be 
placed in the bottom right quadrant. The only consensus between these two groups is (N) 
                                                          
102 Inspectors and above 
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meaning that both sets of officers agree that in their experience the public holds police 
officers in lower esteem post reforms.  
 
From these results, it appears that junior officers have a greater fear of losing their job than 
senior officers and the fear that this might occur if they make a mistake in applying the law 
inappropriately or getting onto the wrong side of a powerful local cadre. This in itself shows 
that junior officers are potentially in an awkward position of having to choose between 
applying the law fairly and risk upsetting an official by going against his potential interests. 
Moreover, junior officers also seem to be more concerned than managers regarding the 
advantages that organisational insiders have over them in terms of better promotional 
prospects and postings due to having better guanxi. In a system where promotion and good 
postings are “not based on merit or transparency but are decided behind closed doors 
where guanxi is key” (Insp 18 years of service), then there is little wonder that junior officers 
selected this as a factor in ethical decision-making. Moreover, as one officer pointed out, 
“If you don’t have the right guanxi then you have to pay money so that you get the posting 
you want to further your career” (PC 3 years of service). Senior officers on the other hand 
seem to have more concerns over issues that affect operational effectiveness (i.e. lacking 
resources/funding and poor training/legal knowledge of their subordinates) and their 
organisation’s image/reputation (i.e. public-relations campaigns that raises public 
expectations that cannot be met and the impact of the internet) than their subordinates. 
This is perhaps not surprising bearing-in-mind that organisational reputation and 









Figure 3: Managers Vs Rank & File decision factor results - China 




4.5(b) Findings for India: 
 
For India, I amended the decision-making factors to reflect the Indian situation without 
altering the thrust or substance of these factors. In item (B) I replaced MPS with ‘State 
Government’; (C) I removed MPS and Lei Feng; (E) replaced MPS with ‘HQ’; (G) added 
‘State Government, excessive VIP protection & private functions’; (J) removed MPS; (N) 
added ‘since independence’; (P) added ‘acceptance of evidence fabrication & evidence 
enhancing’; (S) removed ‘Guanxi’; and (T) replaced local cadre with ‘politician’.  
 




The overall result (see figure 5 below) of the thirty-nine responses received (including both 
rank and file personnel103 and police managers) indicate that: (K) Increasing media 
criticisms and attention; (P) Substantive (pragmatic) vs. procedural (follow letter of the 
law/regulations strictly) Justice culture – i.e. leading to acceptance of evidence fabrication 
or enhancing evidence to make cases stronger against suspects; (T) Increasing fear of 
criticism or losing one’s job if an officer falls foul of new directives/regulations or a politician, 
etc.; (M) Increased expectations of the urban public - which the police are frequently unable 
to meet due to a variety of reasons not least because of the lack of resources and funding; 
(O) Poor pay and working conditions; and, (G) Police officers being used by local/state 
government for non-policing activities e.g. tax/debt collecting, commercial disputes, 
excessive VIP protection, private functions, etc. as meriting both high influence and 
frequency of selection, thus are placed in the top right quadrant of the matrix. Moreover, 
                                                          
103 I included Sub-Inspectors in the rank and file sample because their duties are equivalent to those of a PSB 
Sergeant or Constable. In India, the Sub-Inspector is the investigating officer and HCs and PCs act on his 
instructions with no authority to conduct investigations whereas in China that authority is assigned to PCs. 
Therefore, for the purposes of analysing decision-making I placed the Sub-Inspectors into rank and file instead of 
‘management’.       
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the Indian sample also selected (S) Sense of the lack of promotion and career progression 
opportunities unless one has the right network leading to cynicism; and (R) Low morale 
due to changes in status and sense of alienation to urban population since economic 
reforms began, the most frequently (bottom right quadrant) but has less influence than the 
above items. 
 
Many of the accompanying comments on the survey responses mirror the opinions of 
interviewees and those already shown in earlier part of this thesis. However, the 
following may provide the reader with a bit more texture on the Indian police personnels’ 
answers. For example, for option (K) “Everyone has a mobile phone these days so you 
need to be careful otherwise you will end up on Youtube” (SI 5 years of service); (P) 
“There is a massive gap between theory and practice in applying the law” (HC 19 years 
of service); (T) “There is a great deal of political interference and pressure on the police 
and we are not allowed freedom of action” (HC 18 years of service); (M) “The senior 
officers and politicians tell the public just call the emergency number if you need the 
police but we aren’t given the tools to do the job, often there isn’t even petrol in the police 
cars or it’s being used by senior officers for their own purposes” (HC 15 years of service); 
(O) “We need better pay and working conditions” (PC 5 years of service), “We are never 
allowed to take annual leave and we can’t even go sick when we are ill” (SI 1 years of 
service); (G) “If we don’t extract fines to fund police work then this will hinder the solving 
of cases” (HC 37 years of service), and “Outside influences prevent police from doing 
its work” (HC 6 years of service); (S) “Lack of promotion prospects has led to a vast 
sense of hopelessness and depression for junior officers” (HC 17 years of service); and, 
(R) “Many times the good work of junior officers are compromised by senior officers due 
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Figure 5: Overall decision factor result – India (n=39)  
 
 
4.5(c) Comparison between India and China:                                                                    
In comparing the overall selection (see figure 6 below) by PSB officers and the Indian 
police (IP) samples it is worth noting that the only factors that were selected by both sets 
of officers to be in the top right quadrant (i.e. high influence and frequency of choice) was 
item ‘K’ (Increasing media criticisms and attention). Moreover, both sets of officers also 
selected item ‘M’ (Increased expectations of the urban public - which the police are 
frequently unable to meet due to a variety of reasons not least because of the lack of 
resources and funding) with the Indian officers placing it in the top right quadrant (high 
influence and frequency) versus the PSB sample placing it on the bottom right quadrant 
(Frequency only). This finding indicates that both sets of officers believe the respective 
countries’ economic rise and the effects of increases in urbanisation have impacted their 
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decision-making. Additionally, when a comparison is made between rank and file officers 
only then both ‘K’ and ‘M’ are in the top right quadrant of high influence and frequency – 
i.e. item ‘M’ holds greater significance for PSB rank and file officers than for PSB 
managers. This finding further indicates that frontline officers in both countries are feeling 
the effects of economic modernisation in terms of greater expectations of the urban public 
and the advent of mobile phone/cameras and internet in their decision-making than their 
managers.        
 
Additionally, unlike China, all Indian officers believe that poor pay and working conditions 
are having a great deal of influence on their decision-making (item O). I have already 
provided data points in earlier sections regarding the low pay, long hours, no leave/time 
off even when an officer is ill, poor accommodation and frequent transfers leading to long 
stretches of time away from one’s family. During my visits to Indian police stations, I often 
saw officers literally collapsing onto haphazardly arranged dishevelled beds or were rough 
sleeping on the floor in noisy, cramped and dirty dungeon-like rooms. Indeed, the Human 
Rights Watch 2009 report (‘Broken System – Dysfunction, Abuse, and Impunity in the 
Indian Police’) noted that “police officers often work long hours without shifts. Many told 
Human Rights Watch they were exhausted and demoralized, living in government-
provided tents or filthy barracks and denied leave...Police sleep in cramp barracks where 
its open-air entrances expose police to noise and weather fluctuations; many police 
complain they cannot sleep in such conditions. Low-ranking police spend as many as 
twenty years living in such barracks, which may be located far from their families, due to 
Figure 6: Comparison of China/India results (Items in priority order based on points scored)  
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the limited availability of “family quarters” housing and insufficiency of private housing 
allowances” (Ibid., p.4-6). 
Furthermore, the above situation is compounded by the fact that Indian officers 
(especially among managers – see figure 7 below) also indicate that they are being 
used for non-policing activities e.g. tax collection, VIP protection, on show for private 
functions, etc. (item G) which is also having an impact on their decision-making. Leaving 
aside the fact that officers assigned to a politician are in danger of being asked to 
perform functions that are not only not police duties but also may be unlawful or 
unethical as indicated in earlier sections of this thesis. The diverting of scarce 
manpower from an already stretched service can only hamper the proper functioning 
and effectiveness of the Indian police even further. From this perspective and when 
comparing the ratio of police to population between China (13.8 per 10,000) and India 
(18.2 per 10,000), at a glance it can be argued that on paper at least the workload of 
the PSB officer is greater than those of the Indian officer. However, if one takes into 
account the potential that Indian officers are being used much more on non-policing 
functions and that the 18.2 ratio is what India call ‘sanctioned’ numbers, that is, it is 
based on what the country is supposed to have rather than what it actually has (which 
is often a much lower number e.g. in UP the ‘sanctioned’ number according to Data on 
Police Organisation 01/01/2015 published by the Bureau of Police Research and 
Development is 327,955 but the ‘actual’ number was only 136,909) then it can be 
suggested that the Indian police is in reality more stretched than the PSB.   
Moreover, in comparing the Indian rank and file sample with police managers’ selection 
on decision factors, it appears that rank and file officers indicate that ‘M’ (Increased 
expectations of the urban public - which the police are frequently unable to meet due to 
a variety of reasons not least because of the lack of resources and funding), ‘O’ (Poor 
pay and working conditions), and ‘R’ (Low morale due to changes in status and sense 
of alienation to urban population since economic reforms began) are having a great 
deal more of an impact on their decision-making than they have on police managers. 
This supports my findings during interviews and observations in India that these factors 
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have greater significance for frontline officers on operational duties than managers who 
are more concerned about police performance and who enjoy better pay and conditions.     
 
In comparing the importance of decision-making factors between managers in India and 
China (See figure 8 below), whilst both opted for ‘K’ (Increasing media criticisms and 
attention) as a key influencing factor in their decision-making. There was a clear 
difference of opinion in that PSB managers opted for ‘A’ (Government Policy/ Directives/ 
Legislations) and ‘B’ (MPS Initiatives/policies) with Indian managers opting for ‘G’ 
(Police officers being used by local/state government for non-policing activities e.g. 
tax/debt collecting, commercial disputes, excessive VIP protection, private functions, 













Figure 7: Comparison between Indian police managers (n=7) vs. rank & file sample (n=32) in priority order 




Figure 8: Comparison between Indian Police Managers (n=7) and PSB Managers (n=7) 
 
Similarly, there was a difference between the PSB and Indian rank and file samples too 
(see figure 6 on p189). The PSB sample, like their managers, selected ‘A’ (Government 
Policy/ Directives/Legislations) and ‘B’ (MPS Initiatives/policies) but with the addition of 
‘F’ (Effects of targets/objectives of performance management/appraisal system) as 
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among the most influential factors on decision-making. The selecting of these items 
would suggest that junior PSB officers are more mindful of official policies and 
organisational/management systems than their Indian counterparts. This is because, 
instead of the above choices made by their PSB counterparts, Indian rank and file 
officers ranked (P) Substantive (pragmatic) vs. procedural (follow letter of the 
law/regulations strictly) Justice culture – i.e. leading to acceptance of evidence 
fabrication or enhancing evidence to make cases stronger against suspects; and, (T) 
Increasing fear of criticism or losing one’s job if an officer falls foul of new directives/ 
regulations or a powerful local politician, etc., among their most influential decision-
making factors. From these results it could be argued that that Indian officers are more 
susceptible to cultural norms, unofficial ways of working and, as already previously 
highlighted, influence of individual politicians than PSB officers. Consequently, they are 
in a position of potential greater vulnerability to the rule of man than their Chinese 
counterparts. 
4.5(d) Summary:                                                                                                                    
For China, most officers in the sample, irrespective of rank, places the effects of 
government legislations and central directives, as well as, the increase of media 
criticism as key influencers to ethical decision-making. With the rank and file officers 
feeling the effects of the PSB’s target-based performance management system, the 
lack of an independent complaint investigation/supervision process, and the increased 
expectation of the Chinese public more so than managers. This picture reflects the fact 
that junior officers are at the sharp end of policing and it is they who would be most 
likely the subject of public expectations and consequential complaints for failing, and 
the internal pressures to achieve the arrest and clear-up targets that is now a feature of 
policing in post-economic reform China. Additionally, all officers believe that the 
Chinese public hold them in lower esteem than prior to reform. With junior officers being 
frustrated by the guianxi-based progression culture and a fear of losing their job if they 
make a mistake (especially if it is caught on camera) or by upsetting a powerful cadre. 
Senior officers, on the other hand, are more concerned with their organisation’s 
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reputation, its effectiveness, the burden of increasing workload, and the constant 
central-local power dynamics and politics.  
In contrast, for Indian officers, although they too are feeling in a similar way as PSB officers 
regarding the pressures and stresses brought about by their countries economic rise and 
urbanisation, Indian officers seem to be less concerned about government policies, laws 
and regulations or organisational systems but are more influenced by their poor pay and 
working conditions, frequent political interference in their daily duties, low morale due to 
these pressures and organisational culture in their decision-making. Moreover, although 
junior Indian officers are similarly frustrated as junior PSB officers in the need for 
connections to enhance their promotional and ‘good posting’ prospects. The survey result 
and my overall research indicate that there is a potential that they are more susceptible to 
the rule of man than their rank and file counterparts in China in their decision-making. 
5. Conclusion: 
“The transitions in today’s China represent an important form of social change in the 
contemporary world…This provides a unique context for researchers to study social 
conflicts and social control, and the relations between citizens and the criminal justice 
system in particular is very important” (Hu & Dai, 2014, p.507). In this context, my research 
has focussed on understanding the situation of the PSB itself from an inside-out 
perspective by taking a horse’s mouth approach. As China embarks on its endeavours to 
become a society based on the rule of law, I wanted to explore what some of the potential 
barriers might look like on the ground. To get a better grasp of the situation I decided to 
do a comparative study with India. India was chosen because it shares many similarities 
with China. For example, both countries have a long and rich cultural and political history; 
large population size; vast territories; the legacies of centralized economies; and now 
economic liberalization and rapid growth. Moreover, they differ in that China is said to be 
the largest single party dictatorship in the world and India the largest democracy. 
The overall aim of my thesis is to identify the barriers to building a trusted police service 
in India and China. There is limited research on the PSB and still less in the study of police 
malpractices. There is virtually no literature on comparisons between policing in India and 
China, and still less on police malpractices. Furthermore, for China there has been very 
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little horses’ mouth research with serving police officers104. I attempted to answer the 
overarching thesis question by examining: 1/ how are the PSB and Indian police impacted 
upon by economic modernisation; 2/ to what extent are the police in China and India 
trusted by the masses; 3/ do the respective police forces carry out their duties in a fair and 
unbiased fashion; 4/ what do malpractices look like and why does it persist; and 5/ what 
are the key influencing factors for ethical decision-making at the ‘moments of truth’? – 
exploring this question from a ‘structural’ perspective (e.g. policies, culture, governance, 
impact of media, etc.) rather than from a ‘situational’ or ‘street-craft’ (e.g. suspect’s’ 
race/class/demeanour, time of day & physical environment, etc.) perspective. 
What I found is that China and India’s policing situation appears to have many similarities 
as well as differences – see table 9 below for a summary. In terms of economic 
modernisation, China and India have taken different but equally complex paths which have 
yielded material benefits for the masses and lifted millions out of absolute poverty. There 
is little doubt that China’s economic rise has been more impressive than India’s. However, 
critics continue to argue that despite the lauded economic successes inequality has grown 
in both countries. Modernisation affects traditional societal structures and communal 
values leading to cleavages between police and citizens.             
                                                          
104 The only research that I found based on interviews with PSB officers was conducted by Wang. T. and Zhang. 
S. in October 2005. They interviewed five PSB officers studying in Australia on the subject of training needs: “A 
Qualitative Study of Chinese Police Officers’ In-service Training.” International Journal of Pedagogies and 
Learning 1(2), pp.18-31, October 2005.     
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Rapid urbanisation provides fertile breeding grounds for vice, crime, disorder and 
disputes. Unsurprisingly, as in other development examples, economic growth has 
resulted in more capital being available both in the private and public domains. This has 
not only provided more opportunities and temptation for graft and rent-seeking, but the 
nature, complexity and volumes of crime and disputes have also increased. This is evident 
in the increased crime statistics of both countries. However, it would seem that the PSB 
Table 9: Summary of similarities & Differences 
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is feeling the effects of these developments more so than the Indian police when viewed 
through the prisms of the increased numbers of injuries-on-duty. This must be seen within 
the context that mass rural-urban migration is on a much greater scale than in India 
therefore a much bigger policing challenge. 
In both countries increases in wealth have not only whetted the appetite of unscrupulous 
police officials but has also increased corruption/malpractice opportunities, a potential 
contributing factor in weakening police-public relations. This is evident by both sets of 
officers bemoaning of the more challenging and less respectful relationship with the public 
since reforms. The change in this relationship seems to be more pronounced on the PSB 
than the Indian police. This is because while the Indian police has never enjoyed a great 
deal of public trust and respect where traditionally the Indian masses assiduously avoided 
interacting with the police because of its ‘colonial’ attitudes. The PSB, on the other hand, 
had enjoyed a better level of trust and respect from the Chinese masses. For China, one 
of the potential effects of economic modernisation is the “eroding of legitimacy the PSB 
had once enjoyed. For example, in the early years of the PRC, the relationship between 
the police and the public was alternatively described as ‘flesh and blood’ and ‘water and 
fish’…but the situation today has changed…the most critical problem is one of widespread 
complaints about police dereliction of duty, corruption of office, and abuse of powers. The 
once symbiotic relationship and intimate bond between the police and the masses have 
been…tested and found wanting...The public expects the police to live the Lei Feng spirit 
– totally dedicated and completely selfless. Instead, they appear to be corrupt and 
abusive. From the perspective of the police, the public is not respectful of or helpful to the 
police. The police expect the public to behave like model communist citizens, who are 
totally altruistic, completely supportive, and unfailingly respectful. Instead, they appear to 
be apathetic and antagonistic” (Wong, 2012, p.151). 
As for the Indian police, although economic reforms seem to have been less impactful in 
their relationship with the public in comparison to their Chinese counterparts, Singh (2002, 
p.63-73) noted that due to “urbanisation, increases in crime, housing problems, accidental 
and traffic deaths, growth in mass-media, transportation, communication has increased 
complexity of crime, with mass protest movements as well as organised crime groups 
being better prepared as they can track government and police activities. Increased 
197 | Page 
 
number of motor vehicles allows criminals mobility and increased difficulties for police to 
track suspects or to detect crime…industrialisation and urbanisation has led to more 
labour troubles, more slums, and opportunities for underworld and organised crime 
activities as well as potential large scale political agitations”. Resulting in even more strain 
being put on an already stretched poorly trained and poorly equipped police service. 
For both countries the value of land has rocketed and thus the associated property 
speculation, disputes, intimidation and fraud. Moreover, in China, where the authorities 
still exert a great deal of control over the ‘capitalist’ economy, the example on the 
restrictions of business fundraising is perhaps more unique. But, whatever the dispute, the 
PSB had been tasked with safe-guarding hard won economic growth and ensuring social 
and political stability. These responsibilities put PSB officers in the direct line of fire as 
they are often accused of siding with local officialdom and businesses – whether they are 
motivated by grey money or otherwise. 
Furthermore, the effects of modernisation have proved to have caused strain and stresses 
to both the PSB and the Indian police with 82% of PSB officers and 74% of Indian officers 
agreeing to this fact. These stresses can be seen in the lowering of police morale with 
62% of PSB officers and 54% of Indian officers stating that they would not wish for their 
own children to follow their footstep in joining the police. It is also very telling that in the 
Indian case the 46% who said that they would be proud if their children join the police but 
with the caveat, that only if they join under the IPS route. In regard to whether officers are 
satisfied in their job 56% of PSB officers and 77% of Indian officers said that they were. 
This might seem contradictory to the other morale question responses. However, upon 
further investigation it seems that both Indian and Chinese officers like the ‘iron rice bowl’ 
and the positional power they enjoy for protecting themselves and their families’ interests. 
Additionally, both sets of officers seem to have accepted their allocated lot in life, but they 
hold greater aspirations for their children in the new economic age than they do for 
themselves. 
Paying to become a police officer and for career/financially enhancing postings seems to 
be a common practice in both countries. It seems that this practice has a more corrosive 
effect for China because of ‘vertical collusion’ (Pei, 2016), with President Xi’s promised 
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crackdown as a potential lightening rod regarding the CCP’s recognition for something to 
be done. However, for India, because perhaps due to its long-established practice and 
cultural (both organisational and societal) acceptance, the buying of offices and postings 
has a more commercial transactional flavour where even if a large bribe is paid there is 
no guarantee of securing the desired position. Moreover, because of the fragmentation of 
loyalties between superiors and subordinates brought about by the ever-present shadows 
cast by politicians the effects of vertical collusion do not seem to have the degree of 
importance placed upon it as it does in the PRC.  
How police appointments are made is potentially a good indicator of how internal police 
organisation and governance is impacted due to the effects of economic modernisation. 
The appointment of senior officers in China had been primarily within the remit of local 
government but there has been a shift of power to the centre due to a desire to stamp out 
local corruption which has steadily increased since reform. The fact that survey result of 
38% (including all the police managers in the sample) agreeing to this development is 
further supported by the practice that non-police officials from the Disciplinary and 
Inspections Committee are placed as deputy chiefs after corruption purges in major cities. 
In India, the state government has sole responsibility for law and order and appointments 
of senior officers. However, it is enlightening that many respondents testified to the level 
of interference and micro-management of police appointments down to constables and on 
actual police operations. Indeed, Singh (2002, p.124) noted that due to brazen 
interference from politicians “the average tenure of SPs and SHOs in some states can be 
as short as 15 days to 3-4 months leading to the complete breakdown of the command 
structure”. 
In short, economic modernisation has affected police workload through increases in crime 
and disputes, and (in China’s case at least) increased police-public-confrontations and 
injuries-on-duty. These factors may also have affected morale and the leadership and 
management of the respective organisations. However, on the positive side the greater 
enthusiasm for western style techniques (e.g. community policing and public emergency 
call facilities) indicate a potential step towards greater professionalization.     
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In regard to the public trust of police, the traditional public survey data on trust indicates 
that the PSB enjoys a substantially higher level of trust from the public than the Indian 
police. But, factors such as national pride, willingness to criticise state authorities, political 
legitimacy and level of citizens’ trust of those in power, as well as, influence of the media 
all may play a part in these survey results. However, from the data available, it can be 
argued that even with all these factors taken into consideration the frequency and size of 
the sampling in favour of the PSB versus the Indian police points to potential evidence 
that the PSB is held in higher esteem and trust by Chinese citizens in contrast to the Indian 
situation. Moreover, my study also affirms this position and reveals evidence to support 
the proposition that the corrosive effects of corruption at every level and in every walks of 
life in India has eroded trust of both citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-state generally, as well 
as, trust and respect for the police in particular. The resultant situation of citizens’ 
unwillingness to interact with police or to act as witnesses may hold potential serious 
consequences for police effectiveness and community-safety. For China, my research 
indicates that there are questions that need to be answered in regard to the lack of 
willingness on the part of those participating in the research (who, according to Conflict 
Theory at least, are more likely than other members of the Chinese population to have a 
favourable impression of the PSB because they are part of the privileged elite) to engage 
with the PSB versus the UK Police and their sober assessment on the level of PSB 
misconduct. 
As to the question of whether the Chinese and Indian police act in a fair and unbiased 
fashion. My research found that both in China and India the police are not always fair and 
unbiased when it comes to the execution of their duties. In India, the “police strongly favour 
the rich and powerful including organised criminals but are discriminatory against the poor, 
needy, and down trodden in society” (Dikshit, 2000, p.87-88). They are “rude, selective 
and partisan in their enforcement of laws, are in the pockets of politicians, criminals and 
the rich with no cognisance of grievances of the poor or the uninfluenced so there is no 
redress for wrongs done to them” (Singh, 2002, p.117). This state of affairs has led to what 
“many within the Indian police call the ‘snake reflex’ where the instinct of the masses 
acquired and engrained into their psyche over time is one of distrust and avoidance of the 
police” (Add SP 25 years of service). In China, the police profile the out-group just like 
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police forces all over the world in order to do their job. However, the PSB does not only 
patrol the borderline between the in-group and the out-group but they are in fact very much 
part of the in-group’s ruling elite. This makes them not merely tools of the ruling elite, as 
in the case of the Indian police, but they are in fact at the very core of the Chinese system 
of government and power. 
In regard to what police corruption and malpractices look like and why they persist. I found 
that many of the tricks-of-the-trade in relation to bribery is very similar, although in India it 
can be said to be more insidious and less subtle. Moreover, police brutality and the culture 
of using excessive force is also similar in both countries except that in India the practice 
of staging encounters has become almost an unofficial policy where ‘elimination rather 
than conviction’ is suggested to be more or less tolerated by politicians, the masses and 
the media. In contrast, there seems to be a degree of intolerance toward 
unlawful/excessive police violence among the Chinese masses. The reasons for the 
persistence of police corruption and malpractices lay in many factors. First of which is that 
police in India, similar to China, are involved in many more aspects of the daily lives of the 
population than is expected in western societies, thus affording them more opportunities 
for confrontation and corruption. However, it can be argued that in China clamp downs by 
central government have appeared to reduce, in metropolitan areas at least, these 
interactions (e.g. tax collection and leveraging fines to fund police operations, etc.) and 
hence corruption opportunities. 
Secondly, whilst in China the wide ranging administrative powers and attitude of father 
versus child derived from the Mao era continue to play a part in the PSB’s culture and 
ways-of-working. In India, similarly, the legacy of the British colonial policing system and 
its attitudes still writ large in the daily lives of the masses because of the influence it has 
over the behaviour and values of the average Indian policeman, where the master versus 
servant relationship still dominates. In both countries, the positional power of senior 
officers is greater than that of the state prosecutors. This situation may have a bearing on 
the effects of decision-making especially as there is a lack of a systematic transparency 
and accountability in the system. Moreover, in both forces there seems to be a culture of 
tolerance towards corruption/malpractices. The police survey indicates that 52% of PSB 
officers and 49% of Indian officers would ignore bribe-taking with 39% of PSB officers and 
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41% of Indian officers ignoring unlawful beatings. Indeed, whilst 39% of PSB officers and 
51% of Indian officers said that they would not ignore it if they see a colleague taking a 
bribe and 52% of PSB officers and 59% of Indian officers said that they would not ignore 
it if they see a colleague using unlawful force. The caveat is that most would not report it 
for a myriad of reasons not least because of the concerns of being alienated as a “snitch” 
or not wanting a colleague to “lose his livelihood”. Furthermore, my personal experience 
of the universal police culture of ‘protecting your ass’ and the desire to ‘play it safe’ in 
answering these types of questions would lead the author to suggest that the percentages 
of officers saying that they would ‘intervene’ is more likely to be much lower in reality than 
the result suggests. 
Thirdly, in China, the PSB is the eyes, ears, teeth and claws of the state/CCP and therefore 
not only the tool of the political elite but senior officers are part and parcel of the ruling 
elite. Consequently, the politicisation of police and criminalisation of politics seems to be 
playing a part in both India and China, as well as, the potential risk for the proper 
administration of justice by the rule of man rather than through the rule of law. However, 
in China this is being tackled by the central government’s recent efforts to exert greater 
control over the police. In contrast, in India, there seems to be little appetite by the political 
classes for police reforms. The desire by some politicians to directly control the strong arm 
of the state to affect their personal goals and further their own interests has led to the loss 
of effective police leadership due to frequent transfers of those not willing to tow the party 
line. Thus, resulting in the lower ranks developing loyalties to politicians rather than to their 
own superiors. Consequently, there is an us versus them mentality between officers and 
men, and distrust between superiors and subordinates. Moreover, the “Indian police has 
remained static and stagnated whilst society is constantly changing. There is a lack of a 
political will to improve the quality of the police. In most of the states there is not the 
adequate funds for the police to meet 21st century challenges while those states that have 
the resources have no will power to make their police modern and independent” (Dickshit, 
2000, p.39-40). This lack of adequate funding and the political will to transform the police 
has led to a great deal of stress and discontent within the organisation where the attitude 
that if “no one cares” then “why should I” prevails. Poor morale no doubt also contributes 
to the reinforcement of the culture of abuse and apathy. Additionally, in India, the 
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criminalisation of politics in recent years has exaggerated the officer and men divide and 
castes a darker shadow over the politicisation of policing.  
Finally, in both countries there is a culture of tolerance within the police organisations 
towards corruption/malpractices. However, in India the tolerance for bribe-giving and 
bribe-taking, and other forms of corruption is underscored by the notion of jugaad in Indian 
society. The desire to get a quick-fix and taking short cuts to be practical has meant that 
corruption is rife in many walks of Indian life.  
One of the main focuses of my research is an attempt to identify the structural/institutional 
factors (e.g. policies, culture, governance, impact of media, etc.) that may influence ethical 
decision-making rather than the situational factors (e.g. suspect’s’ race/class/ demeanour, 
time of day & physical environment, etc.) that affect an officer’s operational street-craft, 
and for which has traditionally been the focus of research in this area. My research found 
that for China, the majority of officers in the sample, irrespective of rank, place the effects 
of government legislations and central directives and the increase of media criticism as 
key influencers to ethical decision-making. With the rank and file officers feeling the effects 
of the PSB’s target-based performance management system, the lack of an independent 
complaint investigation/supervision process, and the increased expectation of the Chinese 
public more so than managers. This picture reflects the fact that junior officers are at the 
sharp-end of policing and it is they who would most likely be the subject of public 
expectations and consequential complaints for failing and the internal pressures to 
achieve the arrest and clear-up targets that is now a feature of policing in post-economic 
reform China. Additionally, all officers believe that the Chinese public holds them in lower 
esteem than prior to reform. With junior officers being frustrated by the guianxi-based 
progression culture and a constant fear of losing their job if they make a mistake 
(especially if it is caught on camera) or by upsetting a powerful cadre. Senior officers, on 
the other hand, are more concerned with their organisation’s reputation, its effectiveness, 
the burden of increasing workload, and the constant central-local power dynamics. 
In contrast, for Indian officers, although they too are feeling in similar ways as PSB officers 
regarding the pressures and stresses brought about by their countries’ economic rise, 
urbanisation, the ubiquitous of the mobile smart phone and social media. They seem to 
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be less concerned about government policies, laws and regulations or organisational 
systems but are more influenced by their poor pay and working conditions, frequent 
political interference in their daily duties and postings, low morale due to these pressures 
and their organisational culture in their decision-making. Moreover, although junior Indian 
officers are similarly frustrated as junior PSB officers in the need for connections or 
financial payments to enhance their promotion and ‘good posting’ prospects. The survey 
and my overall research indicate that factors such as the politicisation of police and the 
criminalisation of politics and the divide between managers and subordinates means that 
there is a real risk that they are more susceptible to the rule-by-man than their PSB 
counterparts in ethical decision-making.  
In sum, the barriers to building a trusted police service in China and India include: Firstly, 
the politicisation of police and the associated impact of the criminalisation of politics for 
both countries, leading to a tendency in favour of the rule-by-man rather than the rule-of-
law. However, it can be argued that the Indian police seem to be more prone to this 
tendency than its PSB counterparts. Secondly, historical cultural legacy of master versus 
servant (India) and father versus child (China) relationship between police and the masses 
is also one of these barriers. The cultural traits engendered by this legacy contribute to 
reinforcing the behaviour and attitudes of police officers in both countries to favour 
disregarding rather than protecting/safeguarding their citizens’ rights, as well as, a 
preference for substantive justice over procedural justice. Indeed, in India the attitude is 
that no matter what actually happens on the ground (e.g. fake encounters) but as long as 
the paperwork is in order then that is the most important thing to get right. The focus on 
presenting a ‘legitimate’ cover story rather than being transparent and openly learning 
from mistakes is also part of the culture found in both organisations. Furthermore, the 
organisational culture-of-tolerance towards corruption/malpractices can be said to be an 
extension of the master/servant and father/child effects and consequences. Finally, 
another barrier I identified is the effect of poor morale in both police forces. However, it 
would seem that this is more acute in India’s police due no least to the apathy and 
resentments caused by poor pay and working conditions. This is even more so for the 
rank and file personnel who feel that they are not cared for and that “everyone is only 
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looking after number one”. In conclusion, as a consequence, these barriers have 
contributed to the increasing alienation and distrust of the Chinese and Indian police.  
 
6. Reflections: 
In terms of how to overcome these barriers, speaking from my own experience of 
designing, leading/implementing and advising multi-national companies and government 
agencies (including police forces) around the world on organisational transformation. The 
first critical success factor is to create the environment for success and sustaining change. 
Police organisations do not work in a vacuum, they work within an environment where the 
tone and its values are created largely by the ruling elite.  As de Guzman and Kumar (2011, 
p.405) pointed out, “police practices will reflect, to some extent, their biases for the 
dominant class’ views. Thus, when the dominant class is benevolent and upright, the 
police will uphold such values in their practices. Alternatively, when the dominant class is 
malevolent or corrupt, such malignant characters would be manifested in the existing 
police practices”. 
Consequently, police reform stands a better chance of success if the ruling class is itself 
willing to reform into a less corrupt, more benevolent and caring establishment that leads 
by example. Moreover, my research showed that police (even corrupt police) are weary 
of traditional and social media criticisms. Consequently, the traditional media and the 
ordinary masses themselves have to create and sustain an environment of intolerance 
toward corruption/malpractices. Otherwise, politicians and police alike would use the aged 
old excuse that ‘society gets the police it deserves’.  
In parallel to societal and political changes, the Chinese and Indian police organisations 
themselves can effect change by living and breathing the proper values of the policing 
principles of fairness, equity and equality both internally and in their interactions with the 
public. Therefore, the second critical success factor is creating a clear set of organisational 
values and behaviour that transform the police from a ‘force’ into a ‘service’. These values 
and behaviour must be cascaded throughout the organisation and role modelled by its 
leaders and reinforced through replicating and threading throughout its management and 
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operational processes, ways of working and standard operating procedures. A clear 
system of sanctions and rewards aligned to the desired values is also important to 
reinforce the organisational processes from recruitment through to promotion and 
dismissal. Decision-making transparency and clear lines of accountability are also needed 
within the organisation so that credit for things done well as well as opportunities to learn 
lessons from failures for continuous improvement purposes and holding errant individuals 
to account.   
Furthermore, the other critical success factor is the use of technology to reinforce and 
support processes and procedures. This does not only include the more obvious use of 
body cameras or CCTVs in police facilities to ensure no abuse takes place but also 
technology for capturing citizens’ initial reports and for evidence gathering. Such systems 
will not only improve efficiency, effectiveness, standardisation and professionalization of 
police practices but they also provide real-time case decision-making data and support 
and provide a secure audit trail for management monitoring and review thus making abuse 
harder to hide. Technology and its accrued databases will also enable the provision of 
statistical models and analysis for understanding wider patterns as well as cause and 
effects thus assisting management decision-making in the deployment of scarce 
resources, performance monitoring and identifying patterns of abuse. 
Moreover, in both countries there seem to be a need for more ‘fit for purpose’ training 
programmes to equip their personnel with the right skills and competencies for a more 
professionalised service in the modern world. These training programmes need to 
encompass not only Psychomotor (i.e. physical skills such as the use of restraining 
techniques that requires the use of minimum force, public order control, etc.) and Cognitive 
(knowledge of laws and regulations, etc.) domains of learning, but also Affective (attitudes, 
values, empathy, etc.) domains as well. However, especially in the case of India, the basic 
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hygiene factor105 situations of poor pay and working conditions as well as motivators106 for 
job satisfaction also need to be addressed if they are to get the best out of their human 
capital. 
Finally, the need for external independent oversight is extremely important. The 
establishment of external and independent governmental police monitoring bodies as well 
as non-governmental but statutory citizen-based monitoring and advocacy groups - 
especially for the more deprived and least powerful sections of society – is another key 
success factor. These bodies have a role to play in ensuring compliance to the principles 
of fairness, equity and equality in the policing of India and China. 
In short, reform can only succeed if the ruling elites in these two countries desire it, have 
the will power to role model the right behaviour and be willing to sustain changes. They 
need to create an environment that is conducive to allowing their police to embrace the 
appropriate virtues and practices and to become more professionalized. The police 
leaders themselves need to step up to the challenge and articulate and live the principles 
of fairness, equity and equality in all that they do. Moreover, the need to thread these 
values into the organisations’ every process, operating procedures and ways of working 
as well as introduce the enabling technologies and training programmes to instil these 
values into the muscle memory of their personnel is key. However, none of this would 
work if the necessary hygiene and motivational factors (especially in the case of India) 
were not in place to encourage and sustain the required changes. Finally, external 
independent oversight and monitoring is a structural success factor needed in order to 
keep the police and the politicians honest. 
If I were to be asked which of these countries would stand a better chance of reforming its 
police service to one that is less corrupt and thus enjoy a better level of public trust? From 
                                                          
105 Herzberg (1959) constructed a two-dimensional paradigm of factors affecting people's attitudes about work. 
He concluded that such factors as company policy, supervision, interpersonal relations, working conditions, and 
salary are hygiene factors rather than motivators. According to the theory, the absence of hygiene factors can 
create job dissatisfaction, but their presence does not motivate or create satisfaction.  
106104 In 1954, Maslow introduced his theory about how people satisfy various personal needs in the context of 
their work. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is often illustrated as a pyramid with the survival need at the broad-
based bottom and the self-actualization need at the narrow top.  
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my personal observation, I would speculate that China might have an edge over India. 
Sun and Johnson (2009, p.14) argued that India's weak state, with its mix of elite 
accessibility, political opportunities, and economic scarcity, has simply produced 
distinctive types of corruption not less of it when compared to China's stronger state, elite 
autonomy, scarce political opportunities, and greater economic opportunities. These 
overall contrasts help us understand why a poor democracy has not outperformed a 
developmental autocracy in terms of corruption control. Economic underdevelopment, it 
seems, undermines democracy's anticorruption properties not just through material 
scarcity, but also because it is both effect and cause of weaknesses of key economic 
institutions and guarantees. Those factors encourage corruption that is extensive, 
fragmented, and therefore disruptive in form. Not surprisingly, the public has little trust in 
government generally, and the net impact of corruption on legitimacy of particular parties 
is inconsequential. “A highly fractured society such as India's also weakens "rational public 
opinion" as group identities, educational disparities, and other socioeconomic contrasts 
influence political awareness”. Moreover, Kumar argued that “India would not succeed in 
stamping out corruption unless Indian society tackles the exploitative nature of caste and 
hierarchy” (2014, p.313). 
In China, Sun and Johnson (2009, p.14-15) argued that “the monopoly of the CCP means 
it takes the major blame for the corruption of its rank and file officials. The CCP regime 
may tolerate few domestic critics, but it still suffers when frequent comparisons are made 
against the relatively clean and egalitarian Mao era on the one hand, and mature liberal 
democracies on the other. The former comparison undermines the contemporary CCP's 
credibility from the left while the latter chips away from the right. Farmers and downsized 
workers of state enterprises have expressed pent-up frustration through riots; surveys 
reflect their deplorable transformation from the core social base of the CCP to the prime 
victims of inequality and corruption since the 1990s. Land grabs by rural officials have 
become common, while in state enterprises mismanagement and insider privatization lead 
to bankruptcies and the loss of jobs. Critics abroad and some intellectuals at home, point 
to the CCP monopoly as the root cause of corruption”. Nevertheless, “regime legitimacy 
has not been critically undermined by corruption in post-Mao China, as in India, one 
reason is sheer pervasiveness. Corruption has become mostly materially based, more 
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accessible, and less exclusive than in the early years of economic reform and is ironically 
less divisive. Contemporary corruption, moreover, is no longer seen as directly caused by 
central policies, but more as errant behavior by local officials. In fact, when local protesters 
complain about localized injustices, they are more likely to demand that central policies 
be upheld and not distorted, nor that they be changed”. 
Moreover, Bardhan (2014, p.3) argued that corruption is “implicated or built-in more into 
the Indian structure of institutions and practices: (1) Elections are highly, and increasingly, 
expensive in India. The typical parliamentary constituency has 60,000 voters in the UK, 
1.3 million in India. Coverage of such a large and increasing population size in far-flung 
constituencies requires galloping transportation and mobilization costs. In addition, 
political clientelism, with parties providing private goods (clothing, TV, cash, etc.) to some 
groups in exchange for their promised votes, can also be costly. Raising the large election 
funds, particularly when the legal limits on corporate donations are ridiculously low, often 
leads politicians to corrupt quid pro quo deals. (2) The current system of bureaucratic 
transfers and postings in India is a major source of illicit income of politicians in state 
secretariats. In general, career promotion for officers in India depends more on seniority 
than on performance, so an officer has the incentive to maximise his or her loot in the 
short period of local posting before transfer. The Chinese governance system ‘limits local 
official corruption by giving the local official more of a stake in the local economic 
performance. Chances of career promotion improve if the local area under his jurisdiction 
grows faster (and yields more tax revenue). So even when he steals, he takes care, in his 
own self-interest that the general economic performance of the area does not suffer too 
much. (3) The Chinese system is politically more centralized than the Indian system, so 
the lines of authority are better defined and streamlined. In India, decision-making 
authority is often more fragmented, as a result of which there may be more cases of 
multiple veto powers in operation. So unlike in China there is more uncertainty around 
corruption in India: the bribe-giver is never sure, even after the payment, if and when the 
job will get done. (4) Indian society is much more heterogeneous and stratified than the 
Chinese, and that can have ramifications for corruption. Even assuming that people in all 
social groups have similar propensities towards honesty or dishonesty, there may be 
socio-economic reasons why in equilibrium in some cases the Indian social minorities may 
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be found to be involved in or supporting ‘corrupt’ activities, sometimes even more than the 
upper castes”.  
Bardhan argued that there are two possible reasons for this phenomenon one has to do 
with differential access to social networks. The upper castes having been in “positions of 
power and privilege for centuries have well-developed and well-oiled networks” which their 
members can utilise in fixing problems they face or getting jobs and contracts for their 
relatives and friends. By and large, the lower castes “lack such lucrative and powerful 
networks”. In such situations, it is quite possible that an “upwardly mobile lower-caste 
person may try to use money as a substitute for (the missing) network in getting things 
done. The latter will be called corruption, but the upper-caste use of connections instead 
of money for similar objectives is often not described as corruption”. The absence of 
network may also mean that “corrupt low-caste people get caught more often than equally 
dishonest but more protected upper-caste people”. Furthermore, with the “increasing 
ethnification of politics, for social groups long subject to humiliation, it may be quite 
understandable that dignity politics often trump good governance. So, it is not uncommon 
that a low-caste leader widely known as corrupt gets elected by his fellow caste members, 
election after election, because these leaders in other ways have uplifted the self-esteem 
and dignity of whole groups of people. The leaders’ corruption may even be looked upon 
with an indulgent eye: all these years the upper castes have looted public money maybe 
it is now “our turn”. Such symbolic group self-assertion in politics is quite prevalent in north 
India, where the rise of the historically subordinate groups is relatively recent (in south 
India where self-respect movements are much older, good governance on the part of the 
low-caste leaders is more often in demand). In a study of the caste politics of UP of over 
100 electoral jurisdictions between early 1980s and late 1990s, Banerjee and Pande 
(2009) provide evidence to show a trade-off between caste-loyalty and quality of 
politicians. They find that the effect of increased ethnification on lowering the quality of 
politicians was stronger in jurisdictions where the demographic share of lower caste 
groups was larger” (Ibid., p.4). 
Moreover, in addition to the political and social barriers above, the PSB has less of an ‘us 
and them’ divide between officers and men; they enjoy a flatter organisational structure 
where position of authority and responsibility does not always equate to official rank 
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hierarchy. This along with a more egalitarian communist ethos makes the PSB a less 
differential organisation than the Indian police in comparison. It is also a fact that the 
Chinese PSB is starting from a stronger position in regard to the level of trust they already 
enjoy from their fellow citizens than their Indian counterparts. All these factors together 
with the historical data point that in the case of economic transformation China has clearly 
outperformed India in increasing the wealth of its citizens and lifting a vast swath of its 
people out of absolute poverty in a very short time. This achievement is no doubt largely 
due to the single-minded focus of the CCP’s strong authoritarian central leadership. 
Indeed, if one looks back at the mass campaigns that were such a feature of the Mao era 
and the subsequent emulations of mass anti-crime campaigns in more recent years then 
it is hard to argue that mass mobilisation of both government machinery and the masses 
by the CCP is extremely impressive. Consequently, it may be said that having a “strong 
centralized authoritarian state” such as China and if the political will and leadership exists, 
then it will stand a better chance of reforming its police in contrast to the fragmented 
clientele politics of India where the police are in state hands rather than in central 
government hands. Therefore, even if there were a central political will, the structural 
political set up of India would be extremely difficult to overcome. 
My final reflections relate to the fact that this PhD thesis came about more by accident 
than by design because starting a PhD at the age of fifty-four years was certainly not part 
of this student’s life plan. However, when I met Professor Nolan at the roundtable 
discussion on the subject of the ‘socialist rule of law’ and our subsequent conversations it 
sparked my interest in the subject. The research journey has luckily gone much more 
smoothly than I had anticipated or hoped. This is largely down to good fortunes and the 
kindness of those who went out of their way to help in my research because they felt that 
it would be a worthwhile exercise and an “exciting” subject. I found that having the kinds 
of policing and management consulting experiences and skills that I had gained in my 
professional life together with my cross-cultural perspective gained from my personal life 
helped a great deal in data gathering and insight generation. Moreover, as a trained police 
investigator and management consultant a core competence is to ask awkward and 
sensitive questions in a way that is not threatening nor judgemental. Indeed, having the 
thick skin to ask the ‘naive’ questions is an important art of interrogation. This was 
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highlighted when I first tested out my police questionnaire in India with a very ‘streetwise’ 
crime journalist who when I asked what a police officer would do facing a bribery situation. 
He replied, “that is a really childish question, off course all cops would take bribes if 
offered, most would go out of their way to extract it.” This response not only gave me the 
confidence to ask these types of questions openly during the rest of my fieldwork in India, 
but it also gave me an insight into the reality of the situation on the ground, from someone 
who was living it on a daily basis. 
In terms of research outcomes, I believe that my research has potentially contributed 
knowledge to this under-studied area in several ways. The first of these contributions is to 
provide a broader and deeper understanding of both the Chinese and Indian police forces’ 
organisational and professional culture from an inside-out, bottom-up and from the 
‘horses’ mouth’ perspective. Second, is that I may have enriched current insights 
regarding public perception and trust level of police in India (from both members of the 
elite as well as the general population’s viewpoints) and China (from the country’s future 
elites’ perspective). Third, is on what police corruption and malpractices look like and why 
it persists in these two countries. Fourth, is the factors influencing decision-making at the 
moments of truth from a structural rather than a street-craft or situational perspective. 
Finally, whilst these subject areas may be sound contributions but when added to the fact 
that they are done as a comparative study then they may potentially provide fellow 
scholars with a new perspective.  
However, that said, the limitations of qualitative studies for generalisation purposes are 
well known. Therefore, my survey findings on decision-making factors may act as pointers 




























































Appendix 2: Moments of Truth vs. opportunity for 
police malpractice   






3.1 Chinese Student Survey Result                                                                                                                                                                                      
Total Number of respondents = 31. Age: 23 - 29 yrs (17); 30 - 40 yrs (12); 40+yrs (2). Sex: 16 (Female); 11 (Male); 4 
(Unstated) 
Do you have a close friend or member of family in the Chinese Police (PSB)? 
Why do you think people join the PSB?  
In your opinion, PSB officers (please tick just one statement): 
In comparison to the British Police how would you rate PSB Officers (please tick one option only):  
In China, have you, a member of your family or a friend ever paid 
a bribe to a police officer? 
*N.B. Yes to experience of paying bribes = 22.4% 
Appendix 3: Statistical results of public (student) and police surveys  
In your opinion, how  frequently does the Chinese PSB use excessive/unnecessary force in comparison to the British 
Police? 


















Please circle the person (in each comparison pair) you believe a PSB officer would treat better during a dispute: 
Frequency of choices based on 24 responses – No Response (7)  
3.2 Indian Student Survey Results   
Total Number of respondents = 24. Age: Under 20 yrs (2); 24-27 yrs (12); 30-40 yrs (8); 40+yrs (2). Sex: 14 (Female); 10 
(Male) 
Do you have a close friend or member of your family in the Police?    
Why do you think people join the Police?                               
In your opinion, Indian police officers (please tick just one statement): 
In comparison to the British Police how would you rate Indian Police Officers (please tick one option only): 
In India, have you, a member of your family or a friend ever paid a bribe to a police officer? 
*N.B. Yes to experience of paying bribes = 74.88%. 
In your opinion, how frequently does the Indian Police use excessive/unnecessary force in comparison to the British Police?  




How would you rate the status of the basic level Indian police officer? Please indicate below which job is closest to the status 
of a police officer in India – please tick one only: 
An Indian officer see his colleague steal some jewellery when reporting a burglary in a jewellery shop. Do you think this officer 
would? 
The Jewellery Store Owner above suspect that the officers had stolen from his shop so he reports it to their superiors. Do you 
think (please tick one): 
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An officer walk into the police station and see that some of his colleagues are beating up a prisoner in order to get a 
confession. Do you think this officer will (please tick one): 
Please indicate below which incidences you would involve the police in the UK verses in India   
1 = Definitely involve police;    2 = May involve police;    3 = Definitely Not involve police    
                                                                                                       Total Score: UK : 
1(164); 2(44); 3(8). India: 1(102); 2(72); 3(42) 
Frequency of choices based on 23 responses – No Response (1) 
Please circle the person (in each comparison pair) you believe an officer would treat better during a dispute: 





Appendix 3.3 Police Survey Results: 
Who would be favoured in a dispute - China Who would be favoured in a dispute - India 
(China) Who has more say these days in appointing senior officers? Central Government has more say than Local 
Government these days:  
(India) who has more say these days in appointing senior officers (e.g. SP and above)? 
(India) How happy are you in your work? Most police officers are satisfied in their job because it has high social status and it’s 
a job for life    
(China) How happy are you in your work? Most police officers are satisfied in their job because it has high social status and 
it’s a job for life    
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